as made a longer defence impossible; of a battalion which cut its way through a column of cavalry and a column of infantry. But all the world knows that an action of any sort continued with vigour for nine hours, between 4000 or 5000 men well posted in a strong position and a brave and disciplined corps of 14,000 men attacking it, cannot be fought without very severe loss on both sides. It is a criterion by which the English public are pretty well accustomed to form their judgments. When, at the battle of Salamanca, it was found that the Spaniards had lost somewhere about three rank and file, every child could determine how much they had contributed to the victory. It were to be wished, then, that Sir Robert Wilson would have the goodness to produce his list of killed and wounded; that he would tell us whether he lost 300 men? (which is one quarter of what Marshal Ney talks of.) Whether he lost 100? Whether, in this tremendous battle, he lost 50, or even 20 men? And we might then be enabled to ascertain what manner of action this was and how it was contested.

But the gallant officer has brought forward a dispatch of Marshal Ney's in confirmation of his own report: nor is any further proof required of the haste and confusion in which he has collected the present details, inasmuch as a very slight degree of attention would have convinced him that the evidence of Marshal Ney, if it be worth any thing, proves vastly too much, and is, in fact, at complete variance with a great part of his own narrative. We feel, indeed, some little surprize that Sir Robert Wilson should have thought it advisable to quote a French dispatch in proof of any thing. He must have seen too much of the armies of Napoleon to be ignorant of the mechanism of their bulletins. He must know how often those bulletins were falsified on principle to answer a particular purpose; how often the dispatches of generals were altered or suppressed in Paris, and others fabricated in their room more advantageously suited to the occasion; nor can he avoid, we think, perceiving on further reflection, how evidently the object in the present instance was to obtain a set-off to the defeat of Talavera, and ( pour égayer la bonne ville') somewhere and somehow to eke out something like a victory.

6

But let us see how far this evidence, such as it is, can be said to agree with that of Sir Robert Wilson. Our gallant countryman says that, on his arrival, he occupied those posts which the exigency of the time permitted.' His friend, Marshal Ney, tells us that these posts were fortified with abbatis, ditches, and masses of rock,'precautions which, it is well known, are not the work of a moment. Marshal Ney states that the English general left 1200 men on the field. His gallant antagonist only says that he had many missing, and that the enemy would have little to boast of. Yet surely he would not have passed over in silence a loss any thing like so con

siderable

siderable as this would have been,-a loss little short of one third of the whole corps under his orders? But let us try Marshal Ney's account by the same test of loss which we have applied to that of Sir Robert Wilson. He paints the battle in more tremendous colours than even his opponent has employed on it. He talks of an obstinate defence of a position supposed impregnable; of troops three times rallied; of charges with the bayonet; of all which can be done or suffered in an ably conducted contest, on a scale of the first magnitude. But what, after all, was his loss? In all the late battles, not that of Baños only, out of a corps of 14,000 men, his loss did not amount to 180 in killed and wounded! (p. 28.) Really if the Marshal were to be believed in his account of the battle, he would have had something more to boast of than Sir Robert would be willing to allow; but his dispatches being, as they plainly are, a tissue of empty boastings, we can only repeat our surprize that the gallant author should have thought fit to quote them as authority.

We have yet one more observation to make on Sir Robert's account of the affair at Baños. In enumerating the reasons which led him to defend that position, he tells us that a corps of 14,000 men, within a few hours march on the right, might have moved to attack the enemy in flank while he was opposing him in front; but that, under all the circumstances of the campaign, this step was not thought expedient.-p. 20.

Sir Robert does not like 'insidious allusions. Now, really, we cannot conceive a more flagrant one against an officer of the highest rank, than that a great practicable service was left unfulfilled, and a British general, with 4000 troops, abandoned, without aid, (when aid might have been supplied,) to struggle with overwhelming numbers. But has not Sir Robert, in this passage, even more than usual, given the reins to his imagination, and risked assertions which his soberer judgment and collected memory would have effectually prevented? We put 'expediency' out of the question; and catego rically demand whether it be possible that Sir R. Wilson ever could have expected the co-operation of that corps, inasmuch as he must have known that such co-operation was physically impossible? The corps which he appears to have considered as a sort of auxiliary to his Legion, was commanded by one of the most distinguished generals in our service: it was acting, we presume, in direct combination with, and under the immediate orders of the commander of the forces; and (as we have been assured) instead of being at the distance of a few hours march from Sir Robert Wilson's right, was at Moralejos, fifteen Spanish leagues (equivalent to sixty English miles, or two days forced marches) from Sir Robert's position at Baños. The gallant author tells us that he himself arrived at Baños on the 11th of August, and he confesses that, until he was informed of the march of the enemy, he had no intention of fighting there. Now

114

Now the officer who commanded the corps alluded to could hardly be expected to have moved towards Baños before he knew that Sir Robert was there, and likely to need his assistance. But no advice of this kind (supposing such advice to have been dispatched) could have reached him before the 12th;-yet it was on the 12th that the battle was fought, in which Sir Robert Wilson affects to complain of the non-co-operation of a corps which could not have arrived on the scene of action till two days after his own corps was utterly defeated!

Such is the accuracy of a writer who professes to furnish materials for future history, and thus well-informed is he on the particulars of his own exploits, who writes as if he knew the manœuvres of armies better than the generals who directed them, and as if he were familiar with all the secrets of all the cabinets of Europe! Yet it is not wilful misrepresentation which we impute to him-far from it! But when vanity usurps the place of proper pride, it gives obliquity to the perceptions. The practice of brooding over actions which he conceives to be overlooked, and merits which, he fancies, are neglected; the love of doing all for effect, which despises the reputation to be acquired in a subordinate command, or the patriotism which is unrewarded by power; the spirit, lastly, of party, and a desire to swim against the stream, have made his talents worse than useless as a political writer, and must, even in his own profession, operate as a very disadvantageous drawback to energy however great, and to bravery, however distinguished.

We have yet a few observations to make on the subject of a far less important objector than Sir Robert Wilson, but to whom, nevertheless, we are fully disposed to render not only justice, but, if we could find any grounds for it, indulgence alsowe mean the Count Macirone.-That person has urged, in defence of his conduct in furnishing General Murat, when apprized of his hostile intentions, with a passport, which was only to have been given him conditionally, that the passport could not be used against the allies, and could only have been advantageous to Murat in the event of his abandoning the expedition to Calabria. We fear this plea would hardly avail M. Macirone in a court either of honour or of justice. In the first place, what appearance was there that Murat would relinquish an expedition which was to embark immediately, or how, when once engaged in it, could he abandon the officers who had resigned their all for him? To offer a passport with such expectations would have been insulting,-to accept it would have been monstrous.-But is not M. Macirone aware of the finesse which General Murat endeavoured to practise in his official answer to the allied sovereigns, published the following day at Ajaccio? Is he not aware that he professes to

accept

accept the asylum offered him by the allies, though he declines proceeding to Trieste in the manner specified by them, alleging some incivility on the part of the captain of the British frigate ?* Is it not plain that he thus, by the possession of the passport, intended to throw a blind over his projects, and to deceive either the allies or perhaps his own adherents, as to their destination?— And when his two hundred officers and non-commissioned officers were embarked, does M. Macirone suppose that they were all to be on deck in full uniform? Or was it not worth the trial to offer such a passport in the event of being hailed by a British cruizer, for the chance at least of escaping a search and the detention which would have followed?-Or, if he had been stopped, was it nothing to be able to plead that he was, according to the tenor of his own proclamation, peaceably pursuing his voyage, with his adherents, to Trieste? and, in the event of being defeated in Calabria, if he had escaped the first pursuit, would not the Count Lipona have found his Austrian passport useful in a flight through Italy? It is plain, indeed, that the being provided with such a possibility of evasion was in itself a strong additional stimulus to the desperate enterprize which he meditated. And that he himself felt it, appears from the fact that this paper, which, according to M. Macirone, was of no possible use, was not only accepted by him, but carefully treasured up as of the last importance, and found on his person when he was taken prisoner. To suppose that such consequences were overlooked by M. Macirone would be to suppose him (what we have no reason to do) the weakest and most blundering of political agents; and we, therefore, repeat our opinion, that in acting as he did, he was guilty of a gross infidelity to his employers, and materially forwarded the hostile designs of his illadvised and ill-fated master.

As to M. Macirone's insinuation that General Murat's life would have been spared but for British influence; we have good grounds for asserting that it is a downright and abominable falsehood.Murat was tried by his own laws which which were still in force, -by a court-martial composed of officers who had all borne commissions under himself. By attacking as a private individual a government recognized by all the world, he had placed himself in the situation of a common pirate and disturber of the public tranquillity. The sentence by which he suffered was the same which he had himself denounced in his printed proclamation

Peu de temps après on eut la réponse qu'il avoit donné à Macirone en forme diplomatique, par laquelle, en paroissant d'accepter le passeport, il se réserve de traiter avec S. M. l'Empereur sur les conditions de l'asyle, mais refuse de passer à Trieste sur la frégate Anglaise, sous prétexte de la sommation peu mesurée, dit-il, qui m'a été addressée par M. le Capitaine de la frégate.'-Pièce addressée au Roi de Naples, 16 Oct.

1815

against

against the adherents of King Ferdinand.* And sincerely as we pity the untimely end of a brave and (on the whole) a respectable soldier, it would be weakness to forget the massacre of Madrid, and worse than weakness to deny that the death by which he suffered was as just as it was legal and necessary.

ART. XIV.-1. First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth REPORTS of the Select Committee appointed to Inquire into THE EDUCATION OF THE LOWER ORDERS IN THE METROPOLIS, and to report their Observations thereupon, together with the Minutes of the Evidence taken before them from time to time, to the House: and who were instructed to consider WHAT MAY BE FIT TO BE DONE WITH RESPECT TO THE CHILDREN OF PAUPERS WHO SHALL BE FOUND BEGGING IN THE STREETS in and near the Metropolis, or who shall be carried about by Persons asking Charity, and whose Parents, or other Persons who [whom] they accompany, have not sent such Children to any of the Schools provided for the Education of Poor Children. 1816-1818.

2. A Letter to Sir Samuel Romilly, M. P. from Henry Brougham, Esq. M. P. F. R. S. upon the Abuse of Charities. Tenth Edition. London. 1818. Svo. pp. 67.

3. The Speech of Henry Brougham, Esq. M. P. in the House of Commons, May 8th, 1818, on the Education of the Poor, and Charitable Abuses. London. 1818. 8vo. pp. 49.

4. A Letter to the Right Hon. Sir William Scott, &c. &c. M. P. for the University of Oxford, in Answer to Mr. Brougham's Letter to Sir Samuel Romilly, upon the Abuse of Charities, and Ministerial Patronage in the Appointments under the late Act. Fourth Edition. London. 1818. 8vo. pp. 100. 5. Vindicia Wykehamica; or, a Vindication of Winchester College: in a Letter to Henry Brougham, Esq. occasioned by his Letter to Sir Samuel Romilly, on Charitable Abuses. By the Rev. W. L. Bowles. London. Svo. 1818.

* Ogni individuo impiegato da Ferdinando dopo l'epoca suddetta cesserà le sue funzioni dal giorno della publicazione del presente decreto o della nuova del nostro sbarco. Quelli che dopo tale publicazione o nuova, si ostinassero a conservare i loro impieghi, e a dare una disposizione qualunque, saranno riguardati come ribelli, traditori della patria, e come tali saranno puniti con tutto il rigore delle leggi.'—' Qualunque ministro di Ferdinando [qualunque impiegato] che dopo la publicazione del presente decreto o della nuova del nostro sbarco verrà conservare il potere a fare eseguire gli ordini del suo Sovrano, ordinare delle misure, o dare una disposizione qualunque tendente ad impedire l'esecuzione del nostri ordini, sara dichiarato rebelle, provocatore della guerra civile, traditore della patria e del Re, messo fuore della legge, e giudicato come tale.'-Art. 3 and 4 of the printed decree found on Murat's person. The passage between brackets was interlined with his own writing.

6. A Letter