chase to a French corvette from the Isle of France, which he would have overtaken, but the wind dying away, she escaped by means of her sweeps. He arrived at New-York near the end of the year. He had been sick on the voyage, and failed in health exceedingly afterwards. Being appointed to the Adams for the Mediterranean, he was too feeble to take command and was obliged to resign her to captain Campbell.

In the year 1803 he was sufficiently recovered to enter again upon duty. At this time he commenced a career in which he acquired great honour; and exalted the character and evinced the importance of our infant navy.

In May of that year he was appointed to the command of the frigate Constitution, then lying in Boston, which he was instructed to get ready for sea. In June he received orders to take charge of the squadron destined to act in the Mediterranean, as soon as it should be prepared; consisting of seven sail, viz. The Constitution, 44 guns; Philadelphia, 44, already on the station; Argus, 18; Siren, 16; Nautilus, 16; Vixen, 16; Enterprise 14. This force was committed to his direction for the purpose of protecting effectually the commerce and seamen of the United States against the Tripolitan cruisers on the Atlantic ocean, the Miditerranean, and adjoining

seas.

The president is his message to congress, October 3, of this year, says "The small vessels authorised by congress with a view to the Mediterranean service have been sent into that sea, and will be able more effectually to confine the Tripoline cruisers within their harbours and supersede the necessity of convoy to our navigation in that quarter. They will sensibly lessen the expenses of the service the ensuing year." It would seem that the views of the administration respecting this armament were limited to a constant blockade before Tripoli, as a substitute for convoys to our merchantmen. The commodore, however, hoped to give the bashaw other reasons for desiring peace with the United States besides those he would find in the obstruction of his harbour, by carrying the war into his palace and the streets and houses of his capital.

The secretary of the navy, in announcing to captain Preble his appo: tment, observes, "Reposing in your skill, judgment, and bravery, the highest degree of confidence, 'the president has determined to commit the command of this squadron to your direction.

To a gentleman of your activity and zeal for the public service, to command your most strenuous exertions, I need only inform you that your country requires them."

Commodore Preble accepted this trust with unfeigned pleasure. By a judicious and spirited exertion of this force, small as it was, and apparently insufficient for any brilliant exploit in such a warfare, he hoped not only to effect the immediate object of his command, but to secure public favour to our military marine, and to earn laurels for himself and his associates. He made welcome the chance given him of adding to the proof already existing that if love of money and commercial enterprise, are thought to be the only strong traits in the American character, it is because our local situation and the nature of our policy deny us the means of earning glory. "I am fully aware," says he in his answer, " of the great trust and high responsibility connected with this appointment. The honour of the American flag is very dear to me, and I hope it will never be tarnished under my command." He felt responsible to his immediate superiors. He also felt responsible to his own high sense of reputation as a commander, to the advocates of our naval establishment, and to his partial friends, who were anxious he should be tried in some " enterprise of pith and moment." He considered that he was to do well and more than well; more than would ordinarily be expected, to distinguish himself and his companions, if the field should be opened, by gallant adventure and bright achievement. Such an issue of his command, he imagined, would interest national pride as well as policy in the maintenance and patronage of a maritime force. It would help the cause of those patriots who wished our nation in our disputes, not only with the African governments, but others, to unite with all possible moderation in councils and discussions, a readiness to use our resources with energy where they could be used with effect. It is no more than justice to commodore Preble, in giving a sketch of his life and character, to say that these were his sentiments and feelings on this occasion.

At this time, our situation with respect to Morocco and Tunis, was critical, and in respect to Tripoli had been hostile for more than two years. The American administration had proposed to adopt the same policy towards these powers as that submitted to by most of the governments of Europe; that is, to give them presents, or

annuities, in conformity to their prejudices and habits, but to make an occasional display of force in their seas, with a view to keep down their demands and expectations. The former part of the system, however, had been practised upon at least till after the year 1798 without the aid of the latter. The opposition in congress to the building of vessels of war till that period, withheld from the government the means of employing force to lessen the amount or secure the effect of presents.

Great sums had been paid in specie and articles of war, especially to Algiers. The new bashaw of Tripoli, who had deposed his elder brother, wishing to gratify his subjects-thinking to sell his friendship to us at a high rate, and perhaps expecting the cooperation of one or more of the African governments, sent out his cruisers against our trade. The United States squadrons, first under commodore Dale, and next under commodore Morris, had furnished protection to our commerce and seamen by convoys; and had annoyed Tripoli by blockading her principal cruiser in Gibraltar, and by attacking and dismantling another. Still the bashaw had not received such an impression of our ability and determination to make the war distressing to him, as to be inclined, on admissible terms, to discontinue his piracies. "Specks of war," and symptoms of insolence in the other Barbary States rendered it important they should have a stronger conviction of the inconvenience and danger of refusing to be at peace with the United States. The commanders before Mr. Preble, had urged the necessity of an increase of our force in those seas, and, if Tripoli was to be blockaded with effect, had recommended that a larger proportion of the squadron should be small vessels, who might easily relieve each other. The last suggestion, not the former, appears to have been regarded by the government in the armament entrusted to our offi

cer.

Although impatient to reach the scene of operation, he was not ready to sail with the Constitution till the 13th of August. The wages in the merchant service being higher than those to public ships, it was found difficult to get her manned at all and still more with native American sailors.

On his passage to Gibraltar, he brought to and visited, 7th September, the frigate Maimona, 30 guns and 150 men, belonging to

the emperor of Morocco. After three several examinations of her papers, which were fair, he dismissed her, though he afterwards believed she was authorised to capture Americans. He arrived at Gibraltar 12th September, and immediately found work to fill his hand in the position of our affairs with Morocco. Captain Bainbridge had, on the 26th August, captured the Moorish ship Mirboka of 22 guns and 100 men. This ship had sailed from Tangier August 7th. Among her papers was an order to cruise for Americans. It was not signed, but declared by the captain to have been delivered to him sealed, with a direction to open it at sea, by Hashash, governor of Tangier. She had taken the American brig Celia, captain Bowen, which was then in company, and which сарtain Bainbridge retook and restored to the owner. The last of May captain Rogers had detained the Mishouda, a Tripolitan vessel under Morocco colours. She had a passport from the American consul, with a reserve for blockaded ports. She was taken attempting to go into Tripoli, which captain Rogers, in the John Adams, was known to be blockading. On board her were guns and other contraband articles not in her when she received her passport at Gibraltar; also 20 Tripoline subjects taken in at Algiers. The appearance was that she had been taken under the imperial flag for the purpose of being restored to our enemy. The emperor denied authorising the attempt of the Mishouda, and said if she was given up the captain should be punished. The governor Hashash on learning the capture of the Mirboka, at which time the emperor was absent, declared she acted without authority, and that war was not intended. At the same time her captain certified that this governor gave him his orders. Hashash was, and continued to be in the confidence of Muley Soliman. He had said "do what you please and I will support you."

The next day after his arrival, commodore Preble wrote to the consul Simpson at Tangier, desiring him to assure the Moorish court, that the United States wished peace with his majesty, if it could be had on proper terms-that he could not suppose the emperor's subjects would dare to make war without his permission; but as their authority was disavowed by the governor, he should punish as a pirate every Moorish cruiser, who should be found to have taken an American.

Commodore Rogers, on whom the command of the former squadron under Morris devolved, and who was under orders to return to the United States with the frigates New-York and John Adams, agreed to remain a few days on the station, and to join commodore Preble in Tangier bay, to assist in effecting an adjust

ment.

On the 17th, taking into his ship the principal Moorish officers of the two prizes, he appeared, with the Constitution and John Adams, in Tangier bay, hoisting the white flag in token of peace, but having the men at quarters. Mr. Simpson, however, was not permitted to come on board, nor to write except on an open slip of paper; being confined to his house, with two centinels at his door, by order, as was said, of the governor of Tangier. The governor was at Tetuan, and the emperor was absent at Fez and not expected for several days.

Another act of hostility had been done at Mogadore, by an order to detain all American vessels, and the actual seizure of the brig Hannah of Salem, Joseph M. Williams master.

The commodore was confirmed on the propriety and benefit of a high tone and vigorous measures. He observes, in his communications to the government," that all the Barbary powers, except Algiers, appear to have a disposition to quarrel with us, unless we tamely submit to any propositions they may choose to make. Their demands will increase, and be such as our government ought not to comply with."-" They send out their cruisers,—if they prove successful it is war, and we must purchase peace, suffering them to keep all they have taken; and if they are unfortunate, and we capture their cruisers before they have taken any thing valuable, it is not war, although the orders for capturing are found on board; and we must restore all." This he believed ought not, and need not be suffered. It was equally disgraceful and impolitic for a nation, whose navigation and commerce were second in the world, and whose resources of skill and courage are abundant, to allow these barbarians to think they might have peace on any terms they might please to dictate. Under these impressions he did not hesitate to use his discretion, although specific instructions on this subject were not given, and follow his own ideas of what expediency and honour required, taking a firm attitude towards the agressor. This he would have