dated wall is as much a nuisance, if it imperils the safety of passengers or travellers on a public highway, as a ditch, or a pit-fall dug by its side. Murray v. McShane. Opinion by Bowie, J. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS -RESIDENCE IN STATE ON LANDS CEDED TO UNITED STATES NOT ABSENCE FROM STATE. In an action of assumpsit in which the statute of limitations was pleaded, the plaintiff replied: That at the time of the cause of action aforesaid accruing to him against said defendant, the said defendant was absent out of the State, to wit: within the territory ceded to the United States by the State of Maryland, under the act of assembly of said State of 1847, chapter 158. Held, that the power reserved to the State by the act of 1847, chapter 158, to have its process served in the territory by that act ceded to the United States for the Naval Academy, is valid and operative. That as process from the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel county could reach the defendant while residing there, he could not pro tanto be considered "out of the State" within the meaning of the act of limitations. 2 Greenl. on Ev., § 437; Sleight v. Kane, 1 Johns. Cas. 76; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick. 298; Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio, 306. Maurice v. Worden. Opinion by Brent, J. RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.* CONFLICT OF LAW-PRIORITY BETWEEN CREDITORS OF DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS TACHMENT BANKRUPTCY ATASSIGNMENT FOR CREDITORS.-G., in Boston, dealing with J., in Naples, arranged to make payments as follows: G. procured two letters of credit on B. of London, one in favor of J. and the other in favor of himself, but assigned to J. J. was to send goods to G., was to draw on B. for payment, and with the drafts was to forward bills of lading drawn to B.'s order. B. was to accept the drafts and forward the bills of lading to L., his agent in Boston, who, on receiving from G. funds to meet the drafts and commissions, was to deliver the bills of lading to G., properly indorsed to him, G. agreeing, immediately on receipt of th goods, "to provide funds to meet the corresponding acceptances, commissions, "etc. In the course of business, and pursuant to this arrangement between G., J. and B., J. had drawn on B., and B. had accepted drafts to the amount of £3,900, when B., June 15, 1875, became bankrupt. These drafts were then held by purchasers for value, and were taken up by J. B. was discharged in bankruptcy as of September 8, 1875. G. had paid to L. the sum of $22,314 to meet B.'s acceptances, and this sum had been, by L. and B., mingled with their other moneys. G. paid the account of J. for goods purchased. L. had drawn on B. at times as B.'s agent and at times in his own name. L. became bankrupt in November, 1875, and his assignee was appointed in the district of Massachusetts under the United States bankrupt act. July 27, 1876, G. brought an action against B. to recover the amount paid to L., and attached certain moneys ou deposit in Rhode Island. These moneys were collected on a judgment recovered July 3, 1876, in favor of a former agent of B. who had, in November, 1874, agreed in writing that the moneys belonged to B., and had given L. an irrevocable power of attorney to collect them. In equitable proceedings to determine the right to these moneys, which were claimed by the English assignee in bankruptcy of B., by the American assignee in bankruptcy of L., in virtue of an alleged equitable assignment of these moneys by B. to L., to cover L.'s liability for drafts drawn in his own name on B., and by G., in virtue of his attachment, held, that on the evidence adduced the moneys had not been equitably assigned *To appear in 13 Rhode Island Reports. by B. to L. That the transactions between G., B. and J. were essentially a remittance by G. of funds to B., to be forwarded by him to J. Held, further, that the funds not having been so forwarded by B. to J., B. was liable to G. for them. That B.'s liability to G. was a debt payable in Boston. That this debt was not discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings in England. That the transfer of B.'s estate to his assignee in bankruptcy in England could not affect G.'s attachment in Rhode Island. That G. was entitled to recover his claim against B. out of the attached moneys, but that all dividends paid by B.'s estate, on J.'s drafts, should first be deducted from G.'s claim. Authorities cited, Rodick v. Gandell, 4 De G. M. & G. 763; Casey v. Cavaroc, 6 Otto, 467; Carnegie v. Morrison, 2 Metc. 381; Russell v. Wiggin, 2 Story, 213; Vaughan v. Halliday, L. R., 9 Ch. App. 461; Re Gottenburg Co., 28 Week. Rep. 456; Ex parte Gomez, 23 id. 780; Johnson v. Roberts, 33 id. 763; Re Hallett's Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 396; Guthrie's Savigny, 163, 175; Whart. Conflict L., §§ 359, 401 a., 101 n.; 4 Phill. Ins. Law, §§ 467, 474, 544, 566, 759; Henry For. Law, 11; Odwin v. Forbe's Buck Bank's Cas., 57 Dwarris Stat. 650; Story Confl. L.. §§ 261, 395, 399; Story Bill Ex., § 158; Atwood v. Protect. Ins. Co., 14 Conn. 555; Clark v. Connecticut Peat Co., 35 Conn. 303; Goodwin v. Holbrook, 4 Wend. 377; Braynard v. Marshall, 8 Pick. 194; Towne v. Smith; 1 Woodb. & M. 115; Poe Garn. of Lientard v. Duck, 5 Md. 1,5; Smith v. Smith, 2 Johns. 235; 2 Pars. on Cont., 586, 587; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1; Speed v. May, 17 Penn. St. 91; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 10 Otto, 491; Lewis v. Owen, 4 B. & A. 654; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213; Betton v. Valentine, 1 Curt. 168; Upton v. Hubbard, 28 Conn. 274; Taylor v. Geary, Kirby, 313; Hoyt v. Thompson, 5 N. Y. 320; Abraham v. Plestoro, 3 Wend. 538; Estate of Merrick, 2 Ashm. 485; Johnson v. Hunt, 23 Wend. 87; Mitchel v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; Robinson v. Crowder, 4 McCord, 519; Holmes v. Remsen, 20 Johns. 229; 2 Kent Com., 407; Moray v. De Rottenham, 6 Johus. Ch. 52; Harrison v. Sterry, 5 Cranch, 289; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286; Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Banks v. Greenleaf, 6 Call. 271; Saunders v. Williams, 5 N. H. 213; Royal Bank of Scotland v. Cuthbert, 1 Rose, 462; Milne v. Mouton, 6 Barney, 353; Ellis v. McHenny, L. R., 6 C. P. 228; Gill v. L. R., 2 P. C. 157; Tappan v. Poor, 15 Mass. 419; Blanchard v. Russell, 13 id. 1; May v. Breed, 7 Cush. 15; Oakey v. Bennett, 11 How. 33; Booth v. Clark, 17 id. 322; Topham's Assig. v. Chapman, 1 Mills (S. C.), 283; Armani v. Castrique, 13 M. & W. 443; Munroe v. Guilleaume, 3 Keyes, 30; Bates v. Tappan, 99 Mass. 376; Leighton v. Kelsey, 57 Maine, 85; Kittredge v. Emerson, 15 N. II. 227; Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. (U. S.) 612, 623; Davenport v. Tilton, 10 Metc. 320; Ives v. Sturgis, 12 id. 463; Lefeuvre v. Sullivau, 10 Moore P. C. 1. Goodsell v. Benson. by Potter, J. [Decided Feb. 12, 1881.] Opinion VIRES RIGHTS OF CORPORATION -ACTS ULTRA STOCKHOLDERS.-The H. Railroad Co., a Rhode Island corporation, executed, in 1863, an agreement and lease to the B. Railroad Co., a Connecticut corporation, whereby all the property and business of the former was transferred, in perpetuum, to the latter, the stockholders of the former to be remunerated by receiving stock in the latter or by receiving a fixed price per share, in money. This transfer was ratified by the Legislature of Rhode Island in 1865. In 1866 the B. Co. mortgaged its road. It subsequently became bankrupt, and was dissolved by a decree in Connecticut in 1873. The mortgagees foreclosed by equity proceedings in Rhode Island in 1875, and formed the N. Railroad Co., into whose possession the road passed by deeds from the mortgage trustees and from the assignees of the B. Co. In December, 1875, certain stock phi Loan Association v. Fairhurst, 9 Exch. Rep. 422; NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. holders of the H. Co. filed in Rhode Island a bill in | 443-6; Lowell v. Daniels, 2 Gray, 161; Liverpool Adelequity to set aside the agreement and lease to the B. Co., and to redeem the H. railroad from the mortgages executed by the B. Co., alleging that the agreement and lease were ultra vires, that they were obtained by fraud, and that, they were subject to certain conditions precedent, which had not been fulfilled. Held, (1) that the agreement and lease were ultra vires and violated the rights of the dissenting minority of the stockholders of the H. Co. (2) That on the evidence produced, the fraudulent representations charged against the B. Co. in the matter of the agreement and lease were not satisfactorily proven. (3) That certain provisions in the agreement relative to the cost of purchasing and completing another road, to the stock subscriptions of the B. Co., and to the issue and transfer of stock to trustees, could not be considered condi tions precedent to the transfer. (4) That the complain ants, by their delay in beginning legal proceedings, and DEFINITIONS — BEER-LAGER BEER-CHILDREN.— [Decided Feb. 5, 1881.] Lager bier being a malt liquor, is an intoxicating liquor, under a statute entitled "An act to regulate and restrain the sale of intoxicating liquors," which forbids the sale of " ale, wine, rum, or other strong or malt liquors." State of Rhode Island v. Rush. Opinion by Matteson, J. [Decided Jan. 31, 1881.] The by-laws of a benevolent association provided that on the death of a member a sum of money should be paid "to the widow of such member if there be one; if he leaves no widow, then to the child or children or their lawful guardian for them, share and share alike. Should the deceased member leave no widow, child, or children the money shall be paid to such person as he MOAK'S UNDERHILL ON TORTS. Principles of the Law of Torts; or Wrongs Independent of Contract. First American, from the second English edition; by Arthur Underhill, M. A., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-Law: assisted by Claude C. M. Plumptre, of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-Law. With American Cases, by Nathaniel C. Moak, Counsellor-at-Law. Albany, N. Y. : William Gould & Son, 1881. Pp. viii, 824. THE original of this work was a duodecimo of 268 pages. It was written on the plan of Wigram on Wills, in our judgment the best planned law book ever written, and which was followed to some extent by Brice in his Ultra Vires. The original work has been expanded, as we see, by notes by Mr. Moak, who is one of the few American lawyers who has an equal rank as an advocate and as an editor and reporter. Mr. Moak says in his preface: "One class of lawyers insists, in an elementary work, upon brief, technical statements of the rules of law sustained by a few leading cases; another class, that every case cited should be so distinctively given that the reader may determine, from the work itself, just what that case decides." "This work is intended to occupy a position between the views of the two classes referred to, and to sufficiently give the law of each State to be of service in all, in cases falling under the propositions treated, where the practitioner has not time, in the bustle of practice and the courts, carefully to examine." This accurately describes the scope of the work. It therefore answers very much the same purpose in this field as Abbott's Trial Evidence in the matter of evidence. The practitioner may depend on Mr. Moak's well known and inexhaustible research and his unusual facilities, and implicitly believe that nothing has escaped him. Everything is arranged with rare discrimination. Everything is expressed with remarkable clearness and conciseness. Although the practitioner possesses Judge Cooley's unrivalled work on Torts, he still needs and must have this handy-book, which in its way is just as good and just as important. The book has an excellent index of over 100 pages, but it has no table of cases. It is elegantly printed. 6TH STEWART'S NEW JERSEY EQUITY REPORTS. The present volume of this most admirable series is as interesting as any of its predecessors. Particular attention is called to the following cases: National Trust Co. v. Miller, p. 155. — As a matter of courtesy this court will extend its aid to a foreign receiver in enabling him to recover property. Delaware, etc., R. Co. v. Oxford Iron Co., p. 192. - Persons holding unpaid claims for labor against an insolvent corporation, but no longer in its employ, not entitled to preference under the statute giving preference to "laborers in the employ thereof;" with note by the reporter. Ellison v. Lindsley, p. 258. A valuable note on service of notice by mail. Citizens' Coach Co. v. Camden Horse R. Co., p. 266. A decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals, affirming the chancellor's decision in 4 Stew. Eq. 525, that a horse railway company may restrain a coach company from the habitual use of its rails laid in a public street. Pillsbury v. Kingon, p. 287.- An assignee for benefit of creditors may set aside a fraudulent conveyance by his assignor, overruling Van Keuren v. McLaughlin, 6 G. E. Green, 163; with note by the reporter. The volume contains many other valuable notes by the reporter. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. awards it." The opinion of so eminent and honorable a counsellor is certainly entitled to great weight in reTHE following decisions were handed down, Tuesday, lation to the honor and morale of the profession. June 21, 1881: June 19, 1881. THE Motion granted without costs- - Dodge v. Mann. Motion denied with $10 costs- The Susquehanna Valley Bank v. Loomis. Motion denied, if appellant, in twenty days from entry of order, in pursuance of section 1326 of Code, files and serves an undertaking and pays respondent ten dollars costs of motion; otherwise granted with costs-The Architectural Iron Works v. The City of Brooklyn.- Motion denied, without costs The Glens Falls Paper Co. v. White.-Motion granted with costs- The People ex rel. Coppers v. The Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral. Judgment reversed and new trial granted, costs to abide event Beach v. Colles. -Judgment affirmed with costsTiemeyer v. Turnquist. - Order affirmed with costs — Fogelsonger v. Forson, Shaefer v. Soule; De Rivas v. Dellerques; The People ex rel Vandervoort v. Grace, mayor, etc. (2 cases); In re Raymond, Inre Newton, In re Loew; In re Wheeler; The Pacific Mail Steamship Co. v. Toel; Goddard v. Trenbath. Order modified; reversed so far as it allows costs to plaintiff, and affirmed so far as it denies costs to defendant; no costs in this court-Baine v. The City of Rochester. Appeal dismissed with costs Brownell v. Ruckman; Johnson v. Cameron Coal Co., respondent, Elias appellant; Stilwell v. Prust. Order modified so as to reduce assessment in accordance with In re Merriam, and allowing interest from date of ascertainment of amount thereby, no costs in this court-In re Pelton. CORRESPONDENCE. A QUESTION OF ETHICS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Now that you are discussing the propriety of lawyers' taking cases on "spec," suppose you give us your ideas of the morality of this transaction: A firm of lawyers had been entrusted with a mortgage to foreclose. They wrote the mortgagor informing him of the fact, giving him the option of paying without suit. In a few days a member of another firm appears to them, conveys the idea that one of his clients desires to take an assignment of the mortgage as an investment, obtains an assignment to such person. Within a few days the firm which has obtained the assignment commences a foreclosure, and will thereby obtain a considerable bill of costs. This exact case has very recently occurred. Yours, LEX. ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL COMPENSATION. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: In your excellent article in the last number of the JOURNAL, you refer to the case of Voorhees v. McCartney, and quote from the opinion of the court sustaining your views of the morality of contracts by attorneys for contingent fees. If you desire to add to the opinions of eminent lawyers cited by you, you will find the opinion of the late John H. Reynolds in his points in the case above referred to. He was counsel for Dorr in that case, and sought to reverse the order compelling Dorr to pay McCartney's costs, solely on the ground that the contract to carry on the suit at his own expense, for half the recovery in addition to costs, was not illegal. After arguing this point with much ability, he could not refrain from expressing to the court his personal views of the practice you so earnestly deprecate, by characterizing it as "reprehensible, immoral, and disgusting, as well as debasing to the profession of the law," but added a quotation from Portia's judgment in the Merchant of Venice, apparently by way of apology for advocating an unrighteous cause: "The law allows it and the court REDFIELD'S SURROGATE LAW. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: V. Redfield's L. & P. Surrogate's Courts, ed. 1881. Some Vol. 23, No. 24, A. L. J., p. 478, contains a notice of years ago I purchased the first edition (1875). Shortly afterward I cited this work, p. 106, in Kings Co. Sur. Ct. "The party propounding the will has the affirmative, and the burden of proof rests upon him to show to the satisfaction of the court that the instrument was duly executed by a testator of sound mind and lawful age, etc. Delafield v. Parish, 25 N. Y. 9, 97, aff'g N. Y. Surr., 1 Redf. 130." The surrogate informed me that the decision in Delafield v. Parish was directly the contrary, and upon examination of the reported case I concluded that the surrogate was correct. Upon examination of the ed. of 1881 I find the text of the ed: of 1875 reiterated, as to the decision in Delafield v. Parish. If there are many errors in the work such as this, it seems to me it cannot be very valuable. Yours, very truly, D. B. THOMPSON. Were the verdict to stand which was given the other day at the Guildhall in the case of Bartlett v. Eyre, the legal obligations of the fashionable world of London would be very largely increased. A roll of carpet, such as is in universal use for such purposes, had been laid down from the door of the defendant's house to the door of his carriage. The plaintiff, in passing along the street, caught his foot in the carpet and fell, sustaining severe injuries. There was no suggestion, apparently, on the part of the plaintiff that there was any negligence on the part of the defendant or his servants in the way in which the carpet was laid down. The place where the accident occurred was lighted in the ordinary way, and the only complaint was that no one was stationed by the carpet to warn passers-by of its presence. We venture to think that the case was lost because no witnesses were called for the defense to prove that the carpet was laid in the ordinary way and without negligence. - London Law Times. The heirs of the Anneke Jans-Webber estate in Holland held a meeting in Detroit, Mich., last week. There were about 100 persons present. A letter was read from the Hon. James G. Birney, United States minister at the Hague, in which he said that the whole litigation was a wild goose chase. The members of the Dutchess county bar were astonished over the recent action of Judge Gilbert at Poughkeepsie. He arrived in court at 11 o'clock A. M., charged the grand jury, called the petit jury, and then promptly called the calendar. No cases being ready, he discharged the petit jury, adjourned the court, and left on the 1:15 o'clock P. M. train for New York. It is alleged that eleven cases were ready for Tuesday and Wednesday. 188 Debenham v. Mellor. Authority of wife to pledge 271 CASES IN FULL-Continued. PAGE. CASES IN FULL-Continued. PAGE. 169 Prewit v. Wilson. Validity of marriage settlement 266 349 Citizens' Coach Co. v. Camden H. R. R. Co. Exclusion 290 2 2 8 8 58 367 Regina v. Salmon. Homicide by dangerous act of un- State of Connecticut v. Thomas. Validity of statute 10 190 487 487 411 270 432 Thorp v. Thorp. Conflict of law; marriage by divorced 213 Tiernan v. Kinker. Discrimination against products of 92 505 First Nat. Bank of Utica v. Waters. Taxation of Na- 471 Union Inst. for Savings v. Boston. Rate of interest 180 Franklin St. Cong. Church v. Manchester. Taxation 347 Geissler, Ex parte. Rights of supervisors under Fed- 93 George v. Tate. Forms of instruments; fraud; assign- United States v. Yates. Passing counterfeit trade dol- 407 71 133 German Nat. Bank v. Kimball. Taxation of National 369 Germantown Pass. Ry. Co. v. Walling. Negligence of 371 Graham v. La Crosse & M. R. R. Co. Fraudulent con- 88 Wheeler v. Conn. M. L. Ins. Co. Life insurance; in- 267 Wilson v. McNamee. Constitutionality of pilot laws 168 129 Woods v. Colfax Co. Counties not liable for negligence 14 Hall v. Wisconsin. Employment by State not an office; Harvey v. Farnie. Validity of foreign divorce (Eng. Wyman v. Leavitt. Mental anxiety not element of 253 329 Ingersoll v. Mangam. Service of non-resident infant Hillman v. Newington. Joint action against several Johnson v. Laflin. Purchase by a National bank of its CODIFICATION of the common law as to insanity.. 225 Kilbourn v. Thompson. Authority of House of Repre- Mackay v. N. J. C. R. R. Co. Administrator not au- 151 449 COMMON WORDS, legal definitions of, VI (64), VII See Marriage. CONGRESS (see House of Representatives). CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Green v. State (see Cases in Full). Lord v. Steamship Co. (see Cases in Full). State v. Beswick; State v. Thomas (see Cases in Full). See Notes of Cases. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE, Court of Appeals on, 126 CONTEMPT (see Current Topics). |