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able action affent alſo anſwer appear becauſe beginning body cauſe clear comes concerning conſider conſideration deſire determined diſtance diſtinct doubt duration equal evident examine exiſtence extenſion faculties fame farther figure firſt follow fome give greater happineſs hath himſelf imagine infinite infinity innate itſelf judge knowledge known leaſt length leſs liberty light Locke lordſhip matter means meaſure memory mind modes moſt motion move muſt names nature never notice objects obſerve occaſion operations opinion pain particular perceive perception perhaps pleaſure poſitive preſent principles produce propoſitions prove qualities reaſon received reflection reſt ſaid ſame ſay ſee ſeems ſenſation ſenſes ſet ſeveral ſhall ſhould ſhow ſimple ideas ſince ſome ſpace ſtand ſuch ſuppoſe taken themſelves theſe things thoſe thoughts tion true truth underſtanding univerſal uſe whereby wherein
Page 83 - Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from experience; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Page 143 - ... for wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in separating carefully, one from another, ideas, wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another.
Page 98 - All those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here : in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation.
Page 132 - I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem ; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able with certainty to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw them...
Page 148 - ... do not appear to me to have lost the faculty of reasoning ; but having joined together some ideas very wrongly, they mistake them for truths, and they err as men do that argue right from wrong principles.
Page 269 - Who will render to every man according to his deeds: To them who by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life : But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil...
Page 2 - I imagine any one will easily grant, that it would be impertinent to suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given sight, and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects ; and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute several truths to the impressions of nature, and innate characters, when we may observe in...
Page 103 - I would have any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt ; and when he can do this, I will also conclude, that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true, distinct notions of sounds.
Page 231 - The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest.
Page 126 - The first of these, as has been said, I think, may be properly called real, original, or primary qualities, because they are in the things themselves, whether they are perceived or no; and upon their different modifications it is that the secondary qualities depend. The other two are only powers to act differently upon other things, which powers result from the different modifications of those primary qualities.