Objects of its Contemplation, are, as I have said, The Originat of all Knowledge. Thus the firft Capacity of human Intellect, is, that the Mind is fitted to receive the Impreffions made on it; either through the Senfes, by outward Objects, or by its own: Operations, when it reflects on them. This is the first Step a Man makes towards the Difcovery of any Thing, and the Ground-work whereon to build all thofe Notions, which ever he fhall have naturally in this World. All thofe fublime. Thoughts, which tower above the Clouds, and reach as high as Heaven itself, take their Rife and Footing here: In all that great Extent wherein the Mind wanders, in thofe remote Speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it ftirs not one jot beyond those Ideas, which Senfe or Reflection have offered for its Contemplation.

In the Reception of fimple Ideas the Underftanding is for the most part paffive.

g. 25. In this Part, the Understanding is merely paffive; and whether or no it will have thefe Beginnings, and as it were Materials of Knowledge, is not in its own Power. For the Objects of our Senfes do, many of them, obtrude their particular Ideas upon our Minds, whether we will or no: And the Operations of our Minds will not let us be without, at leaft, fome obfcure Notions of them. No Man can be wholly ignorant of what he does, when he thinks. Thefe fimple Ideas, when offered to the Mind, the Understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a Mirror can refufe, alter, or obliterate the Images or Ideas, which the Objects fet before it do therein produce. As the Bodies that furround us do diverfly affect our Organs, the Mind is forced to receive the Impreffions, and cannot avoid the Perception of those Ideas that are annexed to them.

CHA P. II.

Of Simple ID e a s.

Uncompounded §. I.

Appearances.

T

HE better to understand the Nature, Manner, and Extent of our Knowledge, one Thing is carefully

to be obferved, concerning the Ideas we have; and that is, that Some of them are fimple, and fome complex.

Though

X

t

Though the Qualities that affect our Senfes, are, in the Things themselves, fo united and blended, that there is no Separation, no Distance between them; yet 'tis plain, the Ideas they produce in the Mind, enter by the Senfes fimple and unmixed. For though the Sight and Touch often take in from the fame Object, at the fame Time, different Ideas ; as a Man fees at once Motion and Colour; the Hand feels Softnefs and Warmth in the fame Piece of Wax: Yet the fimple Ideas, thus united in the fame Subject, are as perfectly diftinct as those that come in by different Senfes ; the Coldness and Hardness which a Man feels in a Piece of Ice, being as diftinct Ideas in the Mind, as the Smell and Whiteness of a Lilly, or as the Taste of Sugar, and Smell of a Rofe And there is nothing can be plainer to a Man than the clear and diftinct Perceptions he has of thofe fimple Ideas; which being each in itself uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform Appearance or Conception in the Mind, and is not diftinguishable into different Ideas.

(1)

The Mind can
neither make

nor destroy

them.

§. 2. These fimple Ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are fuggefted and furnished to the Mind only by thofe two Ways abovementioned, viz. Senfation and Reflection. When the Understanding is once ftored with thefe fimple Ideas, it has the Power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite Variety, and fo can make at Pleasure new complex Ideas. But it is not in the Power

(1) Against this, that the Materials of all our Knowledge are fuggefted and furnished to the Mind only by Senfation and Reflection, the Bishop of Worcester makes ufe of the Idea of Subftance in these Words: If the Idea of Subftance be grounded upon plain and evident Reafon, then we must allow an Idea of Subftance, which comes not in by Senfation or Reflection; and fo we may be certain of something which we have not by those Ideas.

(*) In his firft
Letter to the
Bishop of
Worcester,
P.35, &c.

To which our Author (*) answers: Thefe Words of your Lordship's contain nothing as I fee in them againft me: For I never faid that the general Idea of Subftance comes in by Senfation and Reflection, or that it is a fimple Idea of Senfation or Reflection, tho' it be ultimately founded in them; for it is a complex Idea, made up of the general Idea of Something, or Being, with the Relation of a Support to Accidents. For general Ideas come not into the Mind by Senfation or Reflection, but are the Creatures or Inventions of the Underftanding, as I think I have fhewn; and alfo how the Mind makes them from Ideas which it has got by Senfation and Reflection; and as to the Ideas of VOL. I. F

B. 3. c. 3. B.

2.

&

c. 25.
c. 28. §. 18.

Relation,

of the most exalted Wit or enlarged Understanding, by any Quickness or Variety of Thoughts, to invent or frame one new Simple Idea in the Mind, not taken in by the Ways before mentioned: Nor can any Force of the Understanding destroy those that are there. The Dominion of Man, in this little World of his own Understanding, being much what the fame, as it is in the great World of vifible Things; wherein his Power, however managed by Art and Skill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the Materials that are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the least Particle of new Matter, or deftroying one Atom of what is already in Being. The fame Inability will every one find in himself, who fhall go about to fashion in his Understanding any fimple Idea not received in by his Senfes, from external Objects; or by Reflection, from the Operations of his own Mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any Tafte, which had never affected his Palate; or frame the Idea of a Scent, he had never fmelt: And when he can do this, I will alfo conclude, that a blind Man hath Ideas of Colours, and a deaf Man true diftinct Notions of Sounds.

Relation, how the Mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in Ideas of Senfation and Reflection, I have likewife fhewn.

But that I may not be mistaken what I mean, when I fpeak of Ideas of Senfation and Reflection, as the Materials of all our Knowledge; give me Leave, my Lord, to fet down here a Place or two, out of my Book, to explain myself; as I thus fpeak of Ideas of Senfation and Reflection:

That thefe, when we have taken a full Survey of them, and their feveral Modes, and the Compofitions made

B. 2. c. 1. §. 5.

out of them, we fhall find to contain all our whole Stock of Ideas, and we have nothing in our Minds, come in one of these two Ways.' This Thought, in another Place, I exprefs thus.

which did not

These are the most confiderable of thofe fimple Ideas which the
Mind has, and out of which is made all its other
Knowledge; all which it receives by the two fore-
mentioned Ways of Senfation and Reflection.' And,

B.2.c.7.§.10.

B.2.c.21.9.73.

Thus I have, in a fhort Draught, given a View of our original Ideas, from whence all the reft are derived, and of which they are made up.' This, and the like, faid in other Places, is what I have thought concerning Ideas of Senfation and Reflection, as the Foundation and Materials of all our Ideas, and confequently of all our Knowledge I have fet down thefe Particulars out of my Book, that the Reader having a full View of my. Opinion herein, may the better fee what in it is liable to your Lordship's Reprehenfion. For that

your

$. 3. This is the Reason why, though we cannot believe it impoffible to God to make a Creature with other Organs, and more Ways to convey into the Understanding the Notice of corporeal Things, than thofe five, as they are ufually counted, which he has given to Man: Yet I think it is not poffible for any one to imagine any other Qualities in Bodies, howsoever conftituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, befides Sounds, Taftes, Smells, vifible and tangible Qualities. And had Mankind been made with but four Senfes, the Qualities then, which are the Objects of the fifth Senfe, had been as far from our Notice, Imagination and Conception, as now any belonging to a fixth, feventh, or eighth Senfe, can poffibly be: Which whether yet fome other Creatures, in fome other Parts of this vaft and ftupendous Universe, may not have, will be a great Prefumption to deny. He that will not fet himself proudly at the

your Lordship is not very well fatisfied with it, appears not only by the Words under Confideration, but by these alfo: But we are fill told, that our Understanding can have no other Ideas, but either from Senfation or Reflection.

Your Lordship's Argument, in the Paffage we are upon, ftands thus: If the general Idea of Substance be grounded upon plain and evident Reason, then we must allow an Idea of Substance, which comes not in by Senfation or Reflection. This is a Confequence which, with Submiffion, I think will not hold, because it is founded upon a Suppofition, which I think will not hold, viz. That Reason and Ideas are inconfiftent; for if that Suppofition be not true, then the general Idea of Subftance may be grounded on plain and evident Reafon; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from Ideas which come in by Senfation or Reflection, and fo cannot be faid to come in by Sensation or Reflection

To explain myself, and clear my Meaning in this Matter. All the Ideas of all the fenfible Qualities of a Cherry come into my Mind by Senfation; the Ideas of Perceiving, Thinking, Reasoning, Knowing, &c. come into my Mind by Reflection. The Ideas of thefe Qualities and Actions, or Powers, are perceived by the Mind, to be by themselves inconfiftent with Exiftence; or, as your Lordship well expreffes it, we find that we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we must conceive a Subftratum, or Subject, wherein they are, i. e. That they cannot Exist or Subfift of themselves. Hence the Mind perceives their neceffary Connexion with Inherence or being fupported; which being a relative Idea, fuperadded to the Red Colour in a Cherry, or to Thinking in a Man, the Mind frames the correlative Idea of a Support. For I never denied, that the Mind could frame to itself Ideas of Relation, but have fhewed the quite contrary in my Chapters about Relation. But because a Relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the Relation of nothing, and the Thing here related as a Supporter, or a Support, is not reprefented

Top of all Things; but will confider the Immenfity of this Fabrick, and the great Variety that is to be found in this little and inconfiderable Part of it, which he has to do with, may be apt to think, that in other Manfions of it, there may be other, and different intelligent Beings, of whofe Faculties he has as little Knowledge or Apprehenfion, as a Worm fhut up in one Drawer of a Cabinet hath of the Senfes or Understanding of a Man; fuch Variety and Excellency being fuitable to the Wisdom and Power of the Maker. I have here followed the common Opinion of Man's having but five Senfes, though, perhaps, there may be juftly counted more; but either Suppofition ferves equally to my prefent Purpose.

CHA P.

to the Mind, by any clear and diftin&t Idea; therefore the obscure and indiftinct, vague Idea of Thing, or Something, is all that is left to be the pofitive Idea, which has the Relation of a Support, or Subftratum, to Modes or Accidents; and that general, indetermined Idea of Something, is, by the Abftraction of the Mind, derived alfo from the fimple Ideas of Senfation and Reflection: And thus the Mind, from the pofitive, fimple Ideas got by Senfation or Reflection, comes to the general, relative Idea of Subitance, which, without thefe pofitive, fimple Ideas, it would never have.

This your Lordship (without giving by Retail all the particular Steps of the Mind in this Bufinefs) has well expreffed in this more familiar Way: We find we can have no true Conception of any Modes or Accidents, but we must conceive a Subftratum, or Subject, wherein they are; fince it is a Repugnancy to our Conceptions of Things, that Modes or Accidents fhould fubfift by themselves.

Hence your Lordship calls it the Rational Idea of Subftance: And fays, I grant that by Senfation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of Things; but our Reafon is fatisfied that there must be fomething beyond thefe, because it is impoffible that they should fubfift by themselves: So that if this be that which your Lordship means by the Rational Idea of Substance, I fee nothing there is in it against what I have faid, that it is founded on fimple Ideas of Senfation or Reflection, and that it is a very obfcure Idea.

Your Lordship's Conclufion from your foregoing Words, is, And fo we may be certain of fome Things which we have not by those Ideas; which is a Propofition, whofe precife Meaning your Lordship will forgive me, if I profefs, as it ftands there, I do not understand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your Lordship means, we may certainly know the Existence of fomething, which we have not by thofe Ideas; or certainly know the diftinét Properties of fomething, which we have not by those Ideas; or certainly know the Truth of fome Propofition, which we have not by thofe Ideas: For to be certain of fomething may fig ify either of thefe. But in which foever of thefe it be meant, I do not fee how I am concerned in it.