all my Readers, except half a Dozen, this Treatife was
not at first intended for them; and therefore they need
not be at the Trouble to be of that Number. But
yet if any one thinks fit to be angry, and rail at it, he
may do it fecurely: For I fhall find fome better Way of
fpending my Time, than in fuch kind of Converfation.
I fhall always have the Satisfaction to have aimed fin-
cerely at Truth and Usefulness, though in one of the
meanest Ways. The Commonwealth of Learning is
not at this Time without Mafter-builders, whofe migh-
ty Defigns, in advancing the Sciences, will leave lafting
Monuments to the Admiration of Pofterity: But every
one muft not hope to be a Boyle, or a Sydenham; and in
an Age that produces fuch Mafters, as the Great-Huy-
genius, and the incomparable Mr. Newton, with fome
others of that Strain; 'tis Ambition enough to be em-
ployed as an Under-Labourer in clearing the Ground a
little, and removing fome of the Rubbish that lies in
the Way to Knowledge; which certainly had been very
much more advanced in the World, if the Endeavours
of ingenious and induftrious Men had not been much
cumbered with the learned but frivolous Ufe of uncouth,
affected, or unintelligible Terms, introduced into the
Sciences, and there made an Art of, to that Degree,
that Philofophy, which is nothing but the true Know-
ledge of Things, was thought unfit, or uncapable to
be brought into well-bred Company, and polite Con-
verfation. Vague and infignificant Forms of Speech,
and Abuse of Language, have fo long paffed for My-
fteries of Science; and hard and mifapplied Words,
with little or no Meaning, have, by Prefcription, fuch a
Right to be mistaken for deep Learning, and Height
of Speculation, that it will not be easy to perfuade, ei-
ther those who speak, or those who hear them, that
they are but the Covers of Ignorance, and Hindrance
of true Knowledge. To break in upon the Sanctuary
of Vanity and Ignorance, will be, I fuppofe, fome Ser-
vice to Human Understanding: Though fo few are apt
to think they deceive or are deceived in the Use of
Words; or that the Language of the Sect they are of,

has

1

has any Faults in it, which ought to be examined or corrected; that I hope I fhall be pardoned, if I have in the Third Book dwelt long on this Subject, and endeavoured to make it fo plain, that neither the Inveteratenefs of the Mischief, nor the Prevalency of the Fashion, fhall be any. Excufe for thofe, who will not take care about the Meaning of their own Words, and will not fuffer the Significancy of their Expreffions to be enquired into.

I have been told, that a fhort Epitome of this Treatife, which was printed 1688, was by fome condemned without reading, because innate Ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate Ideas were not fuppofed, there would be little left, either of the Notion or Proof of Spirits. If any one take the like Offence at the Entrance of this Treatife, I fhall defire him to read it through; and then I hope he will be convinced, that the taking away falfe Foundations, is not to the Prejudice, but Advantage of Truth; which is never injured or endangered fo much, as when mixed with, or built on Falfehood. In the Second Edition, I added as followeth :

The Bookfeller will not forgive me, if I fay nothing of this Second Edition, which he has promifed, by the Correctness of it, fhall make amends for the many. Faults committed in the former. He defires too, that. it should be known, that it has one whole new Chapter concerning Identity, and many Additions and Amendments in other Places. These I must inform my Reader are not all new Matter, but moft of them either far-.. ther Confirmations of what I had faid, or Explications, to prevent others being mistaken in the Senfe of what was formerly printed, and not any Variation in me from it; I must only except the Alterations I have made in Book II. Chap. 21.

What I had there writ concerning Liberty and the Will, I thought deferved as accurate a View, as I was capable of: Thofe Subjects having in all Ages exercised the learned Part of the World, with Questions and Difficulties, that have not a little perplexed Morality

and

and Divinity; thofe Parts of Knowledge, that Men are most concerned to be clear in. Upon a clofer Infpection into the Working of Men's Minds, and a stricter Examination of thofe Motives and Views they are turned by, I have found reafon fomewhat to alter the Thoughts I formerly had concerning that, which gives the last Determination to the Will in all voluntary Actions. This I cannot forbear to acknowledge to the World with as much Freedom and Readiness, as I at first published what then feemed to me to be right; thinking myself more concerned to quit and renounce any Opinion of my own, than oppofe that of another, when Truth appears against it. For 'tis Truth alone I feek, and that will always be welcome to me, when or from whence foever it comes.

But what Forwardness foever I have to refign any Opinion I have, or to recede from any Thing I have writ, upon the first Evidence of any Error in it; yet this I must own, that I have not had the good Luck to receive any Light from thofe Exceptions I have met with in Print against any Part of my Book; nor have, from any Thing has been urged against it, found reason to alter my Senfe, in any of the Points have been queftioned. Whether the Subject I have in hand requires often more Thought and Attention than curfory Readers, at leaft fuch as are prepoffeffed, are willing to allow : or, whether any Obfcurity in my Expreffions cafts a Cloud over it, and thefe Notions are made difficult to others Apprehenfion in my Way of treating them: So it is, that my Meaning, I find, is often mistaken, and I have not the good Luck to be every where rightly understood. There are so many Inftances of this, that I think it Juftice to my Reader and myself, to conclude, that either my Book is plainly enough written to be rightly understood by those who peruse it with that Attention and Indifferency, which every one, who will give himself the Pains to read, ought to employ in reading; or elfe, that I have writ mine fo obfcurely, that it is in vain to go about to mend it. Which ever of thefe be the Truth, 'tis myself only am affected

thereby,

thereby, and therefore I fhall be far from troubling my Reader with what I think might be faid, in anfwer to those several Objections I have met with, to Paffages here and there of my Book: Since I perfuade myself, that he who thinks them of Moment enough to be. concerned whether they are true or falfe, will be able to fee, that what is faid, is either not well founded, or elfe not contrary to my Doctrine, when I and my Oppofer come both to be well understood.

If any, careful that none of their good Thoughts fhould be loft, have published their Cenfures of my Effay with this Honour done to it, that they will not fuffer it to be an Effay; I leave it to the Publick to value the Obligation they have to their critical Pens, and shall not waste my Reader's Time in fo idle or illnatured an Employment of mine, as to leffen the Satiffaction any one has in himself, or gives to others, in fo hally a Confutation of what I have written.

The Bookfellers preparing for the Fourth Edition of my Elay, gave me Notice of it, that I might, if I had Leifure, make any Additions or Alterations I fhould think fit. Whereupon I thought it convenient to advertise the Reader, that befides feveral Corrections I had made here and there, there was one Alteration which it was neceffary to mention, because it ran through the whole Book, and is of Confequence to be rightly understood. What I thereupon faid was this.

Clear and diftinct Ideas are Terms, which, though fa- : miliar and frequent in Men's Mouths, I have reason to think every one, who ufes, does not perfectly underftand. And poffibly 'tis but here and there one, who gives himself the Trouble to confider them so far as to know what he himself or others precisely mean by them; I have therefore in most places chose to put determinate or determined, instead of clear and diftinct, as more likely to direct Men's Thoughts to my Meaning in this Matter. By those Denominations, I mean fome Object in the Mind, and confequently determined, i. e. fuch as it is there feen and perceived to be. This, I think, may fly be called a determinate or determined Idea, when

fuch

fuch as it iscat any Time objectively in the Mind, and fo determined there, it is annexed, and without Variation determined to a Name or articulate Sound, which is to be fteadily the Sign of that very fame Object of the Mind, or determinate Idea.

To explain this a little more particularly. By de-. terminate, when applied to a fimple Idea, I mean that fimple Appearance which the Mind has in its View, or perceives in itself, when that Idea is faid to be in it: By determinate, when applied to a complex Idea, I mean fuch an one as confifts of a determinate Number of certain fimple or less complex Ideas, joined in fuch a Proportion and Situation, as the Mind has before its View, and fees in itfelf, when that Idea is prefent in it, or fhould be prefent in it, when a Man gives a Name to it: I fay should be; because it is not every one, nor perhaps any one, who is fo careful of his Language, as to use no Word, till he views in his Mind the precife determined Idea, which he refolves to make it the Sign of. The Want of this is the Caufe of no fmall Obfcurity and Confufion in Men's Thoughts and Difcourses.

I know there are not Words enough in any Language, to answer all the Variety of Ideas that enter into Men's Difcourfes and Reafonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one ufes any Term, he may have in his Mind a determined Idea, which he makes it the Sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that prefent Difcourfe. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or diftinet Ideas: 'Tis plain his are not fo; and therefore there can be expected nothing but Obfcurity and Confufion, where fuch Terms are made ufe of, which have not fuch a precife Determination.

1

Upon this Ground I have thought determined Ideas a Way of speaking lefs liable to mistake, than clear and diftin&t: And where Men have got fuch determined Ideas of all that they reafon, enquire, or argue about, they will find a great Part of their Doubts and Disputes at an End. The greatest Part of the Questions and

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