have depleted the Militia of its best men; and already Volunteers have been warned that they will be required for garrison duty at home, and before these lines are in print they will have been invited to offer themselves for service at the Cape. The difference would be that the process could be carried out as part of an organised and well-prepared scheme, instead of being hastily arranged in a moment of emergency; and that the War Office would be able to pick its reinforcements from among several hundred thousand regularly trained civilian-soldiers, instead of having to take those whom it could get, in uncertain numbers and of uncertain quality. The authorities at Pall Mall would feel a good deal easier in their minds if such resources were open to them at the present moment.

Whether the Swiss system, with such large modifications as those suggested, can really be grafted on our institutions is again a question on which the amateur will speak with the utmost diffidence. If there are other and better ways of delivering us from our present insecurity for such it is-military administrators will no doubt be prepared to set them before a somewhat anxious public. One thing is certain. We are not strong enough, so far as regards our armned forces on land, for the work we have to do and the perils we have to encounter. The shock of the Boer War must have brought the fact home to us all; and, being a practical people still, we had better set about to remedy the deficiency as soon as our immediate troubles are off our hands.

SIDNEY LOW.

THE VOLUNTEERS

THERE can be little doubt that after the war now in progress in South Africa, and possibly before it is finished, there will be a demand, which cannot be ignored, for a very considerable addition to the British Army. The feeling is so strong that the Army as it stands at present is deficient in the numbers required for the defence of England when a large demand is made on it to deal with complications at a distance, that the question to be debated will not be whether the Army is to be increased, but rather the best method of adding to its numbers. The cost of the Army of England, including the Auxiliary forces, is rather under nineteen and a quarter millions. The Regular Army consists nominally of about 180,000 of all ranks, of whom about 150,000 are returned as efficient.

The Reserve liable for service at any moment, 82,000.

The Militia, 118,000.

The Yeomanry Cavalry, 10,191.

The Volunteers, 232,711.

Forces on the Indian establishment, 74,000.

The grand total is under 600,000. The troops in India not being counted as Home defence.

The French and German armies cost but little more than ours, and they each number in time of peace about 600,000, and at a last resort about 3,000,000.

These figures illustrate the difference between voluntary service and conscription.

For some reason, whether rightly or wrongly, conscription has never found favour in England, and it has been generally supposed that, though cheaper in money cost, it is really the heaviest burden that can be put upon a nation, and is infinitely more expensive, or rather a source of greater loss to a nation, than a paid army which costs so much more in money. Thanks to the strip of sea which divides us from our neighbours, it has been possible for Englishmen to formulate this theory and act on it. It is doubtful whether the belief is held by the inhabitants of countries who have no choice in the matter; certainly some employers of labour abroad say that it does not

interfere with their supply of labour, nor unduly raise the price of it, and that it solves for them the question of the unemployed. In this country, it is to be feared that the tendency to employ only young men and to get rid of older men who have still the power to work is on the increase, and that men will fall on the rates who should still be able to support themselves. Undoubtedly conscription would give these men a further chance.

The whole question, which is beyond the scope of this paper, will doubtless be considered later on, since it remains in the thoughts of military men interested in the defence of the country, and has lately found utterance in the tentative speech of the Secretary of State for War on the subject of the ballot for the Militia Reserve.

If the objection still prevails, and, in the end, conscription be not adopted, the question will arise what increase to the paid army will be required. Assuming for the sake of argument that an addition would be required of one-third the present numbers, which are given. as about 150,000 effectives of all ranks, this would give 50,000 men, which, as South Africa will for some time to come take a considerable number, would probably not be more than are required.

The cost of the Army as it is at present constituted is divided as follows:

:

Deducting the above and also non-effective and other charges which are perhaps separate from what may be considered the actual cost of fighting men, it would appear that the cost of the 150,000 effectives of all ranks may very roughly be put down at 15 millions, including the general staff, officers of all classes, and expenses of administration, horses, &c.

This is not intended as a statement of great accuracy, but, if it be not very far out, it will serve to illustrate the position, and makes. a simple calculation which everyone can work out. If the millions be divided by the men it would appear that each man, including officers from generals down, costs, including everything spent on him, about 100l. a year.

It is, therefore, apparent that on this basis an addition of 50,000 men to the Army would cost approximately, if not quite correctly, five additional millions a year to the Army Estimates. But this easy calculation does not unfortunately cover all the facts of the case.

The present rate of pay, even including the considerable increase granted last year, seems to produce only the men in the country who have a distinct leaning to the military profession; and it would seem to be impossible to recruit more without such an increase to

the pay as would put the Army in a position to compete with other trades in the labour market. It is evident that, in a year of full work like the present, the class from which the Army should be derived does not think that the pay and prospects are equal to the wages available in other trades, and probably they also consider that a service lasting from three to eight years, with a further service in the Reserve, rendering them liable to be called upon to give up their situations at short notice, places them at a disadvantage with men who begin their business earlier.

The impossibility of getting a larger number of recruits seems to indicate that they will only be forthcoming for a rate of pay which they will clearly see to be as good as they can get elsewhere.

It may be said that in a prosperous year this state of things holds good but that in lean years the required numbers will be available. It is, however, important that no falling off should take place in years in which the country is doing well in trade. The Army, like the Navy, is an insurance which must be kept up. If fifty thousand men are required in addition to the present numbers, it will be necessary to increase the pay, not of this number only, but of the whole Army, as it would not be possible to have men serving together at different rates.

Data on which to calculate the rate of pay that would be required are wanting. It is therefore impossible to arrive at what the actual cost would be; but supposing, in these days of increasing wages, that the amount required would be 1s. per diem per man in addition to his present pay, an extra sum over and above the 5 millions already arrived at would be required of two hundred thousand shillings a day, which would bring the total cost of an extra 50,000 men up to more than 8 millions.

The Militia cannot be looked to for any considerable increase to the present numbers without conscription, which is after all the only complete solution of the question.

And under it what a great nation England would be; absolutely safe from any fear of foreign invasion, the Empire would be impregnable. It is unfortunate that the country at large cannot see this, and that it appears to believe itself to be in that happy position as things now are-a belief not held by experienced soldiers. If, however, this great remedy be not adopted, there remains only the Volunteers.

This force, first raised in 1860, stepped into the gap, and probably at the time prevented a resort to conscription.

At first they attracted little attention as soldiers; but they lived down disparaging remarks, and increased in a marvellous way, considering the small amount of encouragement they received. They compelled the attention of the authorities and of the country; and they now find themselves the subject of many commendations, and

have even succeeded in obtaining an increased grant of public money. But they have, after all, never been taken very seriously. It would really seem that if they took the matter up with faith and energy, and again pushed themselves into notice, they might have a future before them of increased utility and consideration.

Under long-service conditions in the Army, when time was of no value, it was supposed to take a long period to train a soldier; but that is an exploded idea, as witness what can be done in a short time in training mounted infantry. Necessary drill need only be of a simple character, and efficiency will in the future consist chiefly in knowing how to shoot, an art which has never yet been seriously taught even in the Army. If a man expended in a month the ammunition which is allowed for his practice for a year, he might know something about it. No one can see a regiment of Volunteers without recognising the splendid material of intelligent men of which it is composed, or help feeling that at the end of a week's marching under proper conditions they would be steady and reliable soldiers. If they are to do any good, it is these conditions they must insist on, and the first of them is that they must have officers and non-commissioned officers who know their work; otherwise it is a case of the blind leading the blind.

Suppose, therefore, the Government were willing to impose, and the Volunteers to accept certain conditions, a scheme might perhaps be worked out by which, in return for the Volunteers accepting paid officers and an increased number of non-commissioned officers as drill instructors (say two per company), and thereby rendering themselves more efficient, they might fairly claim certain privileges which would be a good bargain for both parties. They might demand the right to be considered eligible to enlist specially as soldiers for the duration of a campaign, and when so enlisted to be, as far as possible, kept together as Volunteer units in their own territorial regiments. Thus, if a sufficient number joined, they might form a separate company of the regiment, or they might be utilised as a provisional battalion of Volunteers, should one be formed and the numbers required were forthcoming. Besides this, they might claim the first right to volunteer for a temporary irregular regiment raised for service abroad and recruited in England. No claim, however, to be made on them to leave the United Kingdom unless they volunteered for the same.

The Government should pay and organise the necessary transport to enable them to concentrate quickly in time of danger, and rations, clothing, and other things supplied to soldiers should be provided while they were out for purposes of actual defence of the kingdom.

Ammunition for practice should be granted on a liberal scale, and ranges provided.