before. Even if it were external, we are yet compelled to believe that an inward temptation, one of the thoughts, was connected with the outward process; for otherwise the idea of being tempted is taken away altogether. A temptation consists, not barely in the ear's hearing evil words, such as are designed to encourage immorality and sin, but always in the mind's receiving certain ideas, so as to feel, in connection with them, some excitement of desire. This must be the case, even if we choose to adopt the notion of a tempting agency working from without, of whatever nature the agency may be. But neither in that thought of evil, such a thought being also in the mind of God; nor in that excitement of desire, such an excitement being inseparable from human nature, there being without it no possibility either of moral combat or victory; in neither, I say, is there any sin at all, so long as the power of choice triumphs purely and perfectly over both. The doctrine then of the Saviour's innocency receives no detriment from this mode of explaining his temptation.

If, however, we should choose to adopt the idea, that Christ's temptation was entirely external, so that, properly speaking, only Satan made an attempt to seduce Jesus, but Jesus was not inwardly affected by it in the least; so that the temptation was therefore objective merely, and not at all subjective; still, I see not how we can dispose of other passages in the New Testament, without admitting an inward excitement of desire, and a struggle ensuing from it in the soul of Jesus. The passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 4: 15 and 5: 7, will still be left; so likewise will many occurrences recorded in the Gospels, where the physical appetite, the excitability of sense, the passions of Jesus, are seen to be in lively movement. Above all we can always appeal to the conflict of his spirit in Gethsemane. There was something in him, at that time, which elicited the wish to be delivered from the fearful suffering, that was inseparable from his elevated destination. But this sensuous1 part of his hu

[Sinnlich, sensuous, in distinction from sensual: the former referring to the animal sensibilities in their constitutional and therefore innocent exercise; the latter to these sensibilities in their undue, inordinate, and therefore sinful indulgence. The word has been, recently, often used in this peculiar signification; and yet it must be conceded, that there is no valid authority for the usage. It has been, unjustifiably perhaps, inserted here, and on one or two subsequent pages, merely for the sake of convenience. The

manity, which broke forth strongly for a moment, and the wish which was excited by it, did not determine the will of Jesus; no, his power of choice, and of pure intellect triumphed; and the victory was proclaimed in these great words, "not as I will, but as thou wilt." We cannot divest Jesus of such excitements, unless we divest him of humanity; but this we cannot do, for it would contradict the plain idea which the New Testament gives of Christ; nor need we do it, for the sensuous power, the excitability connected with it, the susceptibility to temptation resulting from it, are inseparable from human nature, and therefore cannot be regarded as sinful.'

SECTION VIII.

Possibility of perfect virtue.-It cannot be disproved by the actual imperfection of the race.-The vitiosity of our race no proof that Christ was not perfect. Original sin no proof.-The fact, that Christ's animal sensibilities were sometimes excited, no proof that he ever yielded to sin.—His finite nature no evidence of guilt His feeling of humility no evidence of it.

These are perhaps the more important historical objections against the uninterrupted holiness of Jesus. We are next met by some in

word, animal, might perhaps have been substituted, but this word, as well as sensual, often suggests the idea of moral degradation, and such an idea is to be especially guarded against in this connection. A new word is manifestly needed in our language to express the full idea of the German, sinnlich. -TR.]

[To say that a holy being possesses the susce sceptibilities, which, being excited to a certain degree, are the inward or subjective motives that occasion the change from holiness to sin, is only to say that this holy being is a moral being. To say that all excitement of these susceptibilities is itself sin, is to say that there is no difference between voluntary and involuntary desires, between the character and the constitution of inan; it is to say that sin is unavoidable, that it is to be charged upon the Deity, as the only voluntary cause. To admit, however, that the excitement of these susceptibilities is not in itself a sin, and, unless an undue excitement of them be indulged by the will, leaves the being as holy as ever, is merely to admit, that there is such a thing possible as the temptation of a being who remains sinless. The admission is essential to the idea of a moral agent. When it is said that God cannot be tempted with evil, it is of course meant that there is the most entire certainty conceivable of his never choosing any improper object. See Note G, at the close of this Treatise.-TR.]

ternal difficulties, which in like manner demand investigation.-A man may deny the reality of a virtue, that is entirely pure and perfect, on the ground of his believing such virtue to be impossible; he is convinced that there can never be a human being completely holy. This decision, that no man can be perfectly pure and holy, must be founded either on general experience, or on a dictate of reason; it must be either an historical truth, or an a priori one; and we will see whether it be this or that.

In the first place, as to general experience. This has indeed in many minds produced an entire want of confidence in the purity of any human virtue, and an entire distrust in the moral goodness and greatness of our race.—And it is a fact, the deeper we penetrate, and the more earnestly we look into the developments of human life and history, and the more clearly we see our own hearts, so much the more difficult is it to convince us, that an unexceptionably good and pure man has ever lived. For look where we will, there is to be seen, though veiled perhaps under a thousand smiling forms, voluptuousness, vanity, ambition, love of property and power, uncharitableness, envy, and the evil of all evils, selfishness, which knows how to steal, with the most delicate windings, into our noblest desires and acts. Seldom are we cheered, for an instant, with the discovery of a deed that is altogether good and pure; never do we find a man whose life has exhibited an untarnished picture of moral perfection and true spiritual freedom. We have been so habituated to this constant view of dereliction from duty, that we are now almost incapable of conceiving, in all its sublimity and lustre, a development of virtue that is really exalted and altogether unstained. We have lost that mental elasticity, which is essential to our belief in the true greatness of the intellect and heart; and in the end, our knowledge of men dissolves itself into the melancholy state of absolute distrust in the race. But the knowledge of mankind, which leads to this conclusion, is in fact derived from the principle of distrust. At the outset, it is predisposed to discover imperfection and faults, and either to overlook the good and noble, or else to refer them to impure and evil motives. Such acquaintance with human nature shows itself to be unsound by this, that it makes a concession which tends to cripple and utterly prostrate our best moral dispositions, our love and trust, and kills in the root our enthusiasm for mankind.

On the other hand, when we look among men with unprejudiced

feeling, we see an unquestionable amount of the good and noble. Men of the keenest understanding, united with the deepest experience of life, show by their example, that one may possess these qualities, without being induced by them to give up all faith in human nature. They prove, that it depends not so much upon experience, as upon the disposition and the previous judgment with which one examines the phenomena of life, whether he be led to an entire distrust in human virtue, or retain a faith in it. And this faith, properly speaking, is something which lies beyond the sphere of individual experience and is independent of it; it has its foundation, like faith in God, in the depth of the spirit, and, like that, is a power which holds us erect amid the storms of life, and raises us above the influence of bitter experiences. As little as true faith in God can be destroyed by adversity, even so little can faith in mankind be destroyed by the moral imperfections, or wickedness of individuals. All the experience which we can have on this subject is partial and contracted. It therefore in no way entitles us to draw the conclusion, that whatever we find throughout our own narrow horizon, is of course a fact existing everywhere and by absolute necessity; and whatever we do not discover in that same circle, is of course a plain impossibility. In investigating the laws of nature, a phenomenon occurring uniformly allows us to infer, that it is both universal and necessary; but in investigating the operations of the free will, a different process is required. Here millions of ordinary phenomena prove nothing against one extraordinary phenomenon; and this is not in the slightest degree less possible than those. The necessity of sinning and the impossibility of not sinning, is by no means a law of the moral nature of man. Nay, perfect virtue is man's true and original destination, and the appropriate law of his being; and sin is an exception from this law. And what now can entitle us to believe, that there are, everywhere and of necessity, only exceptions to this law; that there can be never and nowhere a fulfilling of it? If ever so many exceptions present themselves before us, they yet do not destroy the credibility, that some one at some period may arrive at the high destination of his race; that he actually may have arrived at it; and if the real existence of a perfect man be represented to us as an historical fact, in all other respects fully entitled to belief, the multitude of opposing experiences cannot rationally prevent us from admitting this one great reality. If we should, in the

department of morals, give credence only to that which we learn from immediate observation, our circle of vision would become very small and confined; and we should lose not only faith in the absolutely pure virtue of the Redeemer, but also faith in the moral excellence of all the great and good men, whom we have never had an opportunity to know. But there is in the moral nature of man, an obligation to believe in such high virtue, even if it do not fall directly within the sphere of our actual notice. We cannot therefore divest ourselves of firm confidence in the purest and most perfect goodness, so far as its appearance, as a matter of fact, is supported by all the external proof, which can make it worthy of credence.1

But now the question arises, whether moral imperfection and vitiosity do not, in some degree or other, lie in the nature of man; and whether reason do not pronounce it a universal truth, that no man can be perfectly good and holy. All the doubts, so far as I know, which pertain to this part of the subject, have been stated particularly by De Wette.2 Following in the footsteps of this honored theologian, we will bring forward the points, which are here to be examined; although we expect to be obliged to solve the difficulties, in a different way from that which he has adopted.

"If," as may be first remarked, "we ascribe to Jesus the possibility of sinning, then we make him a partaker of vitiosity; for this vitiosity consists not in the sum of sins actually committed, but even in the possibility of committing a sin. If then we declare Jesus to be free from actual sin, we have not thereby declared him to be free from original sin. Vitiosity includes a degree, though the least conceivable, of sin, and therefore excludes absolute innocence." That there was in Jesus a possibility of sinning, so far as he was a truly human being, cannot indeed be denied; but this is by no means identical with vitiosity. The possibility of sinning exists in the very nature of free-will; it is inseparable from the constitution of a finite moral being. If therefore it is in itself sinful, then a germ of sin is communicated to man with, and even in his constitution; and if this be the fact, then the author of our moral constitution, is also the au

See Note F, at the close.

2 Christliche Sittenlehre; 1. pp. 182-193. We make the general request, that the whole section, "Christus der Heilige," by De Wette, may be consulted.

3 De Wette Sittenlcehre; I. p. 188.