SPEECH OF GEORGE M'DUFFIE,

DELIVERED

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 15 AND 16, 1826,

On the following resolutions, "Resolved, That, for the purpose of electing the President and Vice President of the United States, the constitution ought to be so amended, that a uniform system of voting by districts, shall be established in all the states; and that the constitution ought to be further amended, in such manner as will prevent the election of the aforesaid officers from devolving upon the respective Houses of Congress.

"Resolved, That a select committee be appointed, with instructions to prepare and report a joint resolution, embracing the aforesaid objects."

MR. CHAIRMAN,

THE resolution, which has been referred to the consideration of the committee, is resolvable into two distinct practical propositions, as plain and obvious in their import as they are unquestionably important in their tendency. The first contemplates the establishment of a uniform mode of voting, by districts, for the President and Vice President of the United States, instead of leaving it to the legislatures of the respective states, either to prescribe and vary the mode of voting, or to assume and exercise that important function themselves. The second proposes that, in the event of no person receiving a majority of all the electoral votes, at the first balloting, some provision shall be made for the final disposition of the contest, that will supersede the eventual interference of either branch of Congress in the election of the two chief executive magistrates of the republic. As the resolution does not declare whether it is expedient that the electors should be dispensed with or retained, nor indicate the substitute by which the final election shall

be prevented from devolving upon Congress, I will very briefly state the details of the proposed amendment, in reference to these particular objects.

As the electors, if retained at all, would hold their first balloting immediately after they are chosen and under circumstances that would almost preclude the possibility of tampering or corruption, I am willing to acquiesce in any decision that a majority of the committee may make upon the question of retaining them in the first instance. For, although I do not believe the electors to be of any possible utility in the system, and can perceive considerable objections to retaining them even thus partially, yet, if a majority of the committee should think differently, I will cheerfully sacrifice this minor consideration, to ensure the accomplishment of the great object of the contemplated amendment.

But, in case the primary vote of the electoral colleges shall fail to decide the election, I propose that the two highest candidates, respectively, shall be referred back to the people, voting directly for the President and Vice President by districts. For, when it is considered that at least three or four months must unavoidably elapse between the first and the second balloting, the argument against retaining a body of electors for so long a period exposed to temptation, becomes, in my judgment, irresistible. And, in addition to this view of the subject, when the contest is reduced to a simple issue between two competitors, there is an end of all the conceivable reasons for a discretionary agency, and the interposition of electors can only be regarded as at best a useless incumbrance.

Such, Mr. Chairman, is the brief outline of an amendment, which so emphatically speaks its own importance, that I need scarcely invoke the patient and undivided attention of those, who, under the most solemn responsibility to the present and future generations, are to pronounce and record their judgments upon it.

In bringing forward this plan of constitutional reform. I am not unaware of the obstacles, common to

every similar undertaking, that must be unavoidably encountered. Some there are, who, in their indiscriminating reverence for the excellencies and imperfections of the constitution, are disposed to regard every proposition to amend it, as a dangerous innovation. Although it is undoubtedly true, that every change is not an improvement, and that the constitution ought never to be altered, even under the clearest convictions of theoretical propriety, for slight or transient' causes, yet it is equally true, that to stand indiscriminately opposed to all changes, is, to say the least of it, the dictate of a very superficial wisdom. It is offering an idolatrous homage at the shrine of the constitution, which the constitution itself explicitly disclaims. That the clause which provides for its own amendment, stands amongst the least equivocal indications of the wisdom of its framers, will be apparent to every one who will reflect but for a single moment, upon the vast comprehensiveness of their labors, and the peculiar circumstances under which they were performed.

Called together by an extraordinary and alarming emergency, and acting under the influence of the excited passions, unavoidably incident to a crisis portending anarchy and civil strife, the convention were under the necessity of forming, in a few months, the entire structure of a government, perfectly new in its principles, and destined, in less than a single century from the period of its formation, to extend either its blessings or its curses, to a larger number of civilized human beings than were ever before associated under the auspices of one common government! When, to this view of the impressive magnitude and growing character of the objects and interests committed to the charge of the federal convention, we add the consideration that they consisted of delegates from thirteen independent sovereignties, having rival interests, and conflicting views to harmonize, the wonder is, not that they failed to make a perfect constitution, but that they made any constitution at all. And here, sir, I will take occasion to remark, as having a more immediate bearing upon

the proposition before us, that, in the organization of the executive department of the government, that department in which it has always been found most difficult to unite the elements, the essential elements of liberty and power; the convention, deriving but few, and glimmering, and delusive lights from history, have most signally failed in accomplishing their patriotic intentions, though this is undoubtedly the part of the system which they regarded as least obnoxious to objection-an impressive admonition to us all, how seldom, in the conduct of human affairs, the wisdom of man transcends the narrow horizon of his experience! In connexion with this view of the subject, I will venture to express the opinion with confidence, that the common mass of tolerably informed politicians, in the present day, having witnessed the actual operation of this part of our political system, understand it decidedly better than the wisest member of the convention. In uttering this opinion, I derogate nothing from the wisdom of that venerable assembly. They were too wise not to form a just estimate, themselves, of their own situation. Conscious of the complicated and perplexing difficulties under which they acted, and viewing their own work, not with the vain arrogance of the Spartan lawgiver, but with the profound wisdom of experimental philosophers, so far from attempting to render it immutable, by proscribing all changes under the imposing sanctions of religion, they adopted a much more effectual means of rendering it immortal, by providing a regulated mode of remedying its imperfections. It is thus that the fundamental laws of the republic, without the violence and blood that have marked the revolutionary throes of other countries, can be gradually and peaceably accommodated to the successive changes and progressive improvements of the social system. In offering to lay the hand of reformation upon the venerated fabric of the constitution, I feel sustained by the consciousness that I am doing nothing more than the members of the convention would themselves do, had it pleased

Providence that they should have lived to participate in the deliberations of this day. I shall proceed, therefore, without either superstitious awe, on the one hand, or unbecoming irreverence, on the other, to expose the existing defects of the constitution, and to indicate what I believe to be the appropriate remedy. And I here distinctly admit, that, before I can expect any member of the committee to vote for a proposi tion involving a fundamental change in the constitution, I am, upon every principle of sound reasoning, bound to establish the affirmative of the proposition. It is our propitious fortune to exist under a government that has, in the main, answered all the great ends for which governments are instituted. Enjoying, in fact, a system of regulated liberty, more perfect in its past operations than any which has heretofore existed in the world, it is the part of wisdom to abstain from change, until the actual existence or threatened approach of danger is clearly and satisfactorily demonstrated.

The first branch of the resolution, we are considering, declares the expediency of establishing a uniform system of voting, by districts, for the President and Vice President. By adverting, for a moment, to the existing provisions of the constitution, on this subject, it will be perceived that the important operation of electing the two chief executive officers of the United States is not regulated by any constitutional rule whatever. The constitution, by declaring that "each state shall appoint the electors, in such manner as the legislature thereof may prescribe," puts an unequivocal negative upon the idea of fixedness and permanence, which essentially enter into the elementary notion of constitutional regulation. Different rules prevail in the same state at different times, and in the different states at the same time, all liable to be changed according to the varying views and fluctuating fortunes of political parties. It may be assumed as a political axiom, that those creative acts of popular sovereignty, which bring the machine of government into existence, and put it in motion, ought to