act as foreign minister, but "the first and last sentiment of my life will be gratitude and devotion." Napoleon was no less polite. He created a rich sinecure, the Vice-grand Electorship, for Talleyrand. He dropped his pilot with grace and forged ahead-towards the rocks. When Paris heard of Talleyrand's new appointment, it said: "Another vice for him."

CHAPTER XIII

AWAY FROM NAPOLEON

THE legendary version of Talleyrand's character that still lingers amongst encyclopædists and historians is refuted by his resignation in 1807. No cause can be assigned for it except an honest refusal to co-operate further with Napoleon's harsh and dangerous and selfish policy. "Napoleon has abandoned the cause of peoples and is bent only on personal glory. He has entered on the fatal path of nepotism, in which I shall decline to follow him." Talleyrand said this in 1807, not as a later explanation of his step. To Mme. de Rémusat he also said, in the same year: "Napoleon suspects me whenever I speak of moderation; if he ceases to believe me you will see with what folly he will compromise himself and us." We are offered no serious alternative as a motive of Talleyrand's retirement, which Count von Senfft describes as "very honorable." The Emperor, says Senfft, wanted "absolutely submissive instruments. Talleyrand declined to be one, as soon as the tragic selfishness of Napoleon was fully revealed. No one affected not to understand his action. It was a protesta protest made at the height of Napoleon's power. He had worked loyally and well with the Emperor "to

establish for France monarchical institutions which should guarantee the authority of the sovereign by restricting it within just limits; and to induce Europe not to grudge France her prosperity and glory." Now Napoleon's

ambition was naked, France was burdened with the most exacting and ruinous military servitude to it, humanity was trodden under foot. And the only man in France to refuse further service was the man who is glibly described as devoid of principle or ideal, and prepared at all times to sell his soul to the wealthiest master.

So little obligation is felt to historical facts by those early and malicious biographers of Talleyrand, on whom our historians seem to rely, that Michaud says he is "quite sure" Talleyrand remained even after Tilsit the inspirer of Napoleon's plans of conquest. Michaud is thinking in the first place of Napoleon's descent on Spain, and it must be admitted that it requires careful study to determine Talleyrand's attitude on this subject. Just before Jena, the Spanish minister, Godoy, had commenced operations for war against some unnamed Power, which all knew to be France, and Napoleon had sworn to Talleyrand that he would extinguish the Spanish Bourbons. When the news of Napoleon's success reached Madrid, Godoy endeavoured to undo his terrible blunder, and Napoleon concealed for a time the claw that was in readiness for Spain. They returned to Paris in August, and Napoleon shortly turned his attention to the Peninsula. Portugal had refused to join in the blockade against England. A treaty was

signed by Spain and France, dividing it (in very unequal fractions) between them, and the French troops crossed the Pyrenees.

I need only summarise here the rapid and disgraceful succession of events in Spain. After Portugal had been taken, the French troops remained masters of Spain. In March the Spanish people, threatened with national ruin and disgusted with their incompetent and scandalous rulers, effected a Revolution. Charles IV abdicated, and was replaced by Ferdinand. Napoleon arrived at Bayonne, enticed both Ferdinand and the late Royal Family there by a trick, and forced them to abdicate. He wrote to Talleyrand on May 1st: 'King Charles is a frank and good-looking fellow. The Queen's sentimentality and history are written on her face that will tell you enough. Godoy looks like a bull . . . He had better be relieved of any imputation of lying, but must be left covered with a thin veil of contempt. Ferdinand is a brute, very malicious, and very hostile to France." A few days later he wrote again to say that Talleyrand must receive and guard the Spanish princes at the mansion he had just bought at Valençay. "Your mission is an honourable one,' he says, sarcastically. "To receive and entertain three illustrious personages is quite in keeping with the character of the nation and with your rank."

Talleyrand affirms in the memoirs that he had entirely disapproved the Spanish expedition, and that Napoleon sent the princes to him in order to make it

appear that he approved. His enemies and Napoleon declare that he fully endorsed and urged the expedition until its evil effects were clear, and then disowned it. We have here another of the "mysteries" of Talleyrand's career. The subject had arisen while he was with the Emperor in Germany and Poland, and, although he had resigned the Foreign Ministry on their return, it must not be supposed that he ceased entirely to share the conduct of foreign affairs. Senfft says that his successor in the Ministry, Champagny, so bored and annoyed Napoleon by the contrast of his incompetence, that Talleyrand was practically recalled to office in October. The truth seems to be that his Chancellorship, which gave him a certain formal interest in foreign affairs, was interpreted with some elasticity. For a time Talleyrand did not resist this. We shall find him doing important work presently. He had made his protest sufficiently clear.

However, in the matter of the Spanish expedition it seems possible to show that Talleyrand had little or no influence. Did he, or did he not, approve the expedition, apart from the treacherous termination? In his memoirs he says that he violently opposed this "insensate" invasion, and that "the disgrace which my candour brought on me justifies me in my conscience for separating myself from his policy and finally from his person. This was written, of course, after all the world saw the blunder. Thiers concludes that he recovered Napoleon's favour after Tilsit by complaisance in his