lack of judgment, his impetuosity, his overweening presumption; but Mr. Asquith also knew Mr. Churchill's qualities as a Party politician. If these did not decide Mr. Asquith's choice, it seems that he must have tossed up. In any case, knowing what he knew of Mr. Churchill's record at the Admiralty, Mr. Asquith, upon the Prince's retirement, allowed Mr. Churchill to remain. And in order that nothing might be lacking, the Prime Minister recalled Lord Fisher from retirement to the post of First Sea Lord. Nothing in the world can extenuate the responsibility of Mr. Asquith in making that appointment. Mr. Churchill could, of course, have prevented it. Did he either suggest Lord Fisher's recall or acquiesce in it, because he thought he could dominate the old officer, or because he relied on Lord Fisher's newspaper reputation to still criticism, or both? The public may draw their own conclusions, in the light of the Report of the Dardanelles Commission. For the Dardanelles expedition was the direct and the inevitable result of the revival of the Fisher policy in time of war by the late Government. Under what Government soever he had held office, Lord Fisher had served the political ends of that Government. He was now to ensure their failure in a military enterprise. There is no doubt at all concerning what is the duty of a First Sea Lord in time of war. It is to secure the working together of the Board of Admiralty and, with his colleagues, to assume the conduct of the war at sea in accordance with the policy of the Government. In war there can be but one policy to win the war. If any proposal made by the Government is either impracticable or in a military aspect inadvisable, it is the duty of the Board, not, as Lord Fisher told the Commission, to resign, but to explain to the Government in what their objection consists. The Ministers who gave evidence before the Commission unanimously accepted that view of the Board's duty, and with an equal unanimity testified that the silence of the professional advisers of the First Lord was taken to signify their agreement with his views. If, after having been duly informed of the opinion of the Board, the Government decide to override it, then, and not until then, is it the duty of the Board to consider whether or not their resignation is required in the interests of the nation. But in the case under consideration the point never arose. When the project for creating a diversion in the Dardanelles was discussed at the War Council, Lord Fisher remained silent. From first to last, it does not appear that any member of the Cabinet, with the exceptions of Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill, had the least idea what were Lord Fisher's views on the subject, except that they assumed from his silence that he approved of the enter 66 prise. When Mr. Asquith first understood that Lord Fisher did not approve of it is uncertain, but he certainly knew on January 25, 1915, because on that date Lord Fisher gave the Prime Minister a memorandum on the subject. On January 28 Mr. Asquith discussed it in his private room with both Lord Fisher and Mr. Churchill. After that conversation, during the same morning, was held the important meeting of the War Council at which, as Sir Arthur Wilson told the Commission, Mr. Churchill kept on saying he could do it without the army.. Neither Mr. Asquith nor Mr. Churchill informed the rest of the Council of the contents of Lord Fisher's memorandum, nor of the conversation with Lord Fisher which had occurred a little earlier. Lord Fisher merely remarked that he did not know the question was to be raised, and that his own views were known to the Prime Minister. And it was on that day the decision to make a naval attack upon the Dardanelles was made by the War Council. There were two meetings of the Council. Between the two, after lunch, as Mr. Churchill told the Commission, he induced Lord Fisher" definitely" to consent to the expedition. Scarce two hours previously Lord Fisher had been dissuaded by Lord Kitchener from resigning because the Prime Minister had ignored his objections. It is right to say, at this point, that it was not the custom of the Prime Minister, in presiding over the meetings of the War Council, to ask the opinion of his professional advisers. These officers stated to the Commission that they did not consider they ought to speak until they were spoken to. Mr. Churchill, Viscount Grey, Mr. Balfour, the Earl of Crewe, and Mr. Lloyd George all testified that they naturally assumed that if the naval and military officers had anything to say, or if they dissented from any suggestion or statement, they would express their views. Such were the conditions under which the late Government conducted the war. And all the while the people were pathetically trusting these men, and especially were they supported by their confidence in the One Sailor. The question as to the practicability of a naval operation unsupported by the Army does not necessarily affect the main indictment of Lord Fisher, for he told the First Lord from the beginning that the requisite ships were needed elsewhere; he was, in fact, the sole judge of that matter. Mr. Churchill, who tried to persuade Lord Fisher that he was wrong, knew nothing about naval strategy. But it does not appear that Lord Fisher ever told the War Council what he believed to be the requirements of the naval situation. If he told Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister concealed the information from the rest of the War Council. Mr. Churchill certainly concealed it. If there is any doubt that had Lord Fisher informed the Council of his objections to the project and of his reasons for them it would, as a purely naval operation, have been abandoned by the Government, it arises from the statement made by Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons on March 20, that in such an event "it would be for the War Council to settle whether they would have a new Board of Admiralty or abandon the project altogether." And how does that statement accord with the reiterated assertions of the Government that they were always ready to follow expert advice? But the fact remains that Lord Fisher did not put the issue to the test. His influence in the War Council, if not absolutely decisive, was exceedingly powerful. Nor is there any doubt that Lord Fisher was perfectly aware of his power. Why, then, did he fail to exercise it? Lord Fisher, First Sea Lord, deliberately allowed the War Council to believe that he approved of Mr. Churchill's proposals, and he permitted Mr. Churchill to assume the conduct of the affair. When failure followed disaster Lord Fisher quitted his post. But that was not the end of the Fisher policy. The Government appointed Lord Fisher, with a salary, to the chairmanship of the Board of Research and Invention (which is known in the Navy by a different name with the same initials). The newspaper legend revived. A mysterious clamour was raised demanding the return of Lord Fisher to save the country. Sandwichmen paraded Whitehall and Downing Street. Then (of all people) Mr. Churchill suddenly pleaded for the return of Lord Fisher to the Admiralty. So did Mr. Lambert, M.P., ex-civil Lord of the Admiralty, in a speech of singular fatuity. Such were the outward symptoms of manoeuvres with which Admiral of the Fleet Sir Hedworth Meux dealt as they deserved, and which served to demonstrate once more Mr. Churchill's ideas of duty to the State. On March 20 Mr. Asquith appeared before the House of Commons as his own advocate to plead a case which had already been decided by a tribunal of his own choosing. He laboriously attempted to prove how right he was in doing wrong. Then Mr. Churchill twisted and turned through a maze of dubious assertions and fallacious arguments. The result was to leave everything exactly as it was before, with this difference: that the two Ministers lost another opportunity for honestly acknowledging failure, forfeited another chance of expressing some sorrow for the death of many valiant men, some concern for their sufferings, some regret for the destruction of fine ships; and so once more, all unconsciously, terribly and indelibly delineated their real character. A NAVAL CORRESPONDENT FIGHTING THE ALPHABET FROM strength to strength our cause proceeds, To Hamilton Monro succeeds And Murray to Monro. Though M.E.F. and F. in E. Have perished simultaneously Great E.E.F. is all in all (Oh marvel alphabetical) And Maxwell home must go. Then tremble Turk and tremble Hun The Alphabet is done. CAIRO INDIA THE CONGRESS AND THE DOMINIONS Ir is by no means clear that the authorities were well advised in issuing the report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India at the present critical stage of the war. The report itself is extremely long and highly complex. It is accompanied by nineteen massive volumes of evidence, and the whole production much exceeds in bulk any similar collection of documents which I have ever encountered even in the Land of Reports. It ought not to have been thrust upon us at the moment when the struggle of the nations is reaching its culminating-point, because the thoughts of most men in this country are concentrated upon the war. India ought also to be thinking of the war and little else, but unfortunately, as in Ireland, her people are apparently thinking a great deal more of their internal controversies. The Report was signed in August 1915. The Home Government, with the concurrence of the Government of India, then decided to withhold publication until after the war. The change of Government at home last December appears to have produced a reversal of the original decision about the Report. After having been held up for nearly eighteen months, the authorities in England and in India disgorged these terrific piles of printed matter, for reasons which seem inadequate. One result was that the London newspapers, with the exception of the Times and the Morning Post, paid very little attention to the Commission's recommendations; and the Times was alone in its attempt to print a fairly comprehensive digest of the conclusions reached. The moment was further inopportune because the domestic politics of India are not at present in a particularly healthy condition-though this contention may obviously be applied both ways. The Indian National Congress, which is chiefly Hindu in texture, and the Moslem League both met at Lucknow during Christmastide, and it was quickly evident that both movements have been completely captured by the "advanced" wing of Indian politicians. The National Congress came to grief at Surat in 1907, when there was a disorderly breach between the "Mode |