Terms of the Propofition, their standing for fuch Ideas, and the Ideas themselves that they stand for, being neither of them Innate; I would fain know what there is remaining in fuch Propofitions, that is Innate. For I would gladly have any one name that Propofition, whofe Terms or Ideas were either of them Innate. We by degrees get Ideas and Names, and learn their appropriated Connexion one with another; and then to Propofitions, made in fuch Terms, whofe Signi-. fication we have learnt, and wherein the Agreement or Disagreement we can perceive in our Ideas, when put together, is expreffed, we at first hearing affent; though to other Propofitions, in themselves as certain and evident, but which are concerning Ideas, not fo foon or so easily got, we are at the fame time no way capable of affenting. For though a Child quickly affents to this Propofition, That an Apple is not Fire, when, by familiar Acquaintance, he has got the Ideas of those two different things diftinctly imprinted on his Mind, and has learnt that the Names Apple and Fire ftand for them; yet it will be fome Years after, perhaps, before the fame Child will affent to this Propofition, That it is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be; because, that though, perhaps, the Words are as easy to be learnt, yet the Signification of them being more large, comprehenfive, and abstract, than of the Names annexed to those sensible things the Child hath to do with, it is longer before he learns their precise Meaning, and it requires more time plainly to form in his Mind thofe general Ideas they ftand for. 'Till that be done, you will in vain endeavour to make any Child affent to a Propofition made up of fuch general Terms: But as foon as ever he has got those Ideas, and learned their Names, he forwardly clofes with the one, as well as the other of the forementioned Propofitions, and with both for the fame Reafon; viz. because he finds the Ideas he has in his Mind to agree or difagree, according as the Words ftanding for them, are affirmed or denied one of another in the Propofition. But if Propofitions be brought to him in Words, which stand for Ideas he has not yet in his Mind; to fuch Propofitions, however evidently true or falfe in themselves, he affords neither Affent nor Diffent, but is ignorant. For Words being but empty Sounds, any farther than they are Signs of our Ideas, we cannot but affent to them, as they correspond to those Ideas we have, but no farther than that. But the fhewing by what Steps and Ways Knowledge comes into our Minds, and the Grounds of feveral Degrees of Affent, being the Bufinefs of the following Difcourfe, it may fuffice to have only touched touched on it here, as one Reason that made me doubt of those Innate Principles. Not Innate, because not univerfally affented to. §. 24. To conclude this Argument of Univerfal Confent, I agree with thefe Defenders of Innate Principles, That if they are Innate, they must needs have Univerfal Affent. For that a Truth should be Innate, and yet not affented to, is to me as unintelligible, as for a Man to know a Truth, and be ignorant of it, at the fame time. But then, by these Men's own Confeffion, they cannot be Innate; fince they are not affented to by those who understand not the Terms, nor by a great Part of those who do understand them, but have yet never heard nor thought of thofe Propofitions; which, I think, is at least one half of Mankind. But were the Number far lefs, it would be enough to deftroy Univerfal Affent, and thereby fhew these Propofitions not to be Innate, if Children alone were ignorant of them. Thefe Maxims not the first known. §. 25. But that I may not be accused to argue from the Thoughts of Infants, which are unknown to us, and to conclude from what paffes in their Understandings before they exprefs it; I fay next, That these two general Propofitions are not the Truths that firft poffefs the Minds of Children; nor are antecedent to all acquired and adventitious Notions; which, if they were Innate, they must needs be. Whether we can determine it or no, it matters not; there is certainly a Time when Children begin to think, and their Words and Actions do affure us that they do fo. When therefore they are capable of Thought, of Knowledge, of Affent, can it rationally be fuppofed, they can be ignorant of those Notions that Nature has imprinted, were there any fuch? Can it be imagined, with any Appearance of Reason, That they perceive the Impreffions from things without, and be at the fame time ignorant of those Characters which Nature itself has taken care to ftamp within? Can they receive and affent to adventitious Notions, and be ignorant of those which are fuppofed woven into the very Principles of their Being, and imprinted there in indelible Characters, to be the Foundation and Guide of all their acquired Knowledge, and future Reasonings? This would be, to make Nature take pains to no purpofe; or, at leaft, to write very ill; fince its Characters could not be read by thofe Eyes, which faw other things very well; and thofe are very ill fuppofed the cleareft Parts of Truth, and the Foundations of all our Knowledge, which are not firft known, and without which which the undoubted Knowledge of several other Things may be had. The Child certainly knows, that the Nurse that feeds it, is neither the Cat it plays with, nor the Blackamoor it is afraid of; that the Wormfeed or Mustard it refufes, is not the Apple or Sugar it cries for; this it is certainly and undoubtedly affured of: But will any one fay, it is by virtue of this Principle, That it is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be, that it fo firmly affents to thefe, and other Parts of its Knowledge? Or that the Child has any Notion or Apprehenfion of that Proposition at an Age, wherein yet, 'tis plain, it knows a great many other Truths? He that will fay, Children join these general abstract Speculations with their Sucking-bottles and their Rattles, may, perhaps, with Juftice, be thought to have more Paffion and Zeal for his Opinion, but less Sincerity and Truth, than one of that Age. . And Jo not In nate. 6. 26. Though therefore there be feveral general Propofitions, that meet with constant and ready Affent, as foon as propofed to Men grown up, who have attained the Use of more general and abftract Ideas, and Names ftanding for them; yet they not being to be found in those of tender Years, who neverthe lefs know other Things, they cannot pretend to universal Affent of intelligent Perfons, and fo by no means can be fuppofed Innate It being impoffible, That any Truth which is Innate (if there were any fuch) fhould be unknown, at least to any one who knows any thing elfe. Since, if they are Innate Truths, they must be Innate Thoughts; there being nothing a Truth in the Mind, that it has never thought on. Whereby it is evident, if there be any Innate Truths in the Mind, they must neceffarily be the first of any thought on; the first that appear there. Not Innate, be caufe they appear leaft, where what is Innate fhews itself cleareft. §. 27. That the general Maxims we are difcourfing of, are not known to Children, Ideots, and a great Part of Mankind, we have already fufficiently proved; whereby it is evident, they have not an univerfal Affent, nor are general Impreffions. But there is this farther Argument in it against their being Innate, That thefe Characters, if they were native and original Impreffions, fhould appear fairest and cleareft in thofe Perfons in whom yet we find no Footsteps of them: And 'tis, in my Opinion, a ftrong Prefumption, that they are not Innate; fince they are leaft known to those, in whom, if they were Innate, they must needs exert themselves with moft Force and Vigour. For Children, Ideots, Savages, Savages, and Illiterate People, being of all others the leaft corrupted by Cuftom, or borrowed Opinions; Learning and Education having not caft their native Thoughts into new Moulds, nor, by fuperinducing foreign and ftudied Doctrines, confounded thofe fair Characters Nature had written there; one might reafonably imagine, that in their Minds thefe Innate Notions fhould lie open fairly to every one's View, as 'tis certain the Thoughts of Children do. It might very well be expected, that thefe Principles fhould be perfectly known to Naturals, which being ftamped immediately on the Soul (as thefe Men fuppofe) can have no Dependance on the Conftitutions or Organs of the Body, the only confeffed Difference between them and others. One would think, according to these Men's Principles, that all thefe native Beams of Light (were there any fuch) should in thofe, who have no Referves, no Arts of Concealment, shine out in their full Luftre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their Love of Pleasure, and Abhorrence of Pain. But alas, amongst Children, Ideots, Savages, and the grofsly Illiterate, what general Maxims are to be found? what univerfal Principles of Knowledge? Their Notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from thofe Objects they have had moft to do with, and which have made upon their Senfes the frequenteft and ftrongest Impreffions. A Child knows his Nurfe and his Cradle, and by degrees the Play-things of a little more advanced Age: And a young Savage has, perhaps, his Head filled with Love and Hunting, according to the Fashion of his Tribe. But he that from a Child untaught, or a wild Inhabitant of the Woods, will expect these abstract Maxims and reputed Principles of Sciences, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of general Propofitions are feldom mentioned in the Huts of Indians, much lefs are they to be found in the Thoughts of Children, or any Impreffions of them on the Minds of Naturals. They are the Language and Bufinefs of the Schools and Academies of learned Nations, accuftomed to that fort of Converfation or Learning, where Disputes are frequent: Thefe Maxims being fuited to artificial Argumentation, and useful for Conviction; but not much conducing to the Discovery of Truth, or Advancement of Knowledge. But of their small Use for the Improvement of Knowledge, I fhall have Occafion to speak more at large, l. 4. c. 7. Recapitula- §. 28. I know not how abfurd this may tion. feem to the Mafters of Demonstration: And probably, it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little Truce with Pre judice, judice, and the Forbearance of Cenfure, 'till I have been heard out in the Sequel of this Discourse, being very willing to fubmit to better Judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after Truth, I fhall not be forry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own Notions; which I confefs we are all apt to be, when Application and Study have warmed our Heads with them. Upon the whole Matter, I cannot fee any Ground to think these two famed fpeculative Maxims Innate; fince they are not univerfally affented to; and the Affent they so generally find, is no other than what several Propofitions, not allowed to be Innate, equally partake in with them; and fince the Affent that is given them, is produced another way, and comes not from natural Infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following Difcourfe. And if these first Principles of Knowledge and Science are found not to be Innate, no other Speculative Maxims can (I fuppofe) with better Right pretend to be fo. $. I. CHA P. III. No Innate Practical Principles. No moral Principles fo clear and fo generally received as the forementioned Speculative Maxims. F thofe fpeculative Maxims, whereof we difcourfed in the foregoing Chapter, have not an actual univerfal Affent from all Mankind, as we there proved, it is much more vifible concerning Practical Principles, that they come fhort of an univerfal Reception: And I think it will be hard to inftance any one moral Rule which can pretend to fo general and ready an Affent as, What is, is; or to be so manifest a Truth as this, That it is impoffible for the fame Thing to be, and not to be. Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a Title to be Innate; and the doubt of their being native Impreffions on the Mind, is ftronger against these moral Principles than the other. Not that it brings their Truth at all in queftion: They are equally true, though not equally evident. Thofe fpeculative Maxims carry their own Evidence with them: But moral Principles require Reafoning and Difcourfe, and fome Exercise of the Mind, to discover the Certainty of their Truth. They lie not open as natural Characters engraven on the |