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F

OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING.

BOOK I. CHAP. I.

INTRODUCTION.

§ 1. An Inquiry into the Understanding, pleasant and useful.

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the reft of fenfible beings, and gives him all the advantage and dominion which he has over them, it is certainly a fubject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to inquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilft it makes us fee and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a diftance, and make it its own object. But whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry, whatever it be that keeps us fo much in the dark to ourselves, fure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the fearch of other things.

§ 2. Defign.

THIS, therefore, being my purpose to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and affent, I fhall not at prefent meddle with the phyfical confideration of the mind, or trouble myfelf to examine wherein its effence confiffs, or by what motions of our fpirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any fenfation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether thofe ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter

or no. These are speculations which, however curious and entertaining, I fhall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It fhall fuffice to my prefent purpofe, to confider the difcerning faculties a man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with: And I fhall imagine I have not wholly mifemployed myself in the thoughts I fhall have on this occafion, if, in this hiftorical plain method, I can give any account of the ways whereby our underftandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can fet down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of thofe perfuafions which are to be found amongst men, fo various, different, and wholly contradictory, and yet afferted fomewhere or other with fuch affurance and confidence, that he that fhall take a view of the opinions of mankind, obferve their oppofition, and at the fame time confider the fondnefs and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the refolution and eagernefs wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reafon to fufpect, that either there is no fuch thing as truth at all, or that mankind hath no fufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

3. Method.

Ir is therefore worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge, and examine by what measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our affent, and moderate our perfuafions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method:

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First, I fhall inquire into the original of thofe ideas, notions, or whatever elfe you please to call them, which a man obferves, and is confcious to himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I fhall endeavour to fhow what knowledge the understanding hath by thofe ideas, and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

Thirdly, I fhall make fome inquiry into the nature and grounds of faith or opinion; whereby I mean that af fent which we give to any propofition as true, of whose

truth yet we have no certain knowledge: And here we fhall have occafion to examine the reasons and degrees of affent.

§4. Ufeful to know the Extent of our Comprehenfion. IF by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding I can discover the powers thereof, how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us, I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the bufy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenfion, to ftop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether, and to fit down in a quiet ignorance of thofe things which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We should not then perhaps be fo forward, `out of affectation of an univerfal knowledge, to raife queftions, and perplex ourselves and others with difputes about things to which our understandings are not fuited, and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or distinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cafes it can only judge and guess, we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state.

$5. Our Capacity fuited to our State and Concerns. FOR though the comprehenfion of our understandings comes exceeding fhort of the vast extent of things, yet we shall have caufe enough to magnify the bountiful Author of our being for that portion and degree of knowledge he has bestowed on us, fo far above all the reft of the inhabitants of this our manfion. Men have reafon to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, fince he has given them (as St. Peter fays) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν και ευσέβειαν, whatfoever is neceflary for the conveniencies of life and information of virtue, and has put within the reach of their difcovery the comfortable provifion for this life, and the way that leads to a better. How fhort foever their knowledge may come of an univerfal or perfect comprehenfion of whatsoever

is; it yet fecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their Maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter fufficient to busy their heads, and employ their hands, with variety, delight, and fatisfaction, if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the bleffings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grafp every thing. We shall not have much reafon to complain of the narrowness of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of use to us, for of that they are very capable; and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishness, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are fome things that are fset out of the reach of it. It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his bufinefs by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad funshine. The candle that is fet up in us fhines bright enough for all our purpofes. The difcoveries we can make with this ought to fatisfy us ;. and we fhall then use our understandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are fuited to our faculties, and upon thofe grounds they are capable of being propofed to us, and not peremptorily or intemperately require demonstration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will difbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things, we fhall do much-what as wifely as he who would not use his legs, but fit still and perifh, because he had no wings to fly.

§ 6. Knowledge of our Capacity, a Cure of Scepticism and Idleness.

WHEN We know our own firength, we fhall the better know what to undertake with hopes of fuccefs: And when we have well furveyed the powers of our own minds, and made fome estimate what we may expect from them, we fhall not be inclined either to fit ftill, and not fet our thoughts on work at all, in despair of

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