appealed to every gentleman who heard him, who had had any experience in the legislature, whether the senate do not feel themselves bound more particularly to look into the private bills? Whether the senate should not be relieved from that influence which is exercised by the borers? If the senate could not be trusted with the raising of the public revenue, they would at least consider themselves set apart by the constitution to control appropriations of the public money. When public money was raised, was it not essential that it should be properly and carefully appropriated? Was it not right that there should be one body to watch and see that the money was properly disbursed? He would ask gentlemen here, who had some knowledge of legislative business, whether there had not been more waste of the public means in making appropriations, than in raising revenue? When money appropriated was dispersed, there was no recovering it. But a bill to raise revenue may be repealed, or regulated, as may be beneficial to the public interest. If money appropriated, was wasted, no remedy was to be had. He begged gentlemen to turn their attention sincerely and closely to this subject, and he would then ask them if they did not see the necessity for drawing a broader distinction between the two houses.

It was the ruin of the French republican spirit,-it was the very means of the destruction of the republic of France, that their two houses were merged in one. This ought to prove an instructive lesson. One body should be distinct from the other, in order that one might be a check on the other. They should be a check on each other, and that only could be by giving power to one and not to the other. The gentleman from Centre, (Mr. Smyth) for whom he entertained much respect, told the convention, that the senate would have nothing to do. Now, that was no argument. Allowing that they would have nothing to do, it was better that they should do nothing, than do what was useless, or injurious. But, he would ask, would they not be employed in passing upon the appointments of the governor? According to the amendments already made to the constitution, the senate would have to act on the nominations of the governor, which would furnish them with employment enough, while bills were being concocted in the other branch of the legislature. knew of no subject in which there was more traffic and trading done between the two houses, than in the appropriation of the public money. The lynx-eye of cupidity was always ready to seize on the public treasure. He did not think that the legislation of our legislature ought to be termed fraudulent, for the term did not apply to it. There was no fraud. He attributed the bad legislation we sometimes had, to the inequality of the power of the two bodies. He knew that a great additional expense was entailed on the public, in consequence of appropriation bills originating in both houses. He would leave it to the good sense of the convention to adopt or reject the amendment that he had offered. For himself, he considered the amendment of much greater importance, than he knew some gentlemen were disposed to regard it.

He

Mr. CUNNINGHAM, of Mercer, said the gentleman from Frankin, (Mr. Dunlop) had sprung an amendment on the convention without notice, without allowing time for due deliberation and reflection. When amendments were offered, they should lie on the table a certain time, in order that members might have an oppertunity of examining them, before being

called upon to vote. He was entirely opposed to engrafting any thing on the constitution, until it was well weighed, and considered by every delegate. He thought he could shew the gentleman from Franklin, at one view, that his amendment ought not to be agreed to. For instance, what meaning was to be attached to the word "appropriation?" As it stood in the amendment, it had no definite meaning. Did it mean an appropriation of land, or of money, or what else? Did the terin “ appropriation" mean a subscription of stock to a rail road company, or a canal; or in aid of the building of a bridge, the making of internal improvements, &c., which might be all considered appropriations. The word would certainly give rise to some doubt. This, then, was one why he was opposed to the amendment. No word or sentence of doubtful meaning, should find a place in the constitution, as it might hereafter, perhaps, be deemed necessary to obtain the decision of a court of law, or to call another convention for the purpose of rectifying the error or errors committed by this body.

reason

He knew of no good reason that could be assigned, why the senate should be prohibited from originating bills, as it might be more convenient for them to do so, than the house of representatives, which might be occupied with other business, and not have sufficient time to consider them. He thought, too, that the senate would give to them an equally careful and attentive examination as the house. Besides, the business of the legislature would be thereby expedited. All bills for raising revenue, originate in the house of representatives. So they do in the house of commons, as stated by the gentleman from Franklin; but he did not go quite far enough, however, in order to make out his comparison between the different branches of the English government, and those of the government of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The house of commons was elected; the house of peers was appointed by the king; and the reason that revenue bills originated in the commons was, that the crown might have no control over the public purse, as would be the case if they emanated from the house of lords, over which body he would have more influence. Such an argument would not apply to the senate of Pennsylvania, over whom the governor had no more influence than over the other branch.

He (Mr. C.) regarded the senate as being at least, fully as capable of originating bills as the house. The members of the house were elected but for one year, and generally, from not having mixed with the people, or had the experience, or enjoyed the same opportunities as the senators, they knew little of the public wants. Indeed, he might say, that the senate was better able to judge of the wants and wishes of the people, than the house of representatives. In conclusion, he would say, that as respected the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Franklin, it would be to adopt a new principle in the constitution, and therefore he objected to it, for the reasons that he had already assigned. He would vote against it, as well as every other, the terms of which were so indefinite, vague, and inexplicit.

Mr Scorr, of Philadelphia, would say a few words to justify the vote that he would give against the amendment of the gentleman from Franklin. He thought the provision in the constitution went quite far enough to prevent the originating of revenue bills in the senate of Penn

sylvania. He would not say it went too far, but it went as far as the genius of our government, and the nature of our institutions require. The provision was taken from that country, from which we had borrowed most of our institutions, and to which we were indebted for most of our civil liberties. The executive (or king, as he is called) of Great Britain, holds his office for life, and his power and authority are transmitted to his successors, in the regular order of succession. The nobility hold their seats in the house of peers for life, and their posterity after them. And, the fear was, that the king might, through the aid of the nobility, overthrow the liberty of the country, and get all the power into his own hands. To prevent this, however, the people had introduced into their constitution, a most powerful check, for they put the purse of the nation into the hands of the house of commons. Therefore, it was said in Great Britain, that revenue (not appropriation,) bills could only originate in the house of commons. It was to be remembered that the members of that body, holds their seats for seven years, unless the king should dissolve the parliament, before the expiration of that time.

In England, then, we see that revenue bills originate with the popular branch, having the benefit of experience and possessing an intimate knowledge of the wants and necessities of the country. But, in the state of Pennsylvania, there was no executive for life, nor was there any senate for life. In the lower house, the members retained their seats only a single year; and consequently they had not that check on them, which the experience of legislation gave to the body of which he had spoken. He conceived, however, that there was nothing in the composition of either branch of the legislature, that could create any apprehension in the minds of the friends of liberty. He thought that the house of representatives did require the aid of the senate, which had had more experience. The senate of Pennsylvania, as had been remarked by a delegate, on this floor, was in its constitution quite as democratic a branch as the lower house. Perhaps it was more so. What, he (Mr. S.) would ask, was the true test of a democratic vote of Pennsylvania, upon any topic? The majority of all the votes of the state. It concentrated the whole votes of commonwealth, on any given subject whatever. A majority of the whole

vote was the democratic vote of the state of Pennsylvania. The truth was, that the more we receded from that vote, the more we receded from the democratic principle. In the election of our senators by districts, each composed of several counties, we approached nearer to the democratic principle, than by electing our representatives from single counties. The larger the districts, the nearer was the approximation to the democratic principle.

The basis of the argument of the delegate from Franklin, (Mr. Dunlop) he admitted, viz: that each branch of the legislature ought to be a check on the other. But he could not concur in his conclusion, that we ought to limit the duty of the senate, simply to revising bills, involving appropriations. He (Mr. S.) apprehended, that the house of representatives were just as well checked by learning the views of the standing committees of the senate, as they would be by the amendments of the body itself; and perhaps better. In what manner was the action of one branch to be checked by that of the other? Why, by a comparison of the measures proposed by each on any subject, and by examining whether the details

were carried out.

Each house would then be enabled to judge which was right, and which was wrong, The gentleman from Franklin had proposed an amendment, prohibiting the senate from originating appropriation bills; or, in other words, to take away from the senate the power of proposing their own views in relation to the expenses-the finances of the commonwealth. He was giving all the power to the house of representatives. The constitution gave power only to the house, to originate revenue bills, but the senate was allowed to exercise its power as to the expenditure of the public revenue.

Were the senators less cautious men? Were they more likely to be influenced by passion? Were they more open to undue persuasion, than the members of the lower house? On the contrary, did we not require from them greater age, more confirmed intellect, more improved mental powers? And, were they not men less liable to be influenced by passion or prejudice, or undue persuasion? He apprehended that if the senate was entrusted with originating appropriation bills, concurrently with the house, there would be less probability of wasteful appropriations being made, than if one body only exercised the power. This was merely the principle of the matter. Let us look at the practice and see how it works.

There were, as we all knew, a great number of appropriation bills passed every year, involving an enormous amount of money, perhaps two, three or four millions of dollars, and they required the calmest and coolest deliberation. Now, if all those bills were to originate in the house of representatives alone, they would be retained by it as long as it pleased, and would not, perhaps, be taken up until the last month, or fortnight, or week of the session, when they were to be calmly and deliberately considered, and passed through a first, second and third reading, all in that space of time, too! How, he asked, was business managed now? Why, the bills were being acted upon in both houses at the same time; and when a bill was amended, or passed, it was sent to the other body for its concurrence, or any other course, it might think proper to adopt.

He apprehended that if the legislation of Pennsylvania was examined, it would not be found that more wasteful appropriations had been made by the senate than the house of representatives. He was aware that a great deal of money had been wasted-had not been as judiciously applied as it might have been under other circumstances. But, then, it was to be recollected that Pennsylvania was making an experiment, and that all men have to pay a penalty for their experience. We, of Pennsylvania, were pioneers in the great work of internal improvement; and he (Mr. S.) felt certain, that if we were to begin de novo, our experience would cost us about the same amount of money. He did not consider the appropriations as wasteful, though they might not be altogether judicious. They, nevertheless, greatly contributed to the welfare and glory of this commonwealth.

He had one word to say as to the remark of the gentleman from Franklin, in reference to that much abused class of men called "borers," whom he complained of as being a great annoyance to the members of the sen ate. He (Mr. S.) begged to inquire who were those individuals, that were thus denominated. Were they not our fellow-citizens? And, had

they who sent their senators to the legislature, no right to ask them the favor of being heard as to their views? Had they who put those men in office, no right to be heard by petition, or private conversation? Was it a fact that members of the senate, or the house of representatives, were alike to be at liberty to reject information which a citizen might wish to give in reference to a particular subject before the legislature? He apprehended that if our legislators were to act in that manner, they would violate one of the great principles which lie at the foundation of our republican institutions. The complaint, if there was any ground for it, would apply more particularly to the house of representatives than to the

senate.

Another reason why he objected to the amendment of the delegate from Franklin. When a senator returned home, at the close of the session, it was presumed that he would not dismiss from his mind his public duty, if he had to go to the legislature at its next session; for, his reputation as a public man, was at stake. If he was an ambitious man, and desirous of performing his duty faithfully, he would retire to his chamber or his closet, and reflect on what had been done at the past session, and what might be effected at the next. Then, having his books and papers around him, he might prepare the measures which he proposed to submit at the next meeting of the legislature. How was it with a member of the house of representatives, when he ceased to be a public man and his duty was fulfilled? Why, he devoted himself, with assiduity and zeal to the management of his private affairs; and if he should ever be re-elected to fill the same station, he would return to Harrisburg with, at least, the knowledge he had there obtained, and a mind somewhat benefitted, from having been in public life.

Look at the house of representatives of Pennsylvania: three-fourths were, from year to year, new men, inexperienced in legislation, and ignorant of the interests of Pennsylvania. Now, what, he asked, would be the effect of the amendment of the gentleman from Franklin? It would be to throw into the hands of eight or ten men, the power of originating bills. Every one must see that, practically, a very few individuals, by means of their superior knowledge of legislation, would have the control of the legislation of the lower house. This, in point of fact, would be the working of the amendment.

One half of us have been members of public bodies. We all recollect how we were obliged to pore over documents relative to revenue, and other subjects, before we were prepared to act understandingly in the discharge of our duties. We cannot be prepared to act on all points without some consideration. How is a man of three months' experience, to understand your whole revenue system? Your system of internal improvement, and your various appropriations for different objects? To no body should we look for the requisite experience, with more confidence, than to the members of the senate. This body ought not to be held up in an odious light to the people; but in that light they would stand, if they were to exercise only a veto duty in regard to the appropriations made by the house. If they are merely to exercise a revisory power, and do nothing but to check appropriations, they will be very obnoxious to the people. Let them judge in the first instance; let them have the opportunity of originating bills for the relief of the aged soldier,