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ambition and perverse and capricious favouritism to which every mob is liable.-Nor, even if we should allow, what we are not very willing to believe, that, both in France and in other countries where the power of Buonaparte was established, the conduct of the allies is the subject of loud complaint, and the English, in particular, regarded with an evil eye, --should we be reduced to admit that these complaints or this unpopularity are evidences of our national misconduct, or of the excellence of that system in the destruction of which we have borne a principal part.-We should account for it from that disappointment which, in all human affairs, is the natural result of hopes raised high; and which is attendant on every change, even when that change is decidedly for the better. We should account for it from the unavoidable private suffering which every disorganization of established forms must produce, and which renders even the most beneficial and popular revolutions the source of murmurs and misery to thousands. Whoever had travelled through the highlands of Scotland, or through many counties, which we could name, of England and Wales, during the first half century after our own revolution, would have met with loud and deep lamentation for the events which establishied our liberties; and bitter regret for those unfortunate Stuarts who, while seated on the throne, had been so misguided and unpopular. At Rome, the memory of Nero himself was held in honour, after his decease, by the rabble and the soldiery.--A pretender to the empire gained adherents by assuming his name; and Suetonius tells us of unknown hands who, during half a century after, and under the best princes that Rome ever saw, continued to deck with flowers the tomb of this worst and most contemptible of mankind.-What wonder then that Buonaparte should retain, after his fall, the regrets of many of his ancient followers; -of many who, either directly or incidentally, were gainers by his power and losers when he was deposed; of many of that unthinking herd who are swayed by a blind and instinctive hatred of all existing authority, and are accustomed to cry out, even in times of the greatest prosperity, that the former days were better than these.'— There are others, too, of a better spirit, who are swayed, nevertheless, by the recollection of those events by which the pride of a warlike and ambitious people was so severely humbled; who cannot look back without pain on trophies defaced, though those trophies had been purchased by their own blood and misery; or on days of defeat, though that defeat had saved them from worse evils. It is hard to forgive those by whom we have benefited in spite of ourselves ; and years must pass away before such persons as we have described can entertain a kindly feeling towards their conquerors.-To all these causes of irritation in

which the allies were sharers, but in which England bore a principal part as the ancient rival of France and the leading member of the European confederacy,—we must add the peculiar reasons for disgust and dislike which the imprudence of our countrymen has furnished; we must add those wretched specimens of English vulgarity and insolence with which the mercantile speculations of some, and the idle curiosity of others, have inundated the cities of Europe ; we must add the general distress which, though a mere visitation of Providence, was ascribed by the starving manufacturers of the continent to English monopoly, with as much reason as the starving manufacturers of England ascribed it to parliamentary corruption ; we must add, above all, the activity with which the zealots of English faction have filled every coffee-house in Paris, Rome and Brussels, with abuse of their native land, and misrepresentations of her motives and actions. Nor can we wonder that so many concurrent causes should have produced their natural effect, and that a nation whom all envy should be the subject of frequent calumny, and unjust dislike.

The first step towards the recovery of the general complacency of mankind was, without doubt, that which has already begun to operate :—the return of more genial seasons,—and the restoration of comfort and industry. The next will be found in the more general diffusion of political knowledge through France; in the intercourse and good understanding which will daily increase between the people and their representatives; in time itself, the great medicine for political disorders, and, eventually, perhaps, in those very foreign dangers to which Sir Robert Wilson looks forward with so much alarm, but which will do more than any thing else to tranquillize the public mind; by giving a legitimate vent to the morbid activity of some, and a rational object to the fears and jealousies of others.

In the mean time, however, (for all these remedies are' of slow operation, it is idle to deny that a great mass of mischievous fermentation was to be expected in France; and, till the king had been able to reproduce, under better auspices, that military force which the dignity and tranquillity of his people required,and till the peaceable and well-disposed among his subjects had begun to feel their proper strength, and understand their natural interests,so long the continuance of the army of occupation was a benefit to France and to the world.

But it may seem vain to defend the justice of that policy which the allies have pursued, if the fabric they have reared be exposed, as Sir Robert Wilson apprehends, to inevitable and speedy ruin;if, while engrossed in providing against the ambition of France, they have allowed one among their own number to attain a yet




more formidable supremacy, and, like the horse in the fable, subnritted to be bridled and saddled, in order to glut an inconsiderate revenge on their ancient antagonist.-Let us, then, examine what real cause we have to fear the power of Russia, or to regret the issue of the contest which laid France at the feet of her rival.

And here it will not be necessary for our purpose to examine at length the accuracy of those details, (derived, it must be owned, from sufficiently common sources, the journals and statistic writers of the continent,) which the gallant author has given us of the military and political resources of Russia.-We shall admit that she possesses an empire the most extensive which the world has yet seen, and a territory singularly defensible against foreign enemies.

We admit that she has one port on the White Sea, three on the Black, and in the Baltic no less than five, with several thriving stations for the fur-trade on the Northern Pacific Ocean. We admit that her power has been rapidly progressive, and that she has, within the last seventeen years, made some very important acquisitions on the sides of Turkey, Sweden, and Poland. We cheerfully agree with our author in bearing testimony to the rapid internal improvement of her states, to her judicious, mild, and liberal

system of government, and, to the talents and the goodness with which the Emperor Alexander conciliates the affections of those whom his arms have subdued. We allow her a population of more than 40,000,000, and an army latterly consisting of not less than 600,000 regular troops.-We are well aware of all those bearings and distances, from Astrakhan to Teheran, and froin Tiflis to the Red Sea which Sir Robert Wilson has traced out ou his map to frighten the proprietors of India stock.-We will even concede the probability that Russia has not yet attained the summit of that political greatness to which she is destined,—and yet we will not despair of the future safety of Europe, and yet we will not jom the author in lamenting the issue of our late contest, and yet we will continue to believe that this country has, of all others, least cause to regret the present greatness or to deprecate the further increase of the Russian power!

We must, in the first place, not forget, while estimating the dangers to which we are exposed, to pay some degree of attention to those from which we have been just delivered, when Italy, Germany, Holland, and Spain were groaning under the yoke of our most implacable enemy ;—when Prussia was the most wretched and down-trodden of his slaves when Austria, broken in heart, in revenue, in renown, in battle, submitted to the necessity of a degrading counexion, and lent ber remaining strength to the ambitious projects of the conqueror;-when the might of Russia was unknown even to herself, and studiously depreciated by those whom Sir Robert Wilson now considers as models of political wisdom!


It was, then, no future and distant possibility against which we had to guard. The continent was already groaning under the weight of despotism :-the whole coast of Europe, from Cattaro to Dantzig, was armed against the commerce and liberties of England,—and fleets were to spring up, wherever a fleet could swim, to carry over to our shores the infection of military slavery. And England !-single-handed as she was in her contest with the world, -who then of our author's present friends anticipated her success or her safety?—what was the language held, what the advice given? That we should husband our resources,—that we should crouch and temporize, that we should wait for better times, and conciliate the forbearance of our enemy!

-We have not husbanded our resources, but we have laid then out to the best advantage. We have not bent before the blast or waited for better times, but we have braved the one and brought about the other. We have not conciliated our enemy's forbearance, but we have deprived him of the means of injuring us.—And, are we now to have our laurels tarnished with grief,--and are we now to murmur at the prosperity of that ally by whose aid we have triumphed?

But the evil which Sir Robert Wilson seems to apprehend is, from us, at least, incomparably more distant, than that from which we have rescued ourselves. We, of all others, should have reason to rejoice that the source of alarm was transferred from Paris to Petersburgh. It is plain that the lion in the street is less formidable than the lion in the lobby ; that so far as our national existence is concerned, we shall, at least, have the privilege of Ulysses in the Cyclops cave; and that Prussia, Sweden, Austria, Turkey, and France are to be devoured before our turn arrives to glut the inperial maw. And is another century's lease of freedom nothing ? Or, if we ourselves and our children are to be free and great and happy, is it too much to entrust our remoter posterity to Providence ?

Nor is the danger, on Sir Robert's own shewing, more distant only; so far as we are concerned, it is less. The same remoteness of our island from Petersburgh and Moscow which would make us the last object of Russian cupidity, would, in the event of our being assaulted, operate as our effectual ally. The impulse communicated through a long chain of conquests would fall with little force on its intended victim. Had Cræsus triumphed when he crossed the Halys, there can be little doubt but Athens and Sparta would have eventually become parts of his empire. But the divan of Persepolis was never able to subjugate Greece; and though France and Flanders should experience the fate of Lydia and lonia, our own more fortunate land might still hope to boast its Marathon, its Platæa, its Salamis !

But before we talk of Russia's conquering Europe, let us be quite sure that her means, even as represented by Sir Robert Wilson, are equal to so great a task. Russia, we are told, has 600,000 troops and above 40,000,000 of subjects. But Sir Robert Wilson is too good a politician not to be aware that many -considerations not usually expressed in a statistical table must enter into and materially affect the estimate of a nation's offensive power; and such, in the case of Russia, are the smallness of her population in comparison with her extent of territory and the poverty of her exchequer.

On the first of these points we are anxious not to be mistaken. We are well aware that the ancient and central provinces of the Russian empire are as well peopled as the average of the North of Germany, and by a population little less industrious and thriving. It is here, in fact, that the genuine Muscovite character is to be sought for, no less than the deep-rooted power and ancient wealth of the country, while the whole of the Asiatic and a very considerable part of the European territory can be regarded in no other light than as rising and improveable colonies. The colonies of Russia indeed are not, like those of England and Spain, divided by an ocean from the mother-country; they are more advantageously placed on the same continent with her, and bounded within the sanie ring-fence. But these, like all other colonies, though they contribute very largely to the general wealth and prosperity of the mother country, add little, directly, either to her revenue or her armies; and in many instances are actually a drain on her resources by the garrisons which they require and the expenses of administration. Thus while the fortresses on the Black Sea, the Araxes, and the Pacitic Ocean are defended by troops from Old Russia, neither the Crimea, nor Caucasus, nor the vast extent of Siberia, furnish (we believe) a single regular soldier to the parent state, any more than, in our own empire, is done by Canada or New South Wales. As the population of all these countries is reckoned in that general census to which Sir Robert Wilson refers; a very considerable deduction must be made from the total of 40,000,000 in estimating the effective and disposable population of the Russian empire; and, however vast her army list, a similar deduction must be made of all the troops which are necessary for remote garrisons and for watching over the allegiance of wild and predatory tribes, before we can form any probable conjecture as to the numbers which she may send on foreign service. A government which does little or nothing by the civil power; which employs a serjeant's guard, where the western states of Europe em


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