As, then, the Doctor holds, that the acts of men never are the effects of their own power, as they would be under such a merely exciting agency; and that men have no power to put forth or originate their own acts, as they would possess under such an agency; he of course cannot mean to designate such an agency by that phraseology. Nor can he, for the same reason, mean an agency by which God merely imparts to men the power of acting, which they themselves exert in originating and putting forth acts: for if men do not possess any power of originating and exerting acts of themselves; and if, consequently, none of their acts are the effects of their own power, then no such power is communicated, and therefore no such agency as that by which God would merely impart the power of acting, is exerted on them.

This is obvious too, from the Doctor's argument derived from the dependence of men in support of the position, that God produces all their actions by a direct influence. He assumes it as an indubitable dictate of reason, that a creature cannot possess the power of acting. The power of exerting internal exercises and external actions does not and cannot belong to

his constitution. Power is an incommunicable attribute, and exists no where in the universe, but in God. These views are exhibited in the following quotations:

"It is the dictate of right reason, that no created being is capable of acting independently." He does not here mean, acting with an absolute exemption from all influence whatever, or control; but acting with one's own power, in distinction from another's, as appears from his inferring, from the dependence of creatures, that their actions must be the production of a Divine efficiency. Since, if their dependence does not consist in an absolute destitution of power, he cannot infer from it that all their actions are produced by God's power. If they possess power, it is to be inferred, that their actions are produced by that power, instead of God's.

"Universal and absolute dependence goes into the very idea of a creature; because independence is an attribute of the Divine nature, which even Omnipotence cannot communicate." Vol. i. Vol. i. p. 203.

"And

since all men are dependent agents, all their motions, exercises, or actions, must originate from a Divine efficiency. We can no more act than we can exist, without the constant aid and influence of the Deity." Vol. ii. p. 31.

A thing "originates from a Divine efficiency," when the power which gives it existence is God's; for "efficiency" is the efficacious exertion of power. If men can no more act than exist without the constant aid and influence of the Deity; then, as they do not possess within themselves the power at all of existing, or are not at all self-existent, but are kept in existence entirely by Divine power; so they do not possess in themselves at all the power of acting, but all their actions are created by Divine power: and the fact, that all their "actions must originate from a Divine efficiency," arises from their being absolutely destitute of power.

Since, then, the Doctor regards the absolute dependence of men as consisting in an absolute destitution of power, and infers from it the impossibility of their exerting of themselves, acts which are the effects of their power, he cannot of course mean by the phraseology in question, to designate an agency by which the power of acting is communicated. For if he grant that the power of acting is communicated at all, he must, to be consistent, give up his views of the dependence of creatures, and abandon his argument erected on it, to prove that all the acts of men are the

production of Divine power; for it makes no difference in the nature of their dependence, nor in the fact that their actions are the effect of their own power, and not God's, whether the power of exerting them is communicated at the time it is exerted, or at the commencement of their existence. If they actually possess power, they are not absolutely destitute of it, as the Doctor teaches;-and if they possess the power by which their actions are exerted, then their actions are the productions of their own, and not of God's power.

Since, then, the Doctor could not have used the phraseology under consideration, to designate an agency by which the power of acting is communicated, without contradicting his views and reasonings respecting the dependence of men, it is apparent that he cannot have employed it to denote such an agency. Nor can he mean to designate by those phrases, an agency by which God merely governs men in the exercise of their power; since merely to govern men, or exert on them an agency which simply determines the mode in which they act or exert their power, is nothing more nor less than to bring them into a state in which they are

disposed or choose to act in a given manner. But the Doctor denies that God can dispose men to act in any other way than by producing, that is, creating their volitions; and of course denies that He can govern them, or determine the mode of their acting, in any other way than by creating their actions. And moreover, he denies that men possess the power by which their actions are exerted. Their actions are, according to his representation, entirely the effects of God's power. Of course he cannot mean to denote by the language referred to, an agency employed in governing them in the exercise of power belonging to themselves. Nor can he, for the same reason, be supposed to use those phrases to designate an agency consisting of part, or all of the kinds of agency which have been mentioned, united.

If, therefore, as thus appears, he neither employed it to denote an agency which merely produces in men a disposition to act, or exert their own power, or excites men to act, or exert their own power; nor an agency which imparts the power of acting; nor an agency consisting of part, or all of those kinds of agency; then, if he intended to denote by it