may easily be convinced, by only reflecting on the immense superiority which education and improvement give to civilized above barbarous nations, in refinement of taste; and on the superiority which they give in the same nation to those who have studied the liberal arts, above the rude and untaught vulgar. The difference is so great, that there is, perhaps, no one particular in which these two classes of men are so far removed from each other, as in respect of the powers and the pleasures of taste and assuredly for this difference, no other general cause can be assigned, but culture and education.

Exercise is the chief source of improvement in all our faculties, either bodily or mental; and even in our external senses, though these are less the subject of cultivation than any of our other powers. We see how acute the senses become in persons whose trade or profession leads to nice exertions of them. Of this we have a clear proof in that part of taste, which is called an ear for music. Only the simplest and plainest compositions are relished at first; practice extends our pleasure; teaches us to relish finer melody, and by degrees enables us to enter into the intricate and compounded pleasures of harmony. So an eye for the beauties of painting, is never at once acquired. It is gradually formed by being conversant among pictures, and studying the works of the best masters. In the same manner, with respect to the beauties of composition and discourse, attention to the most approved models, study of the best authors, comparisons of lower and higher degrees of the same beauties, operate towards the refinement of taste. At first, the sentiment is obscure and confused; but, by experience, the taste, at length, becomes more enlightened and exact. We not only perceive the character of the whole, but the beauties and defects of each part; and are able to describe the peculiar qualities which we praise or blame.

But although taste be ultimately founded on sensibility, it must not be considered as instinctive sensibility alone. Rea

Of the greatness of the difference between these classes, what is ob-. served; and for this difference, what cause, only, can be assigned? Of the effect of exercise, upon both our bodily and mental faculties, what is remarked; and even in our external senses also? How is this remark illustrated, in what is called an ear for music; an eye for the beauties of painting; and, also, the beauties of composition and discourse? Though taste be ultimately founded on sensibility, yet why may it not be considered instinctive sensibility alone?

son and good sense have so extensive an influence on all the operations and decisions of taste, that a thoroughly good taste may well be considered as a power compounded of natural sensibility to beauty, and of improved understanding To be convinced of the truth of this position, we may observe, that the greater part of the productions of genius, are no other than the imitations of nature-representations of the characters, actions, and manners of men. The pleasure which we receive from such imitations, as representations, is founded on mere taste but to judge whether they be properly executed, belongs to the understanding, which compares the copy with the original. In reading, for instance, such a poem as the Eniad, a great part of our pleasure arises from the plan or story being well conducted, and all the parts being joined together with probability and due connection-from the characters being taken from nature, the sentiments being suited to the characters, and the style to the sentiments. The pleasure which is derived from a poem so conducted, is felt or enjoyed by taste as an internal sense; but the discovery of this conduct in the poem is owing to reason; and the more that reason enables us to discover such propriety in the conduct, the greater will be our pleasure.

From these two sources then, first, the frequent exercise of taste, and next, the application of reason to the objects of taste, taste as a power of the mind receives its improvement. But we must not forget to add, that as a sound head, so likewise a good heart is a very material requisite to just taste. The moral beauties are not only themselves superior to all others, but they exert an influence, either more near or more remote, on a great variety of other objects of taste. He who has no admiration of what is truly praiseworthy, nor the proper sympathetic sense of what is soft and tender, must have a very imperfect relish of the highest beauties of eloquence and poetry.)

The characters of taste, when brought to its most improved state, are all reducible to two; Delicacy and Correctness.

To be convinced of the truth of this proposition, what may we observe? On what is the pleasure which we receive from such imitations founded; but how do we judge whether they be properly executed? How is this remark illustrated, from the reading of such a poem as the Eniad? From what two sources, then, docs taste receive its improvement? But what remark must we not forget to add; and of moral beauties, what is observed? Who must have a very imperfect relish of the highest beauties of eloquence and poetry. What are the characters of taste, when brought to its most perfect state?

Delicacy of taste respects, principally, the perfection of that natural sensibility on which taste is founded. It implies those finer organs or powers which enable us to discover beauties that lie hid from the vulgar eye. It is judged of by the same marks, by which we judge of the delicacy of an external sense. As the goodness of the palate is not tried by strong flavors, but by a mixture of ingredients, where, notwithstanding the confusion, we remain sensible of each; in like manner, delicacy of internal sense appears, by a quick and lively sensibility to its finest, most compounded, or most latent objects.

Correctness of taste, respects chiefly, the improvement which that faculty receives through its connection with the understanding.) (A man of correct taste is one who is never imposed on by counterfeit beauties; who carries always in his mind that standard of good sense which he employs in judging of every thing. He estimates with propriety the comparative merit of the several beauties which he meets with in any work of genius; refers them to their proper classes; assigns the principles, as far as they can be traced, whence their power of pleasing flows; and is pleased himself precisely in that degree in which he ought to be pleased, and no more. Delicacy and correctness of taste, it is true, mutually imply each other. No taste can be exquisitely delicate without being correct; nor can it be thoroughly correct without being delicate: but still a predominancy of one or other quality in the mixture is often visible. The power of delicacy is chiefly seen in discerning the true merit of a work the power of correctness, in rejecting false pretensions to merit. Delicacy leans more to feeling; correctness more to reason and judgment: the former is more the gift of nature; the latter, more the product of culture and art.

The variations of taste have been so great and frequent, as to create a suspicion with some, (whether, in relation to it, there be any standard, by which a true taste may be distinguished from one that is corrupt. In architecture, in

What does delicacy of taste principally respect; and what does it imply? By what marks is it judged of; and how is this illustrated? What does correctness of taste chiefly respect? Of a man of correct taste, what is remarked? How does it appear that delicacy and correctness of taste mutually imply each other; but still, what is often visible? In what is the power of delicacy chiefly seen; and in what the power of correctness? To what do they respectively lean; and whence are they derived? Of what have the variations of taste created a suspicion? How is this illus trated, from architecture, poetry, and eloquence?

poetry, and in eloquence, not only one nation, but also one age, has differed from another. But let it be observed, that, if there be no such thing as a standard of taste, all tastes are equally good; the taste of a Hottentot or a Laplander, is as delicate and as correct, as that of a Longinus, or an Addison. There must then be a good and a bad, a right and a wrong, in taste, as well as in other things. It is not, however, in matters of taste, as in questions of mere reason, where there is but one conclusion that can be true, and all the rest erroneous) (Truth, which is the object of reason, is one; beauty, which is the object of taste, is manifold.) Taste, therefore, admits of diversity of objects; but this can take place only where the objects themselves are different. Where one man condemns that as deformed, which another pronounces to be highly beautiful, there is no longer a diversity, but a direct opposition of taste; the one must be right, the other wrong

The standard of taste to which the ultimate appeal must ever lie, is the sense of mankind-the taste of men in polished and flourishing nations, where arts are cultivated and manners refined; where works of genius are subjected to free discussions, and taste is improved by science and philosophy. Even among such nations, however, the proper operations of faste may be warped by the state of religion, or the form of government; by a licentious court, or an admired genius; by envy, popular humor, or party spirit. But in the course of time, the genuine taste of human nature will again disclose itself, and gain the ascendancy over any fantastic and corrupted modes, which casual circumstances may have introduced.

That taste is not an arbitrary principle, and subject to the fancy of every individual, is evident. Its foundation is the same in every human mind. It is built upon sentiments and perceptions which belong to our nature; and which, in general, operate in the same uniformity as our

But, if there be no standard of taste, what consequence will follow; and what must, therefore, exist? Whether the same thing holds in matters of taste, that holds in questions of mere reasoning, what is observed; and of truth and beauty what is remarked? Though taste admits of diversity of objects, yet where, only, can this diversity take place; and how is this illustrated? What is the standard of taste, to which the ultimate appeal must ever lie? Among such nations, however, by what may the proper operations of taste be warped; but, in the course of time, what will take place? What evidence have we that taste is not an arbitrary principle; and on what is it built?

other intellectual principles. When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, they are capable of being rectified by reason. Their sound and natural state is ultimately determined, by comparing them with the general taste of mankind. Let men declaim as much as they please, concerning the caprice and the uncertainty of taste, it is found, by experience, that there are beauties which, if they be displayed in a proper light, have power to command lasting and general admiration. In every composition, what interests the imagination and touches the heart, pleases all ages and all nations. (There is a certain string, to which, when properly struck, the human heart immediately vibrates

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Hence the universal testimony which the most improved nations of the earth have united, throughout a long series of ages, to bestow on some few works of genius such as the Iliad of Homer, and the Æniad of Virgil. Hence the authority which such works have acquired, as standards, in some degree, of poetical composition; since, from them, we are able to collect what the sense of mankind is concerning those beauties which give them the highest pleasure, and which, therefore, poetry ought to exhibit. Authority or prejudice may, in one age or country, give a short-lived reputation to an insipid poet, or a bad artist; but when foreigners, or when posterity examine his works, his faults are discerned, and the genuine taste of human nature appears. Time overthrows the illusions of opinion, but establishes the decisions of nature.

When these sentiments are perverted by ignorance and prejudice, how may they be restored; and how is their sound and natural state ultimately determined? Though men may declaim concerning the caprice of taste, yet what is found by experience to be true? Of every composition what is observed; and why is this the case? Hence, on what works has the universal testimony of mankind been bestowed? Why have such works obtained authority as standards of poetical composition? What may authority or prejudice do; but when his works come to be examined, what will follow?