Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International NegotiationsRudolf Avenhaus, I. William Zartman In this book, leading experts in international negotiations present formal models of conflict resolution and international negotiations. Besides the description of different models and approaches, the book answers three questions: How can the abstract concepts and results of rational choice theorists be made more understandable and plausible to political and social scientists not trained to work with formal models? What can be done to encourage practitioners to use not only simple but also mathematically advanced approaches in their analysis of real world negotiation problems? How can practitioners (e.g., politicians and diplomats) become interested in, take into account, and apply formal models of their more important problems? |
Contents
| 1 | |
Barry ONeill | 25 |
A Stocktaking and Analysis of | 45 |
Rationality of Choice versus Rationality of Knowledge | 69 |
Negotiation Models and Applications | 83 |
Michael Gabbay 99 | 98 |
Formal Methods for Forecasting Outcomes of Negotiations on Interstate | 123 |
Bridging Games and Diplomacy | 149 |
Creative Applications | 211 |
A Noncooperative Game Analysis of the Kyoto Protocol | 231 |
The Graph Model for Conflict Resolution as a Tool for Negotiators | 251 |
A Minimax Procedure for Negotiating Multilateral Treaties | 264 |
Steven J Brams D Marc Kilgour M Remzi Sanver 265 | 283 |
Procedural Design for Conflict Resolution | 297 |
Lessons for Theory and Practice | 323 |
| 339 | |
GreekTurkish Territorial Waters Game | 180 |
Some Lessons from the Use of the RAINS Model in International | 194 |
Other editions - View all
Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations Rudolf Avenhaus,I. William Zartman No preview available - 2009 |
Diplomacy Games: Formal Models and International Negotiations Rudolf Avenhaus,I. William Zartman No preview available - 2010 |
Common terms and phrases
accept actions Adjusted Winner agreement allocation analysis analyzed application approach assessment assume assumptions behavior choice coalition combination compromise Conflict Resolution consensus consider countries coupling strength decision makers deterrence developed dispute Druckman dynamic economic emissions trading envy-freeness equilibrium escalation evaluation example extensive form game fair-division force formal models game theory game-theoretic Graph Model Greece Greek Iceland IIASA implies initial interaction interests international negotiations intervention issues Kyoto Protocol mathematical mediation Nash bargaining solution Nash equilibrium natural preference negotiation process NO2 NO2 NO2 node noncooperative nonlinear normal form game optimization options outcome Pareto equilibria payoff vector players Political Science positively playable possible problem procedure proposals Raiffa RAINS model rational reduction costs situation status quo strategies structure subgame perfect subgame perfect equilibrium territorial waters third party tion tool top preference treaty Turkey UNCLOS University Press voting