Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of KnowingIn this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space thatis epistemic injustice.The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a newway, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice. |
Contents
Introduction | 1 |
1 Testimonial Injustice | 9 |
2 Prejudice in the Credibility Economy | 30 |
3 Towards a Virtue Epistemological Account of Testimony | 60 |
4 The Virtue of Testimonial Justice | 86 |
5 The Genealogy of Testimonial Justice | 109 |
The Wrong Revisited | 129 |
7 Hermeneutical Injustice | 147 |
Conclusion | 176 |
| 178 | |
| 185 | |
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Epistemic Injustice:Power and the Ethics of Knowing: Power and the Ethics of ... Miranda Fricker No preview available - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
accept active aspect become beliefs Cambridge capacity cause cognitive collective comes conception concerns Consider constitute construction context corrective credibility judgement critical deficit depends disadvantage discussion distinction effect emotional epistemic epistemology ethical example exercise experience fact give given Greenleaf harm hearer hermeneutical injustice historical human idea identity power identity prejudice imagination individual influence instance intellectual interest interlocutor involves justice kind knowledge less Marge marginalization matter means mind moral motivation Nature negative object one’s operation particular perception perhaps person philosophical political position possess possibility practical present question rational reason reflection relations reliable render respect response seems sense sensibility sensitivity sexual silencing simply Sincerity situated social social identity someone sort speaker specifically stereotypes structural suggest systematic telling testimonial injustice things trust truth understanding University Press virtue virtuous women wrong