themselves and others. If a Man fhould try all the magnetical Experiments himself, and publish them as his own Thoughts, he might take bimfelf to be the Inventor of them: But he that examines and compares with them what Gibbert, and others have done before him, will not diminish the Praife of his Diligence, but may wish he had compared his Thoughts with other Men's: By which the World would receive greater Advantage, although he had lost the Honour of being an Original.

To alleviate my Fault herein, I agree with your Lordship, that many Things may feem NEW, to one that converfes only with his own Thoughts, which really are not fo: But I must crave leave to fuggeft to your Lordship, that if, in the fpinning them out of his own Thoughts, they feem new to him, he is certainly the Inventor of them; and they may as juftly be thought his own Invention, as any one's; and he is as certainly the Inventor of them, as any one who thought on them before him: The Distinction of Invention, or not Invention, lying not in thinking firft, or not first, but in borrowing, or not borrowing, our Thoughts from another: And he to whom, fpinning them out of his own Thoughts, they seem new, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented Printing in Europe, who, without any Communication with the Chinese, fpun it out of his own Thoughts; though it were ever fo true, that the Chinese had the Ufe of Printing, nay, of Printing in the very fame Way, among them, many Ages before him. So that he that fpins any Thing out of his own Thoughts, that feems new to bim, cannot ceafe to think it his own Invention, fhould he examine ever fo far, what Thoughts others have had before him, concerning the fame Thing, and should find by examining, that they had the fame Thoughts too.

But what great Obligation this would be to the World, or weighty. Caufe of turning over and looking into Books, I confefs I do not fee. The great End to me, in converfing with my own or other Men's Thoughts, in Matters of Speculation, is to find Truth, without being much concerned whether my own fpinning of it out of mine, or their fpinning of it out of their own Thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the Honour of an Original, may be feen in that Place of my Book, where, if any where, that Itch of Vain-Glory was likelieft to have fhewn itself, had I been fo over-run with it, as to need a Cure. It is where I fpeak of Certainty, in thefe following Words, taken Notice of by your Lordship, in another Place: I think I have fhewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty confifts, which, whatever it was to others, was, I confefs, to me, heretofore, one of thofe Defiderata, which I found great Want of.'

;

Here, my Lord, however New this feemed to me, and the more fo because poffibly I had in vain hunted for it in the Books of others yet I fpoke of it as New, only to myfelf; leaving others in the undifturbed Poffeffion of what, either by Invention, or Reading, was theirs before; without affuming to myself any other Honour, but

that

that of my own Ignorance, 'till that Time, if others before had fhewn wherein Certainty lay. And yet, my Lord, if I had, upon this Occafion, been forward to affume to myself the Honour of an Original, I think I had been pretty fafe in it; fince I should have had your Lordship for my Guarantee and Vindicator in that Point, who are pleased to call it New; and, as fuch, to write against it.

And truly, my Lord, in this Refpect, my Book has had very unlucky Stars, fince it hath had the Misfortune to displease your Lordfhip, with many Things in it, for their Novelty; as, new Way of Reasoning; new Hypothefts about Reafon; new Sort of Certainty; new Terms; new Way of Ideas; new Method of Certainty, &c. And yet in other Places, your Lordship feems to think it worthy in me of your Lordship's Reflection, for faying, but what others have faid before: As where I fay, In the different Make of Men's Tempers, and Ap⚫plication of their Thoughts, fome Arguments prevail more on one, and fome on another, for the Confirmation of the fame Truth ;' your Lordship afks, What is this Difference from what all Men of Understanding bave faid? Again, I take it, your Lordship meant not thefe Words for a Commendation of my Book, where you say, But if no more be meant by, The fimple Ideas that come in by Senfation, or Reflection, and their being the Foundation of our Knowledge,' but that our Notions of Things come in, either from our Senfes, or the Exercife of our Minds: As there is nothing extraordinary in the Discovery, so your Lordship is far enough from oppofing that, wherein you think all Mankind are agreed,

And again, But what need all this great Noife about Ideas and Certainty, true and real Certainty by Ideas; if, after all, it comes only to this, that our Ideas only reprefent to us fuch Things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of Things?

But, The World hath been strangely amufed with Ideas of late; and we have been told, that frange Things might be done by the Help of Ideas; and yet these Ideas, at last, come to be only common Notions of Things, which we must make use of in our Reasoning. And to the like Purpose in other Places.

Whether, therefore, at laft, your Lordship will refolve, that it is New or no; or more faulty by its being New, must be left to your Lordship. This I find by it, that my Book cannot avoid being condemned on the one Side, or the other, nor do I fee a Poffibility to help it. If there be Readers that like only New Thoughts; or, on the other Side, others that can bear nothing but what can be justifed by received Authorities in Print; I must defire them to make themselves amends in that Part which they like, for the Displeasure they receive in the other: But if any fhould be fo exact, as to find fault with both, truly, I know not well what to fay to them. The Cafe is a plain Cafe, the Book is all over naught, and there is not a Sentence in it, that is not, either for its Antiquity or Novelty, to be condemned; and fo there is a fhort End of it. From your Lordship, indeed, in particular, I can hope for fomething better; for your Lordship thinks the general Defign of it so good, that that, I

flatter

I flatter myself, would prevail on your Lordship to preserve it from the Fire.

But as to the Way, your Lordship thinks, I should have taken to prevent the having it thought my Invention, when it was common to me with others, it unluckily fo fell out, in the Subject of my Essay of Human Understanding, that I could not look into the Thoughts of other Men to inform myfelf. For my Defign being, as well as I could, to copy Nature, and to give an Account of the Operations of the Mind in Thinking; I could look into no-body's Understanding but my own, to fee how it wrought; nor have a Profpect into other Men's Minds, to view their Thoughts there; and observe what Steps and Motions they took, and by what Gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themfelves with Truth, and their Advance in Knowledge: What we find of their Thoughts in Books, is but the Refult of this, and not the Progrefs and Working of their Minds, in coming to the Opinions or Conclufions they fet down and published.

All therefore, that I can fay of my Book, is, That it is a Copy of my own Mind, in its feveral Ways of Operation. And all that I can fay for the publishing of it, is, That I think the Intellectual Faculties are made, and operate alike in moft Men, and that fome, that I fhewed it to before I published it, liked it fo well, that I was confirmed in that Opinion. And therefore, if it should happen, that it fhould not be fo, but that fome Men fhould have Ways of Thinking, Reafoning, or arriving at Certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my Mind to use and acquiefce in, I do not fee of what Ufe my Book can be to them. I can only make it my humble Requeft, in my own Name, and in the Name of thofe that are of my Size, who find their Minds work, reason, and know in the fame low Way that mine does, that thofe Men of a more happy Genius would fhew us the Way of their nobler Flights; and particularly would discover to us their horter or furer Way to Certainty, than by Ideas, and the obferving their Agreement or Difagreement.

+ Mr. Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester, P. 353, &c.

Your Lordship adds, But now, it feems, nothing is intelligible but what fuits with the new Way of Ideas. My Lord, The new Way of Ideas, and the old Way of speaking Intelligibly was always, and ever will be the fame: And if I may take the Liberty to declare my Sense of it, herein it confifts: 1. That a Man ufe no Words, but fuch as he makes the Signs of certain determined Objects of his Mind in Thinking, which The can make known to another. 2. Next, That he ufe the fame Word fteadily for the Sign of the fame immediate Object of his Mind in Thinking. 3. That he join those Words together in Propofitions, according to the Grammatical Rules of that Language he fpeaks in. 4. That he unite thofe Sentences in a coherent Difcourfe. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preferve himself from the Confines and Sufpicion of Jargon, whe

ther

ther he pleases to call those immediate Objects of his Mind, which his Words do, or should ftand for, Ideas or no.

S. I.

CHA P. II.

The Way fhewn how ave come by any Knowledge, Sufficient to prove it not

Innate.

No Innate Principles in the Mind. IT is an established Opinion amongst fome Men, that there are in the Understanding certain Innate Principles ; fome Primary Notions, Kovai avvolar, Characters, as it were ftamped upon the Mind of Man, which the Soul receives in its very firft Being; and brings into the World with it. It would be fufficient to convince unprejudiced Readers of the Faifenefs of this Suppofition, if I fhould only fhew (as I hope I fhall in the following Parts of this Difcourfe) how Men, barely by the Ufe of their natural Faculties, may attain to all the Knowledge they have, without the Help of any Innate Impreffions; and may arrive at Certainty, without any fuch Original Notions or Principles. For I imagine any one will eafily grant, That it would be impertinent to fuppofe, the Ideas of Colours Innate in a Creature, to whom God hath given Sight, and a Power to receive them by the Eyes, from external Objects: And no less unreasonable would it be to attribute feveral Truths, to the Impreffions of Nature, and Innate Characters, when we may observe in ourselves Faculties fit to attain as easy and certain Knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the Mind.

But because a Man is not permitted without Cenfure to follow his own Thoughts in the Search of Truth, when they lead him ever fo little out of the common Road; I fhall fet down the Reasons, that made me doubt of the Truth of that Opinion, as an Excufe for my Miftake; if I be in one; which I leave to be confidered by thofe, who, with me, difpofe themselves to embrace Truth, wherever they find it.

General Assens
the great Ar-
gument.

§. 2. There is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain Principles, both Speculative and Practical (for they fpeak of both) univerfally agreed upon by all Mankind: which therefore, they argue, muft needs be conftant Impreffions, which the Souls of Men receive in their firft Beings, and which they bring into the World with them, as neceffarily and really as they do any of their inherent Faculties.

8.3.

Univerfal

Confent proves
nothing In-

nate.

§. 3. This Argument, drawn from Univerfat Confent, has this Misfortune in it, that if it were true in Matter of Fact, that there were certain Truths, wherein all Mankind agreed, it would not prove them Innate, if there can be any other Way fhewn, how Men may come to that Univerfal Agreement, in the Things they do confent in; which I prefume may be done.

What is, is ; and, It is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be, not univerfally affented

to.

§. 4. But, which is worse, this Argument of Univerfal Confent, which is made use of to prove Innate Principles, feems to me a Demonftration that there are none fuch; because there are none to which all Mankind give an Univerfal Affent. I fhall begin with the Speculative, and inftance in thofe magnified Principles of Demonftration; Whatfoever is, is; and, 'Tis impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be; which, of all others, I think have the most allowed Title to Innate. These have fo fettled a Reputation of Maxims univerfally received, that 'twill, no doubt, be thought ftrange, if any one fhould feem to question it. But yet I take liberty to fay, that these Propofitions are fo far from having an Univerfal Affent, that there are great Part of Mankind to whom they are not fo much as known.

Not on the

Mind natural-
ly imprinted,
because not
known to
Chil-
dren, Ideots,
&c.

S. 5. For,, firft, 'tis evident, that all Children and Ideots have not the leaft Apprehenfion or Thought of them: And the Want of that is enough to deftroy that Univerfal Affent, which must needs be the neceflary Concomitant of all innate Truths: It seeming to me near a Contradiction to fay, that there are Truths imprinted on the Soul, which it perceives or understands not: Imprinting, if it fignify any thing, being nothing else, but the making certain Truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing on the Mind, without the Mind's perceiving it, feems to me hardly intelligible. If therefore Children and Idents have Souls, have Minds, with thofe Impreffions upon them, they muft unavoidably perceive them, and neceffarily know and affent to thefe Truths; which fince they do not, it is evident that there are no fuch Impreffions. For if they are not Notions naturally imprinted, How can they be Innate? And if they are Notions imprinted, How can they be unknown? To fay a Notion is imprinted on the Mind, and yet at the fame time to fay, that the Mind is ignorant of it, and never yet took notice of it, is to make this Impreffion nothing. No Propofition can be faid to be

I

in