much diligence to put down, as exertion on the other hand to build up.

CHAPTER XVI.

MANY advantages are gained in this system, in regard to the acquirement of a knowledge of words. The scholar is not only led to search out the definitions of various words, but also to see their situation, relation, orthography, punctuation and proper use.

It hardly need be mentioned that we see already too many trying to aggrandize a low and grovelling style, or more properly perhaps, light and unmeaning, by searching out and bringing in hard sounded words without judgment or reason; as though uncommon and unfamiliar noises constituted good sense and a learned style. Who, we ask, is not capable of bringing a tone from a harp ? yet it does not follow thence, that any and every person can bring music? And, I verily believe, that the present mode of abstracting words from the Dictionary for the study of the youth, is about as conducive to profit, as the sounding of notes at random, would be to the learning of a well harmonized tune. "It often happens," says Locke, "that men even when they would apply themselves to an attentive consideration, do set their thoughts more on words than things, nay, because words, many of them, are learned before the ideas are known, for which they stand; therefore, some, not only children, but men, speak several words, no otherwise than parrots do, only because they have learned them, and have been accustomed to those sounds."

This affectation in writing, if I may so term it, will always be found in those who neglect to become familiar with a good style when young, taking but a cursory view

of distinguished writings, and trying to imitate them without exercise or study.

CHAPTER XVIII.

If we place before the student the thoughts or ideas of another, expressed with ease and propriety, and require of him a transposition of the same, he cannot avoid seeing how certain words are made the signs of particular or general ideas; and the abuse of language, of men having names in their mouths, without any determinate ideas in their minds, whereof they are signs, or the failure of conveying their ideas with quickness and ease, for the want of distinct names for their complex ones, could seldom take place.

CONCLUSION.

IN addition to what has already been adduced, I shall furthermore briefly consider, 1st. The expediency of themes 2d. The natural tendency of rules. 3d. Influence of habit. 4th. Imitation. 5th. Taste, how improved. 6th. Conversation. 7th. Reading. And 8th. Grammar and Rhetoric.

I. Expediency of Themes.

One would suppose, who was divested of all prejudice either for or against, that the present age was very tenacious to the old sentiment of innate ideas; and had set the youth "in toto" to search out those latent principles that nature had deposited in their souls.

Locke has, in his Treatise on Education, very forcibly touched on this subject, to which we neither can add, nor take from. "And here the poor lad, who wants knowledge of those things he speaks of, which is to be had only from time and observation, must set his invention on the rack, to say something, when he knows nothing, which is a sort of Egyptian tyranny, to bid them make bricks, who have not yet any of the materials. And therefore it is usual in such cases for the poor children to go to those of higher forms with this petition, "Pray give me a little sense ;" which, whether it be more reasonable or more ridiculous is not easy to determine. Before a man can be in any capacity to speak on any subject, it is necessary to be acquainted with it; or else it is as foolish to set him to discourse of it, as to set a blind man to talk of colours or a deaf man of musick. And would you not think him a little cracked, who would require another to make an argument on a moot point, who understands nothing of our laws? And what, I pray, do school boys understand, concerning those matters which are used to be proposed to them in their themes, as subjects to discourse on, to whet and exercise their fancies."

II. Natural tendency of Rules.

Rules, unless they are formed for the acquirement of knowledge, in a manner which we understand, or for the proper disposal of that, which we knowingly possess, tend more to perplex, than aid or instruct.

III. Influence of Habit.

Habit, is that aptitude or disposition, either in mind or body, to perform an act with more than natural ease; acquired by the frequent repetition of the same act.

"The power of habit," says Dr. Beattie, "in forming rational beings to virtue or vice, to elegant or rustic man

ners to attention or inattention, to idleness, to temperance or sensuality, to passionateness or forbearance, to manual dexterity or the want of it, is universally acknowledged. Something no doubt depends.on the peculiar constitutions of different minds and something too perhaps on the structure and temperament of different bodies; but in fashioning the character, and giving impulse and discretion to genius, the influence of habit is certainly very great. And if doing a thing frequently, did not breed an inclination to do it, the improvement of our nature would be impossible, and we could hardly be said to be moral beings."

I question much whether my sanity would not be doubted, were I to contend that the habit of reciting rhetorical and grammatical rules produced that vast variety of intellectual beauty extant in the world? But questions the learned youth, "Cannot I write a letter? Have I not been through the grammar three times, parsed in blank verse, and answered all the questions in Blair's Rhetoric ?" Yes, my friend, it must be confessed that you have a very good government, although nothing to govern; and had you taken as much pains to accumulate the requisite materials of knowledge, as you have in acquiring rules to govern that which you have not, you might have been in a fair way to usefulness. But how the habit of reciting these rules with ease, is to get you into the habit of composing and conveying your thoughts with ease and elegance, is not so easy to determine.

This, however, we will leave to the wisdom of the instructor, presuming that his acquaintance with the powers and operations of the mind is sufficient, to lead him forward in placing before the youthful mind those things to study, that may be useful for it to be in the habit of attending to for,

"Usus promptos facit."

IV. Imitation.

“We are all a set of chameleons," says a philosopher, “ that still take a tincture from things near us; nor is it to be wondered at in children, who better understand what they see than what they hear."

'Some may be ready to repeat-" Imitatores! servum pecus." I can by no means justify the "servile copyist” alluded to by Horace, who introduces himself among the learned as the Daw among the Peacocks; but "imitation, so far as it is discoverable in this plan of instruction, cannot be but approved. For, we ask, in what other way do our youth learn their various lessons, our young men their trades as mechanics or artists, than by imitation ? how did the Grecian orator, Demosthenes, perfect his style of writing but by imitation ? He even transcribed the history of Thucydides eight or ten times, to acquire his happy mode of communicating his thoughts. But, does it follow hence that the result of imitation, so far as this system allows, is nothing more than a faculty of doing certain things in a way precisely as some of our predecessors have done? No-no more, than that, an inoculated scion will only bring forth the same fruit that the tree produces into which it is engrafted.

When there are natural connexions between words and ideas, and nature produces one with the other; or when the mind comes into being stocked with innate principles, which, like golden ore in the earth, to be possessed requires our digging,-then imitation may be dispensed with, and a child brought up in solitude, recluse from the sphere of human action, would have as flattering prospects of success, as he who explores and rummages the world. But as nature is-we need not depreciate that, which every man practises, and on which depends in a great