the overseers of the poor shall investigate each place where the town paupers are to be supported, and shall make such contract for the support of town paupers as in the judgment of the overseers of the poor will secure proper care and maintenance for such paupers.' It further provides for a record of each case, containing the terms and conditions of the support agreed upon; and for a certificate to be made by a majority of the overseers of the poor that an investigation has been made, and that they are satisfied that the poor of the town will be well and properly cared for. In terms the act applies to towns, and I am of the opinion that it is intended to apply to towns only, and not to cities.

The only possible doubt arises from the provisions of the Public Statutes, one of which is c. 3, § 3, cl. 23, declaring that "The word town' may be construed to include cities;" the other is c. 28, § 2, to wit: "Chapter twenty-seven and all other laws relating to towns shall apply to cities so far as they are not inconsistent with the general or special provisions relating thereto." It is to be observed, however, that the chapter of the Public Statutes relating to the support of paupers (c. 84) makes repeated use of the expression "cities and towns." That, being in the same statutes as the two provisions referred to (making the word "town" inclusive of cities), is significant. Unless we are to conclude that the Public Statutes were carelessly drawn, there must have been in the minds of the legislators some reason for making the statutes relating to the support of poor apply in terms to cities as well as to towns; for otherwise the general provisions of c. 27 would have rendered it unnecessary to repeat so often the expression "cities and towns." It is clear, therefore, that the word "town" does not include cities in all the statutes which have to do directly or indirectly with towns. The distinction may be thus stated. Chapter 27, in which it is provided that the word "town" should include cities, deals directly with privileges, duties and obligations of towns as municipalities. Chapter 84 of the Public Statutes, on the other hand, deals principally with the support of paupers, and the mere fact that paupers must be supported by towns does make it in terms an act "relating to towns." It is an act

relating to a specific matter of legislation, to wit: the support of paupers, and as to which it may, and in fact does, happen that the duties imposed upon towns and upon cities are different. In my opinion, therefore, it was not the purpose of Pub. Sts., c. 28, § 2, to provide that in all statutes in which duties were imposed upon towns the word "town" should include cities, but only such general laws as related to towns themselves considered as municipalities.

The act under consideration is binding upon towns, but the subject of legislation with which it deals is indicated by its title, to wit: "An Act relating to the support of poor in towns." The words in towns" limit what otherwise would have been the general scope of the act, and make it applicable not to cities, but to towns only.

2.

"Does the word 'paupers' in the law include children as well as adults?"

The word "paupers" in art. III. of the Amendments to the Constitution of the Commonwealth was defined in Opinion of Justices, 11 Pick. 539 (February 14, 1832), to mean "persons claiming assistance for themselves or families from the provisions made by law for the poor." It was there said that the word had acquired a precise and technical meaning. See also Opinion of Justices, 124 Mass. 596; Sturbridge v. Holland, 11 Pick. 459; Fiske v. Lincoln, 19 Pick. 473; Commonwealth v. Cambridge, 20 Pick. 267.

Such meaning, therefore, is to be given to the word paupers in the act of 1897. Pub. Sts., c. 3, § 3, cl. 3. But "paupers" is a word broad enough to include children, even taking its meaning to be as technical as is above stated. Provision is made by law for the settlement of children under the pauper law. The provisions of the statute in question are certainly as important in their application to children as to adults; perhaps even more so. I can see no reasonable ground to suppose that the act does not include such children. as come within the meaning of the word "paupers."

3. "Do the provisions of the law apply to the inmates of the State institutions for the insane supported therein by the cities and towns?"

The purpose of the laws is to take precaution (1) against paupers being supported in improper places by providing for investigation by the overseers of each place where such paupers are supported, and for compulsory periodical visits by the overseers to such places, and by allowing the State Board permission to visit such places; and (2) against paupers being placed out upon terms and conditions not conducive to their proper care and maintenance, by compelling the overseers to keep a full record of all cases" where paupers are provided for otherwise than in a workhouse or almshouse," and to certify upon the records that they have made investigation in each case, and are satisfied that the paupers will be well and properly cared for; and furthermore by allowing the State Board to determine in what manner overseers of the poor shall contract for the support of town paupers.

In the case of paupers supported in the State lunatic institutions, it is clear that, though such persons may be technically within the letter of the act of 1897 as being provided for "otherwise than in a workhouse or almshouse," yet the spirit of the law does not apply to them. None of the precautions provided for by the act is necessary in such cases. Ample provision is made by law to secure the proper management of these institutions (Pub. Sts., c. 87, §§ 6, 7, 9), and to provide for the payment of the expenses of the support of inmates. Pub. Sts., c. 87, § 31. Where the language of the statute in its ordinary meaning leads to a manifest inconvenience or absurdity, other words may be interpolated; and when the real intent of the Legislature is plain, the language of the statute must be given such a construction as will carry that intent into effect. The absurdity of requiring overseers of the poor, under pain of a fine of one hundred dollars, to investigate and visit State lunatic hospitals once every three months, if any town pauper happens to be there, is apparent, and cannot have been intended by the Legislature.

4.

"Does the law apply to paupers partially supported, as well as to those fully supported?"

I assume that this question refers to cases where persons are assisted to a greater or less extent by the overseers of the poor,

on account of their partial inability to care for themselves. In these cases the town takes no responsibility of their surroundings or of the proper care and attention given to them. They still remain in the control of their own affairs, free to live where and how they please. The act does not in terms include such persons, and in my opinion is not intended to include them. 5. "Do the words workhouse or almshouse,' in § 1, exclude the State Farm, as well as the State Almshouse, from the operation of the law?"

It is clear that the words "otherwise than in a workhouse or almshouse" are sufficiently comprehensive to exclude the State Farm and the State Almshouse from the operation of the statute. Before the passage of St. 1887, c. 264, the State Farm was called the State Workhouse. Pub. Sts., c. 88. The reason, moreover, which I have suggested for excluding State lunatic hospitals from the scope of the statute, applies with equal force to the State Farm and to the State Almshouse.

6. "Are the overseers of the poor required by the law to make visits in person, or can such visits be made by an agent appointed by them?"

I am of opinion that the duty imposed by the statute is personal, and is imposed upon each overseer; that is to say, each overseer of the poor in the town is required, once at least in three months, to visit each place where the town paupers are provided for, and to make a record of his visit and of the condition of the paupers visited.

ASSISTANT CLERK OF COURT PRO TEMPORE, - COMPENSATION.

The salary of an assistant clerk of courts appointed by the clerk of courts under authority of Pub. Sts., c. 159, § 9, must be paid by the clerk and cannot legally be paid from the county treasury under the provisions of Pub. Sts., c. 159, § 33, making an allowance to clerks of courts for extra clerical assistance.

To the Control-
Accounts.

ler of County

The clerk of courts for the county of Berkshire may, under Pub. Sts., c. 159, § 9, appoint an assistant clerk pro tempore; but the same section expressly provides that the compensation June 18. of such assistant shall be paid by the clerk.

1897

To the Governor. 1897

June 29.

This express provision is not controlled by § 33 of the same chapter. The assistant so appointed does not come within the classification of extra clerical assistance, referred to in the latter section. The duties and authority of an assistant clerk are much more extensive than those of a person rendering extra clerical assistance. He may perform all the duties of a clerk. Pub. Sts., c. 159, § 9. Unless the Legislature specially authorizes the payment of the salary of an assistant clerk, the clerk making the appointment must pay it himself.

INSURANCE, ASSESSMENT COMPANY, MASSACHUSETTS

BENEFIT

LIFE ASSOCIATION, "BENEFIT MEMBERS," EXPENSE FUND,

Policies of insurance, issued to persons other than the original incorporators,
and those whom they voted to associate with them, by the Massachusetts
Benefit Life Association, a corporation organized under St. 1874, c. 375,
as amended by St. 1877, c. 204, the company having repealed the by-law
making each policy holder a member thereof before it issued any policies,
were issued illegally till the enactment of St. 1885, c. 183, which ratified
what had been done by the company, and authorized the continuance of
just such business.

Policies first issued described the holders thereof as members. These were
recalled and new policies substituted, describing the holders as "benefit
members " There is no such thing in the law as a "benefit member" of
a corporation, and they were not members; yet it cannot be said that the
legal rights of the policy holders were infringed by the change.
All the policies issued by the company, after providing for the collection of
an annual assessment for expenses, stipulated that the expense fund
should beat the sole disposal of the officers of the association;" and,
although the assessments were largely in excess of the expenses, yet the
levying of them cannot in law be said to be an infringement of the rights
of the policy holders.

The statutes of the Commonwealth provide for the making of annual returns
by the company to the Insurance Commissioner. Since the business of
the company was legalized by St. 1885, c. 183, the Commonwealth has no
right of action against the company unless its annual returns were untrue;
if untrue, the remedy is by indictment.

Your letter of April 30 requests the opinion of the AttorneyGeneral upon two questions, to wit:

First. Whether the rights of the policy holders in the Massachusetts Benefit Life Association have been improperly infringed upon; and