a total of 410,000 rank and file in the united kingdom. Foreign corps, the barrack department, and the general staff establishment were also submitted, among the estimates, to the attention of the committee. For the staff, it was proposed to vote the sum of 154,6471.; which, though large, was represented to be necessary, in consequence of the number of brigade officers employed to train the volunteer force of the country. For the latter description of force in Great Britain, he estimated, that a sum of 730,000l. would be necessary, from the 25th December 1803 to the 25th December 1804. Of the volunteer force, the right hon. gentleman stated, that about 45,000 served without pay; 42,000 infantry, and 2500 cavalry. An additional expense of 20,000l., he observed, would be incurred by the necessary appointment of agents and field officers. number. This was a splendid armament, and, in point of numbers, more than adequate to repel any force which the enemy could bring against this country. But it was necessary to consider the materials of which it was composed: whether the structure were of solid masonry, or only of lath and plaster. The proportion and arrangement of the parts must be examined, in order to estimate the combined strength of the whole; for, if the parts were not correspon dent, the whole must be defective. Mr. Windham contended, that, although men were never more eager to come forward, the zeal and spirit of the volunteers had not been properly directed. It was absurd, he said, to train them to act with troops of the line. This practice wasdefended on the ground, that a battalion, whether young or old, added to a body of men, increased its strength. But the case admitted of a different illustration. Frigates were not brought into the line of battle, not because their metal would produce no effect on a 74, but because they might be forced out of the line, and consequently the ship near them might be the more exposed. It was the same in the army. An officer, unless secure of his troops, would not attempt any difficult enterprise. From these considerations, he was of opinion, that the volunteers, instead of being disciplined to act in the line, should be employed to hover about the foe, in order, in this manner, most effectually to harass and annoy the enemy. He illustrated the success with which this mode of attack might be conducted, by the circumstances attending the capture of general Burgoyne. to about Burgoyne. With respect to the military strength of the kingdom, The question being put upon the first resolution, Mr. Windham rose, and observed, that the subjects under consideration afforded the house an opportunity to take a view of the general state of the country, with respect to its means of defence. The army of reserve, he asserted, had cost, in bounty money alone, 1,000,000l. not granted by parliament, but levied in a manner more incommodious to the subject. The expense of the volunteers was also about 1,000,000l. to government and as much to themselves. Hence, the creation of these two descriptions of force had been attended with an expense to the nation of 3,000,000l. Taking the population of the united kingdom at 15,000,000, he had expected to find the military establishment amount to about 400,000. It far exceeded this Mr. Mr. Windham said, that if the voluntecrs, the militia, and the reserve, excepting the few who had entered for general service, were deducted from the sum total, the effective force of the country would appear to be by no means very considerable. The regular army, in proportion to its numbers,he considered as efficient a military body as any troops in the world. In the militia too there were many good troops, possessing every requisite short of experience. With respect to the army of reserve, it could not at present, whatever it might in time become, be considered as an efficient military force. From this general view of the army that had been created, it appeared to him, that the means which the population, spirit, and disposition of the country afforded, had been gross ly abused; for, in fact, the 5000 who had entered from the army of reserve, for general service, were to be regarded as the only real accession to the effective force of the country. Mr. Windham strongly recommended the erection of military works. He conceived they would be peculiarly beneficial on the very exposed coast of Suffolk, south of Yarmouth; and recommended Martello towers in preference to redoubts, which might be carried by numbers, and in which the men could perhaps only remain for a fire or two. In confirmation of the superiority of Martello towers, he mentioned an instance of a ship of the line having stationed itself within a quarter of a mile of one of these fortresses, for the purpose of demolishing it: but which, having been twice set on fire, was compelled to weigh anchor without effecting its destruction. A few such towers erected along this range of coast, provided with only a single gun each, would afford ef fectual security, where fleets could give no immediate protection. Thirty Martello towers, at the inconsiderable expense of 10001. each, would probably be sufficient for this purpose. They would at least severely gall any invading force, and effectually oppose the landing of cavalry or artillery. For the defence of the whole county of Norfolk, he stated, that only sixteen pieces of cannon, and one re giment of militia, had been provided. The town of Yarmouth, however, was the defence of the road of Yarmouth, and consequent, ly of the great road to the north of England. This he regarded as no very favourable specimen of a judi cious system of defence; since it thus appeared, notwithstanding their 4 or 500,000 men, ministers had left the kingdom in many places in a state of great insecurity. The sea-fencibles he considered as so many good hands of which the navy had been deprived. Ex Reverting to the subject of the army, he reprobated the excessive bounties paid to volunteers from the army of reserve, and the vicious habits contracted in spending those bounties. Without meaning that every man balloted should be liable to serve, he disapproved_of the system of substitution. emptions from service should be purchased by a fine payable to government, and the recruiting ser vice would thus be open to govern, ment alone, without the disadvantage of competition. An additional facility to recruiting might also be afforded by changing the term of service for life, to a limited period of time. If the present system of recruiting were continued, if in a period of 8 or 9 months only seven thousand men had been ob tained, the regular army could by no no means be kept up. The peren nial recruiting of the regular army, for which the population of the empire afforded ample means, he regarded as indispensable, in order to maintain the requisite military establishment; but this he asserted could not be accomplished at any reasonable rate, if substitutes were allowed. From the whole of what he had stated, he concluded, that the present ministers could not properly be intrusted with the administration of public affairs. Mr. secretary Yorke replied to Mr. Windham, but without entering very fully into a detailed explanation of the general system of defence. Lord Castlereagh having explained, very circumstantially, both the outline and the minute parts of this system, it may be proper to defer, to an analysis of his comprehensive speech, an account of those measures, which may be considered as furnishing an answer to Mr. Windham's animadver sions. Mr. Pitt followed Mr. secretary Yorke, and undertook, in a very spirited and argumentative manner, a defence of the efficiency of the volunteer establishment. One great object of Mr. Pitt's speech was to demonstrate the capability of efficient improvement, of which the volunteer corps were susceptible, and he took occasion, at the same time, to suggest those means which appeared to him calculated to produce this effect. Waving the consideration of a variety of topics, which had been introduced into the discussion, respecting the conduct of his majesty's ministers, he proposed to confine himself strictly to the subject then before the committee: the number and the formation of the different descriptions of military force which had been provided for the defence of the empire, and which were stated in the estimates submitted to the committee. He defended the propriety of establishing a large vo lunteer force, and affirmed that the opinion of parliament, repeatedly and distinctly expressed, fully justi fied our having recourse to a great national force, independently of the regular army and the militia, in order effectually to provide for the public defence. He looked to the army as the great rallying point to which the volunteers must have recourse, by whose example they must be regulated, by whose experience they must be guided.. But these corps, he conceived, might be improved and matured to such a degree of perfection, as would enable government to employ a large proportion of the regular force abroad, either in defending our distant possessions, in attacking the vulnerable points of the enemy, or, if fortunately for mankind the prospect should once open, in assisting to effect the deliverance of Europe. Of the amount of the volunteer force he saw no reason to complain. In their distribution, however, he could have wished that the number had been greater in the more exposed parts of the maritime coast. For he was decidedly of opinion, that a smaller number of men who could oppose the enemy immediately on their landing, and almost before they could ascend the beach, would be much more serviceable than a much larger number after the enemy had obtained a footing in the country. Mr. Pitt stated, that the object he had more immediately in view, was to render this force, the existence of which was absolutely necessary, not merely a nominal force, but but an efficient and permanent army. He was apprehensive that the estimates contained no adequate provision for giving them a greater degree of discipline, system, and improvement. For this ob ject, he was desirous, that all volunteer companies should be brought to act in battalions, and, whenever it could be done, in brigades. He also proposed to give to every battalion the assistance of a field officer and an adjutant; such officers still retaining their rank and pay in the army. The expense of this measure, he acknow. ledged, would be great; but the difference between those battalions which had the assistance of field officers who had seen service, and those which had not received this advantage, was more than adequate to the increase of expense. With respect to the number of days which the corps should be exercised, he was of opinion, that about fifty days would be sufficient for the next year, and forty for each succeeding year. Mr. Pitt estimated the expense arising from the assistance of field offcers and adjutants at about 160,000!. and that of the allowance to such volunteers as may, from their circumstances, be obliged to accept of pay, at between 3 and 400,000Z.; making probably, in the whole, about 500,0001. If for that sum we could maintain a force of nearly 400,000 men in gradual and efficient improvement, he affirmed that it would be the cheapest part of the whole expenditure. If the house should agree with him in opinion, that the appointment of acld officers and adjutants should be adopted, still the object he had in view could not be attained merely by the instruction of those officers, without some regulations to ensure punctualattendance, which would keep up thenumbers of the vo lunteers, and give them the habits and steadiness of soldiers. Looking, as we ought to look, to a protracted contest, we ought to provide the means of maintaining it for a length of time. We ought never to forget with whom we are contending. We should never calculate upon any given period to prepare for the reception of the enemy. If it were apprehended that the danger was withdrawn, the spirit of the volunteers might languish and moulder for a time, though it cer tainly would not be extinguished. It should be the great object of government to prevent that spirit from subsiding, lest the country be called upon to meet the sudden, but long meditated attack of the enemy. Perhaps something like the compulsory act of the last session might be adopted, during the war, in order to keep up the numbers and the punctual attendance of the volunteers, and to preserve that subordination which is essential to progressive improvement. On the subject of the sea fencibles, Mr. Pitt observed, he should agree with his right honourable friend (Mr. Windham), that if they were composed of a class of men liable to be impressed into his majesty's sea-service, it would not only be an useless but an improper institution. But the main object for which they were employed was to serve on board gun-boats, for which they were peculiarly qualified. In this point of view, he looked upon them as one of the most valuable parts of our force; and this de scription of service brought into activity a body of men, who, being chiefly pilots and fishermen, could neither be employed in the navy nor be permanently taken from their families. Declining to enter into any wider field of discussion, Mr. Pitt concluded by stating that, at the proper time, he should propose the resolutions to which he had alluded. Lord Castlereagh was desirous, before he stated what had been accomplished for the general defence since the separation of parliament, to rescue the military system from two objections advanced against it by Mr. Windham; the injury which the recruiting service had sustained from the measure of the army of reserve, and the high bounties which resulted from it; and the locking up, by volunteer exemptions, of a large proportion of the population of the country, from. services of greater importance. With respect to the first objection, his lordship observed, that out of 35,000 men already raised for the army of reserve, 7,500 had entered for general service. This measure, therefore, which had been described as so fatal to the recruiting service, had, in the short space of two months, produced nearly as many men for general service as had been obtained in the preceding year by the ordinary mode of recruiting; at a period too when aeither the militia nor the army of reserve were in progress. To the second objection his lordship replied, that there was nothing to prevent a man serving in a volunteer corps from entering into the militia, or the regular army; and it was an ascertained fact, that any description of military duty ripened and prepared the feelings of men for general service. The facility, therefore, of procuring substitutes for those upon whom the ballot fell, was, by this very circumstance, materially increased. His lordship then proceeded to state the extent of the military force in the united kingdom. This force, he observed, was naturally divided into troops on permanent pay, and those liable to service in the event of invasion. Of the first description, there were in Great Britain, and in the islands of Guernsey and Jersey, 130,000 men; and in Ireland 50,000 men: making in the whole 180,000 rank and file. The effective rank and file of the militia in Great Britain and Ireland amounted to 84,000 men; the regular force to 96,000; of which 27,000 were for limited service, and 69,000, at this moment, a force disposable for general service. The next grand feature of our military strength consisted in the volunteer force, of which 340,000 men, accepted and arrayed, were at present in Great Britain; and in Ireland it amounted to 70,000; making a total of 410,000 rank and file in the united kingdom, to which were to be added 25,000 sea-fencibles. The total amount of the whole military force was therefore as follows: Militia in Great Britain and Ireland 84,000 ritain} Regularforce for general 69,000 service |