CHAPTER VII.

OF RETENTION.

I. Contemplation.

THE next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progress toward knowledge, is that which is called retention, or the keeping of those simple ideas which from sensation or reflection it hath received. This is done in two ways; first, by keeping the idea, which is conceived, for some time actually in view; which is called contemplation.

II. Memory.

The other way is the power to revive again in our minds those ideas which after imprinting have disappeared, or have been as it were laid aside out of sight; and thus we do when we conceive heat or light, yellow or sweet, the object being removed. This is memory, which is, as it were, the storehouse of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas ander view and consideration at once, it was necessary to have a repository to lay up those ideas, which at another time it might have use of. But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions in the mind, which cease to be any thing when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in the repository of the memory signifies no more than this, that the mind has a power, in many cases, to revive perceptions which it once had, with this additional perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this sense it is, that our ideas are said to be in our memories, when indeed they are ac

tually no where, but only there is an ability in the mind when it will, to revive them again, and, as it were, paint them anew on itself, though some with more, some with less difficulty; some more lively, and others more obscurely. And thus it is, by the assistance of this faculty, that we are to have all those ideas in our understandings, which though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in sight and make appear again, and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those sensible qualities which first imprinted them there.

The word memory is not employed uniformly in the same precise sense; but it always expresses some modification of that faculty, which enables us to treasure up, and preserve for future use, the knowledge we acquire; a faculty which is obviously the great foundation of all intellectual improvement, and without which, no advantage could be derived from the most enlarged experience. This faculty implies two things; a capacity of retaining knowledge; and a power of recalling it to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use. The word memory is sometimes employed to express the capacity, and sometimes the power. When we speak of a retentive memory, we use it in the former sense; when of a ready memory, in the latter.

The various particulars which compose our stock of knowledge, are from time to time, recalled to our thoughts, in one of two ways; sometimes they recur to us spontaneously, or at least, without any interference on our part ; in other cases, they are recalled, in consequence of an .effort of our will. For the former operation of the mind, we have no appropriated name in our language, distinct from Memory. The latter, too, is often called by the same name, but is more properly distinguished by the word Recollection.

III. Attention, Repetition, Pleasure and Pain, fix Ideas.

Attention and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory but those which naturally at first make the deepest and most lasting impressions, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain. The great business of the senses being to make us take notice of what hurts or what benefits the body, it is wisely order. ed by nature that pain should accompany the reception of several ideas; which supplying the place of consideration and reasoning in children, and acting quicker than consideration in grown men, makes both the old and young avoid painful objects, with that haste which is necessary for their preservation; and, in both, settles in the memory a caution for the future.

IV. Two defects in the Memory, Oblivion and Slowness.

Memory in an intellectual creature, is necessary in the next degree to perception. It is of so great moment, that where it is wanting, all the rest of our faculties are in a great measure useless; and we, in our thoughts, reasonings, and knowledge, could not proceed beyond present objects, were it not for the assistance of our memories, wherein there may be two defects.

First, That it loses the idea quite, and so far produces perfect ignorance; for since we can know nothing farther than we have the idea of it, when that is gone, we are in perfect ignorance.

Secondly, That it moves slowly, and retrieves not the ideas that it has, and are laid up in store, quick enough

This, if it be to a great

to serve the mind upon occasion. degree, is stupidity; and he who, through this default in his memory, has not the ideas that are really preserved

there ready at hand, when need and occasion call for them, might almost as well be without them, since they serve him to little purpose. The dull man who loses the opportunity, whilst he is seeking in his mind for those ideas that should serve his turn, is not much more happy in his knowledge than one who is perfectly ignorant. It is the business therefore of the memory to furnish to the mind those dormant ideas which it has present occasion for in the having them at hand on all occasions consists that which we call invention, fancy, and quickness of parts.

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V.. Of the Improvement of Memory.

The improvement of which the mind is susceptible by culture, is more remarkable, perhaps, in the case of memory, than in that of any other of our faculties.

Of one sort of culture, of which memory is susceptible in a very striking degree, no explanation can be given ; it is the improvement which the original faculty acquires by mere exercise; or in other words, the tendency which practice has to increase our natural facility of association. This effect of practice upon the memory, seems to be an ultimate law of our nature, or rather, to be a particular instance of that general law, that all our powers, both of body and mind, may be strengthened, by applying them to their proper purposes.

Besides, however, the improvement which memory admits of, in consequence of the effects of exercise on the original faculty, it may be greatly aided in its operations, by those expedients which reason and experience suggest, for employing it to the best advantage. These expedients furnish a curious subject of philosophical examination : perhaps, too, the inquiry may not be altogether without use; for, although our principal resources for assisting

the memory be suggested by nature, yet it is reasonable to think, that in this, as in similar cases, by following out systematically the hints which she suggests to us, a farther preparation may be made for our intellectual improvement.

Every person must have remarked, in entering upon any new species of study, the difficulty in treasuring up in the memory its elementary principles, and the growing facility which he acquires in this respect, as his knowledge becomes more extensive. By analyzing the different causes which concur in producing this facility, we may, perhaps, be led to some conclusions which may admit of a practical application.

1. In every science, the ideas about which it is peculiarly conversant are connected together by some particular associating principle; in one science, for example, by associations founded on the relation of cause and effect; in another, by associations founded on the relations of mathematical truths; in a third, by associations founded on contiguity in place or time. Hence one cause of the gradual improvement of memory with respect to the familiar objects of our knowledge; for whatever be the prevailing associating principle among the ideas about which we are habitually occupied, it must necessarily acquire additional strength from our favourite study.

2. In proportion as a science becomes more familiar to us, we acquire a greater command of attention with respect to the objects with which it is conversant; for information which we already possess, gives us an interest in every new truth, and every new fact, which have any relation to it. In most cases, our habits of inattention may be traced to a want of curiosity; and therefore such habits are to be corrected, not by endeavouring to force the attention in particular instances, but by gradually learning to place the ideas which we wish to remember, in an interesting point of view.