has found expression in this Review and elsewhere. By our critics abroad such a result has been openly anticipated as a highly satisfactory probability.

It is not because I altogether share in these apprehensions, but because I admit them to be natural, that I think the Admiralty would do well to make some definite pronouncement on this question. The terms of the answer given by the First Lord in the House of Commons last year left it to be inferred that the problem was being considered, and the mere absence of provision in this year's Estimates does not imply that it has been solved. Nor does the answer given by the First Lord to Captain Norton on the 6th of April last carry the matter much further. This is what Mr. Goschen then said:

Close attention has been given by the Admiralty to the subject of submarine boats. The submarine boat, even if the practical difficulties attending its use can be overcome, would seem, so far as the immediate future is concerned, to be eventually a weapon for maritime Powers on the defensive, and it is natural that those nations which anticipate holding that position should endeavour to develop it. The question of the best way of meeting its attack is receiving much consideration, and it is in this direction that practical suggestions would be valuable. It seems certain that the reply to this weapon must be looked for in other directions than in building submarine boats ourselves, for it is clear that one submarine boat cannot fight another.

The First Lord of the Admiralty could scarcely be expected to go into detail in answer to a question across the floor of the House. But what he said has not satisfied, and could scarcely be expected to satisfy, those who have been impressed by the confident statements of the French submarinists. It is to be noted that while the First Lord thinks the reply to the submarine is to be looked for in other directions, he does not indicate the Brennan as an existing substitute. And the invitation of 'practical suggestions' would seem to prove that the whole question is far less of a res judicata than many persons outside the Admiralty have assumed. No amount of confident assertion on the part of outsiders can possibly reassure the doubters so long as the responsible Department keeps silence or only invites suggestions. If the reason why we do not follow France and America in their submarine policy is that the idea is useless and incapable of being made useful, or that we are better served by existing apparatus, an authoritative and reasoned statement to that effect would be received with general satisfaction. Although a larger amount of time than is usual has been already devoted to the Navy Estimates, the great Shipbuilding Vote has been held over. When it is reached (some time after Whitsuntide) we may perhaps expect to be told fully and clearly why it does not contain-as it never has contained-any provision for submarine or submersible boats.

EDMUND ROBERTSON.

"I might cite the Pall Mall Gazette of the 17th of April and the Spectator of the 21st of April.

THE DEARTH OF NAVAL ENGINEERS

As attention is now being drawn, both in Parliament and out, to the question of the efficiency of the Navy and home defence-a few hard facts as to the former may not be out of place; especially as, although long and acrimonious debates have taken place in the House of Commons on the subject, exigencies of space compel the outside world to remain in ignorance of them, and of the inability of those in responsible positions to answer questions of vital import. The pages of Hansard reveal the grave fact that there are certain questions of paramount importance to which Mr. Goschen and the Admiralty authorities cannot give a straight answer.

When questions as to the efficiency of certain departments are put, the answer is given that the fleet is ready, like the French army in 1870, down to the last gaiter button or its naval equivalent; attention is drawn to the glorious records of the Navy; the splendid bravery of the naval brigade in South Africa; the shipbuilding programme to anything, in fact, which is not a direct answer to the question.

Splendid as the records of the Navy in the past may be; magnificent as has been the courage and dash of the handy-man' on shore, the fact remains that the records of the Navy as a steam Navy in war have yet to be made. The next naval war-and the Americans have learned the lesson-will be an engineers' war, and for such a war we are unprepared. The ships may be perfect, the executive officers and bluejackets may be perfect; all these will avail nothing in the day of Armageddon if the ships, the guns, and the men break down, as they may break down, from the snapping of that weak link, the fatal weak link, in the chain-the strain on the engineering department.

To this question, as to the deficiency in numbers of the engineer officers and personnel, evasive answers are given-or no answers at all. The debate in the House a short time ago lasted more than three hours, and still no light was thrown on the matter.

The following facts speak for themselves-they cannot be gainsaid; they stand out like the writing on the wall at Belshazzar's feast.

In 1858, when the steam Navy was in its infancy, there were 971 commissioned engineer officers to a total of 2,880 petty officers and men (engineering department); in 1900, when a couple of battleships contain nearly as much machinery as would have stocked a fleet in those days, we find 910 commissioned engineer officers to a total of 24,496 petty officers and men. That is to say, the engineroom complement of petty officers and men has increased by more than eightfold, while the responsible trained engineer officer has actually diminished in numbers.

These figures do not, however, fully represent the situation; for with the increase in numbers required in the engine-rooms, has enormously increased too, and out of all proportion, the complexity and terrific power of the machinery and guns; in addition to which the engineer is responsible for torpedoes.

A second fact is this: that, owing to the deficiency of engineer officers, there are not enough to officer all the ships in the Navy, all of which will, of course, be needed in commission should war break out. The complement of engineer officers allotted by the Admiralty to each ship in commission is far below the number required for the safety and efficiency of the ship, being, in fact, on the scale in vogue in days when the machinery of the ships was on a smaller and much less complex scale. But even after allotting the full maximum allowed by the Admiralty to each ship, we find that there are no more officers remaining to take the reserve ships to sea. There will still remain a number of ships for which engineer officers, and also stokers, cannot be found-because they do not exist. This is not an alarmist statement, it is a simple matter of fact, which anyone can prove for himself with a piece of paper and pencil, dividing the number of battleships, cruisers, gunboats, destroyer and torpedo boats, by the number of engineers pro rata.

Should the Reserve Fleet have to be mobilised, we have no reserve of officers to fall back upon after an action, and the Reserve Fleet itself could only be sent to sea by means of still further depleting the Channel and other squadrons of engineers-understaffed at the outset, and with no means of filling up gaps.

How many people supposed as they gazed with pride on the splendid assemblage of ships at the Jubilee Review at Spithead, that every shift conceivable had to be made to get together enough engineers and men to man the engine-rooms; that the splendid array of ships was-a splendid array of ships, and nothing more; that it was no more able to safeguard the honour of the Empire than the cardboard array moved by the scene-shifter at a theatre! Assuming that the squadrons on foreign stations had their Admiralty complement of engineers, there was not a vessel in all that

assemblage off Spithead in which the engineering department was on an efficient war footing.

The Navy, and especially the engineering department, is not like the Army, where a deficiency of officers can be made good, though it is questionable if, with a war in which we were fighting for existence, we should meet that difficulty as we are doing now. The naval engineer is the product of years of training and study, and on each individual officer depends the safety and efficiency of a thousand lives and a million pounds worth of material. There will be, there can be, no repairing a break-down of the Navy, for by the efficiency— complete and undoubted efficiency—of the Navy, we live, and move, and have our being.

It has been often said that, if the affairs of a private company were conducted in the same fashion as those of the nation, that company would soon be in liquidation.

Let us examine the engine-room complement which a great steamship company like the Cunard consider necessary for the safety of the passengers and the utmost efficiency of the ship, and compare it with that of a battleship or cruiser-vastly more complex and terrible in its ingenuity, and in the responsibility hanging over the officers who, it must be remembered, have the charge of the guns, gun mountings, steam and hydraulic engines for loading and working them, for turning the turrets and barbettes, and for the torpedo department.

The Cunarder Lucania has twin screws, two sets of triple expansion engines capable of developing 28,000 I.H.P. Each set of engines comprises five cylinders, two H.P. thirty-seven inches; one I.P. seventy-four inches; two L.P. ninety-eight inches, stroke sixty-nine inches. The steam is supplied by twelve main, and two auxiliary boilers, having a total of 102 furnaces. The auxiliary machinery comprises air, circulating, feed, bilge and fire pumps, evaporating and distilling plant, fans, electric light, refrigerating engines, and deck machinery.

She carries twenty-two engineers, of whom ten hold first-class and two second-class Board of Trade certificates. Two electricians, one boiler-maker, twenty-nine greasers, seventy-eight firemen, sixty trimmers, two store-keepers, two donkey-men. Seven engineers on a watch.

Compare this with the Terrible, first-class cruiser, which has two sets of triple expansion engines, capable of developing 25,000 I.H.P. with three times as many subsidiary engines as the Lucania, of the most complicated kind, to say nothing of the gunnery and torpedo department.

She carries one fleet engineer, one engineer, five assistant engineers, one artificer engineer—a total of seven commissioned and one warrant engineer officers; in addition to which there are three

chief engine-room artificers, fifteen artificers, who, although mechanics, have no direct responsibilities.

The Lucania, therefore, has twenty-two engineer officers, to seven on the Terrible. The Lucania makes short voyages of six days each, and, supposing the very unlikely event of one third of them being rendered useless, the remaining two-thirds keeping watch about for a few days could, without any serious strain, bring her into port with no diminution of speed or safety. But consider the condition of the seven naval officers, subjected to such a strain of mind and body as few would be subjected to; and that, not for six days, but indefinitely -so long as war lasted. Men are not machines. It is the hard fact that already in peace time engineers have become insane, or so ruined in mind and health, from the wearing strain, that they have had to retire from work. If this is so in peace, what will it be in war? It is easy to imagine; and let it be repeated, these men are the only ones-there are none to take their places after an engagement. It is well known and repeatedly stated in naval circles, that to fill up gaps with engineers from the mercantile marine, as the Admiralty propose to do, who would be hopelessly at sea in the engine-room of a man-of-war, and who would know nothing of guns or torpedoes, would not only be useless, but dangerous! Imagine an order bungled, or mistaken, by a man who has been pitch-forked into a man-of-war-with no special training or knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of the machinery-and how can we expect anything but disaster in a naval action? We certainly cannot look for efficiency; and, without efficiency, what else is there but disaster?

So far from there being any reserve, the above mentioned shortage of officers is actually increasing, owing to the number of new ships built or building.

In the typical examples of the mercantile marine, such as the Lucania or Oceanic, the ratio of officers to engine-room complement is about one to eight.

In the Royal Navy, the ratio runs from one to twenty-one in battleships, to one to thirty-seven in ships of the Terrible class, and is raised as high as one to forty-eight in some of the destroyers.

In conclusion, the words of Mr. Frank Bullen, an ex-officer of the Merchant Service, and well-known writer and naval expert, are a severe comment on the methods of the Admiralty-methods which will land us before long in the vortex of the maelstrom, in the current of which we are even now drifting.

It is no doubt a bold assertion to make, but from a personal comparison of the two I feel perfectly justified in saying that in both men and morale a first class battleship is far worse equipped in the engineering department than any ordinary liner. The following figures will not appeal of course to landsmen very much, but to sea engineers, unacquainted with the Navy, they will be terrifying. For the battleship whose complications I have been describing above (the Mars) one