assimilating points prevent a strict line of separation between them. In uttering a simple request, we use quite a different intonation and force, from that employed on the same words, in the spirit of a command. But gradually add earnestness to the request, and gradually moderate the spirit of the command; and as the states of mind become identical, so will the voices, if properly representing those changes. Notwithstanding the universal admission of a difference of meaning in the terms Thought and Passion, yet in our ignorance of the analytic history of speech, we have not felt the want of a discriminative nomenclature, and consequently have had no brief corresponding terms, to designate precisely, the vocal signs that severally represent them. Books on elocution have indeed, employed the word Expression, to signify the utterance of feeling or passion. But they furnish us with no single or appropriate term for the plain declaration of simple passionless thought; which as we proceed in our history will be essentially required. Till science breathes a defining and dividing voice over common thought and language, all is desultory and confused. Thus the term Expression, though sufficient for the indefinite purpose of the Orator and Player, does not answer the purpose of exact discrimination; for it is as common to speak of the expression of the thought or sense of discourse, as of its feeling or passion. This want of precision in the use of the terms Thought and Feeling, prevents a clear distinction, between the terms of the Vocal signs, by which each should be respectively represented. We will however, employ the term Expression, to denote the sentiment and passion of the speaker. But where shall we find a contradistinguishing term, for his simple thought?

Generally, in plain narrative and description, we state the simple condition of thought: and as we shall learn hereafter, that a certain form of intonation is appropriate to the language of simple Narrative, we may draw our term from it. I will therefore adopt the terms Narrative, and Expression, respectively, for the signs of Thought and of Passion, as they are employed in Reading and Speech. But we shall find in the following pages, how difficult it is to draw a definite line of separation between the mingling

signs of simple thought, and of passion; and how readily the intellectual as well as the vocal relationships pass, by indistinguishable shades, into each other.

The classifications of science were instituted, in part, to assist the memory and imagination; but while they fulfill the purpose of communicating and preserving knowledge, they unfortunately produce the undesigned hindrance of its alteration or advancement, by creating a belief of its systematic completion. The numberless revolutions in scientific arrangements are full of admonitions: yet we forget how often the fictitious affinities, and the distinctions of system have on the one hand, presumptuously united the intended divisions of nature, and on the other, broken the beautiful connection of her circle of truth.

In submission to the necessities of instruction, I have, in this essay, tried to separate the part called, for the want of a brief and better term, the Simple Narrative of speech, from that which treats of its Expressive signs; with the hope that future observation may determine their real relationships, by a full development of the nature of the mind and of the voice. For we may as well suppose, all those works of usefulness are already accomplished, which are foretold by the powers of human observation, and the calculated promises of Science; as that those Delightful Arts, which employ while they regulate the imagination, have to minds of intelligent and refined perceptions, presented their yet undisclosed grandeurs and graces, in Form, and Color, and Sound, marked-out for fulfillment in the Prophetic Book of Taste. Let us leave the seventh day of rest, to the holiday rejoicing of physicians, lawyers, priests, and politicians, who look upon their disastrous creations, and cunning schemes for human misery, and pronounce them original, and finished, and good. Let them build strongly around the vaunted perfection of their Theories, Codes, Councils, and Constitutions. Let them guard the ark of a forefather's wisdom, and proclaim its unalterable holiness to the people, for the safety, honor and emolument of the keeper. The great Contributions to Knowledge, like the great and progressive Creations of Nature herself, have never yet found, and perhaps

never will find, their day of rest: while the renowned forefathers of many a work of usefulness as well as glory are, by the like merit or ambition which raised their own temporary greatness, transmuted to corrigible children, in the eye of the advancing labor of a later age.

It has been alleged of the expression of speech, that a discrimination of its concealed and delicate agency, is beyond the scrutiny of the human ear. If the term human ear is sarcastically used for that fruitlessly busy and slavish organ, which has so long listened for the clear voice of nature, amid the conflicting tumult of opinion and authority, we must admit and regret the truth of the assertion. But it is not true of a keen, industrious, and independent exercise of the senses; nor can it be affirmed, without profanity, of that supreme power of observation, deputed by the original, and final cause of creation, for the effective gathering of truth, and the progressive improvement of mankind.

Our conquests in knowledge must be the joint achievement of Numbers and Time. Leaving then to futurity the completion of my design, I looked around for present assistance: and having, with more need than hope, consulted the thoughts of others, on the analytic means of delineating the signs of expression, I generally received some query like this: Is it possible to recognize and measure all those delicate variations of sound, that have passed so long without detection, and that seem scarcely more amenable to sense than the atoms of air on which they are made? It is possible to do all this: and if we cannot Find a way for the victorious development of nature, 'let us,’——— with the maxim, and in the contriving spirit and resolution of the great Carthagenian Captain, let us Make one.'

It will not be denied, that intonation, time, and force of voice, under all their forms, constituting the expression of speech, may be distinctly heard; and that there is no liability, even in the common ear, to misapprehend, or to confound the varied sentiments, they respectively convey. No: but it is objected, that the peculiar kind, the measurable degree, and the commingling variety of those forms cannot be distinguished.

Now since the vocal movements thus distinctly audible, include all these conditions; and since our sentiments are so readily recognized under all their kinds, degrees, and combinations, I leave it to those who make the objection, to ask themselves, whether a full and clear discrimination of the vocal signs of expression is not implied in that recognition. The truth is, the delicate voices of expression, though supposed to be imperceptible, are always distinctly heard; and as far as an unhesitating apprehension of their meaning may prove the assertion, are always recognized and measured, in the strictest sense of the word: but they have never been named. And although all persons who are observant in this way, have nearly an equally acute perception of the expression of speech, they have no language for designating those delicate discriminations, every day unconsciously made even by the popular ear. I propose to give, in the course of this essay, an analysis of vocal expression; to point out its modes, forms, and varieties, and to assign a definite nomenclature to them.

There is perhaps no vain confidence, in supposing the reader to be now well acquainted with the character of the radical and vanishing movement. This wide-reaching function, and masterprinciple of the voice, has been represented under its varied forms, in speech and song. We have traced it in the literal elements, and seen its influence in directing the phenomena of syllables. I have yet to show its instrumentality in the various and delicate uses of expression: and if I shall be able thereby to unfold the principles of this marvellous work of nature, it will be by developing that greater marvel of agency, in which a strict economy of means is employed for the production of her infinities.

Five general divisions of the modes of vocal sound were made in the first section of this essay. In summary repetition, they are, Quality, or kind of voice; Time, or the measure of its duration; Force, or the variations of strength and weakness; Abruptness, or an explosive utterance; and Pitch, or the variations of acuteness and gravity. It will be shown, that each of these general modes is inclusive of many forms and varieties,

with their different degrees; and that the now assignable, and measurable Expression of Speech, is effected by the un-mysterious combination of the different forms and varieties of these modes with each other.

SECTION VII.

Of the Pitch of the Voice.

THE mode of the voice we have now to consider, although not more essential than the others, in the constituency of speech, has nevertheless, from our ignorance of its nature, been a subject of wonder; and from our childish love of wonder, has become especially a subject of interesting inquiry. To this mode of Pitch, belong the many forms and varieties of Intonation, or as they have been called in the schools of Rhetoric and Prosody, by a sort of prescriptive determination, the ‘undiscoverable Tones of the voice.'

The Greeks in their fondness for definition and division, were always disposed to go to the root of whatever knowledge they believed to have a root, and at the same time to be worthy of inquiry. They seem therefore, as we might infer from their want of logical curiosity on this point, to have considered a full analysis of speech, either as impracticable, or as useless. But, whether from these or other causes, the subject so feebly attracted their attention, that we might be disposed to think they derived their knowledge of the sliding or concrete movement, from Egypt, or from some earlier Eastern source. Had it been discovered in the school of Pythagoras, or of Aristoxenus, it does not seem probable, that having found this key to the