for gold, and should it be found to contain gold the Governor may cancel wholly or in part the sale of such land, and upon notification thereof in the Gazette the proprietor is entitled to compensation, but exclusive of the value of the gold. The land thereupon becomes Crown Land (p). And by the Mining Act of 1889 all land purchased from the Crown since the 30th September, 1889, is subject to a like condition in regard to not only gold, but other minerals also (q). (2). For mining villages. If no Crown land be available, the Governor may resume any private land which he may deem necessary for the purpose of a mining village, the owner being entitled to compensation (r). (3). For public purposes generally. Owners of land are compellable to alienate when their land is required by the Government for some public purpose, such as railways (s), tramways (t), roads (u), canals or cuttings for irrigation (v), and many other undertakings of a public character, or for the public benefit (w). Many Crown Grants also contain an express reservation of full power to resume all or any of the land granted which may be required for any public purpose (x). Summary. The right and liability to alienation, both voluntary and involuntary, are inherent in property. So inherent is the right of alienation of all estates (except estates tail, in which as we have seen, the right is only of a modified nature), that it is impossible any owner, by any means, to divest himself of this right. And in the same manner the liability of estates for (p) 48 Vic. No. 18, s. 45. (8) Act No. 26, 1900, ss. 33, 144. (1) Act No. 6, 1901, s. 49. to involuntary alienation cannot by any means be got rid of. So long as any estate is in the hands of any person, so long does his power of disposition continue (y), and so long also continues his liability to have the estate taken from him either to satisfy the demands of his creditors, or to afford facilities for meeting public requirements. But, a gift of property may be confined to the period of the grantee's personal enjoyment, when lands or property are given by one person for the benefit of another. Thus, land may be given to trustees in trust for A. until he shall dispose of the same, or shall become bankrupt, or until any act or event shall occur, whereby the property might belong to any other person or persons (z). And this is frequently done. On the bankruptcy of A., or on his attempting to make any disposition of the property, it will in such a case not vest in the official assignee for the benefit of creditors, or follow the attempted disposition; but, the interest which had been given to A. will thenceforth entirely cease in the same manner as the interest of a tenant for life terminates on his decease. But, although another person may make such a gift for A.'s benefit, A. would not be allowed to make such a disposition of his own property in trust for himself (a). An exception to this rule of law occurs in the case of a woman, who is permitted to have property settled upon her in such a way that she cannot when married make any disposition of (y) Litt. s. 360; Co. Litt. 206b, 223a; Gazzard v. Jobbins, 14 N.S.W.R. Eq. 28, 31. (2) Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Str. 947; Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. 429, 433; Re Taylor, 15 N.S.W.R. Bcy. 113. (a) Lester v. Garland, 5 Sim. 205; Phipps v. Lord Ennismore, 4 Russ. 131. See, however, as to a restriction on a man's own alienation, the case of Brooke v. Pearson, 27 Beav. 181; In re Detmold, L.R. 40 Ch. Div. 585. it during the coverture or marriage; but this mode of settlement is of comparatively modern date (b). Rights of husbands and wives. In addition to the interests which may be created by alienation, either voluntary or in voluntary, there are certain rights in each other's lands conferred by law on husbands and wives, by means of which the descent of an estate from an ancestor to his heir might formerly be partially defeated. These rights will be the subject of a future chapter. Meanwhile we shall consider, in the next chapter, the law governing the descent of an estate in fee simple. (b) Brandon v. Robinson,, 18 Ves. 434; Tullett v. Armstrong, 1 Beav. 1; 4 M. & Cr. 390; Scarborough V Borman, 1 CHAPTER IV. OF THE DEVOLUTION OF REAL ESTATE. If a tenant in fee simple had not disposed of his estate in his lifetime, or by his will, and if it were not swallowed up by his debts, his lands formerly descended (subject to any rights of his wife) to the heir-at-law. The heir, as we have before observed, is a person appointed by the law. He is called into existence by his ancestor's decease, for no man can during his lifetime have an heir. Nemo est haeres viventis. A man may have an heir apparent, or an heir presumptive, but until his decease he has no heir. The heir apparent is the person who, if he survives the ancestor, must certainly be his heir, as the eldest son in the lifetime of his father. The heir presumptive is the person, who, though not certain to be heir at all events, would yet be the heir in case of the ancestor's immediate decease. Thus, an only daughter is the heiress presumptive of her father; for, if he were now to die, she would at once be his heir; but she is not certain of being heir; for her father may have a son, who would supplant her, and become heir apparent during her father's lifetime, and be afterwards his heir. An heir at law is the only person on whom the law casts property, whether he would or not. If I make a conveyance of land to a person in my lifetime, or leave him any property by my will, he may, if he pleases, disclaim taking it, and in such case it will not vest in him (b). But it was otherwise with an heir at law. Immediately on the decease of an ancestor, the heir became presumptively possessed, or seised in law, of all his lands (c). No disclaimer that he might make would have any effect, though, of course, he might, as soon as he pleased, dispose of the property by an actual conveyance. A title as heir at law of land in New South Wales cannot now arise, in consequence of certain legislative provisions, first introduced by an act of parliament, known as Lang's Act, which we shall presently notice (d). And even in England such a title is not nearly so frequent now as it was in the times when the right of alienation was more restricted. And when it does occur it is often established with difficulty, owing to the nature of the facts to be proved rather than to any uncertainty in the law. For the rules of descent have attained an almost mathematical accuracy, so that, if the facts are rightly given, the heir at law can at once be pointed out. This accuracy has arisen by degrees,-by the successive determination of disputed points. Thus, we have seen that in the early feudal times, an estate to a man and his heirs simply, which is now an estate in fee simple, was descendible only to his offspring, in the same manner as an estate tail at the present day. But by the time of Henry II. it was settled law, that collateral relations were admitted to succeed (e). Subsequently, about the time of Henry III. (ƒ), the old Saxon rule, which divided the inheritance equally amongst all males of the same |