tained by the Surveyor-General, on behalf of the crown: renewals were conceded at the pleasure of the tenants; while extravagant fees, payable at public offices, instead of being charged to the tenants, were deducted from the fines, and became a grievous burthen upon the revenues of the crown. At least seven-eighths of the value of the land were received in the shape of fines, and one-eighth only in rent; and these fines, again, were computed at high rates of interest, by which the payments to the crown were further diminished. Encroachments and waste were permitted upon the royal demesnes, with scarcely a check. Such mismanagement, however, was not due to any want of officers, appointed to guard the public interests. On the contrary, their very number served to facilitate frauds and evasions. Instead of being a check upon one another, these officers acted independently; and their ignorance, incapacity, and neglect went far to ruin the property under their charge. As an illustration of the system it may be stated, that the land-tax was frequently allowed twice over to lessees; from which error alone, a loss was sustained of upwards of fifteen hundred pounds a year. Even without mismanagement, the wide dispersion of the estates of the crown multiplied the charges of superintendence and administration. From these various causes the noble estates of the crown, for the first twenty-five years of the reign of George III., produced an average net revenue little exceeding six thousand pounds a year. Some of these abuses were exposed by Mr. Burke in 1780, who suggested as a remedy, a general sale of the crown lands.2 1 Reports of Commissioners of Inquiry into the Woods, Forests, and Land Revenues, under Act 26 Geo. III. c. 87. 2 Parl. Hist., xxi. 26. In 1786, the king sent a message to Parliament, by the advice of Mr. Pitt, recommending an inquiry into the condition of the woods, forests, and land revenues of the crown; and a commission was accordingly appointed by Act, to make that inquiry, and to suggest improvements in the system of management.1 The recommendations of this commission led to the passing of an Act in 1794, by which an improved administration of the land revenues was introduced 2; and means were taken for making them more productive. This commission had reported that, in their opinion, the estates which had hitherto yielded so insignificant a revenue might, under improved management, eventually produce no less than 400,000l. a year. Existing interests postponed for a time the realisation of so sanguine an estimate but in 1798 the crown lands were valued at 201,250l. a year 3; in 1812 they were valued at 283,160.*; in 1820 they actually yielded 114,8527.; in 1830, they produced 373,7701.; and in the year ending 31st March, 1860, they returned an income of 416,5307.5 But when the land revenues of the crown were at proceeds of length becoming nearly an equivalent for the civil list, a considerable proportion of the income was still diverted from the Exchequer. The land revenues, and the woods and forests, were originally managed, each by a Surveyor-General: but in 1810 the functions of these two offices were combined in a commission of woods, forests, and land revenues. In 1832, the superintendence of public works was added to the duties of this commission7; when it soon became evident that what Appropria tion of the the land revenues. 1 Parl. Hist., xxvi. 186, 202. Report of Surveyor-General, 1st Report of Comm. of Woods and Forests, 1812. 5 Finance Accounts, 1860. Hence, they received with one hand, they were too ready to Civil list pensions. tions upon grants of Prior to the reign of Queen Anne, the crown had Restricexercised the right of charging its hereditary revenues with pensions and annuities; and it had been held that pensions charged the king had power, in law, to bind his successors.2 But on the accession of Queen Anne, in 1701, when alienations of crown lands were for the first time restrained by Parliament 3, it was also provided that no portion of the hereditary revenues could be alienated 1 14 & 15 Vict. c. 41. ditary duties on beer, ale, or other 2 Bankers' Case, 1691; State liquors, the post-office, first-fruits Trials, xiv. 3-43. and tenths, fines on writs, post fines, crown lands. Pensions on the hereditary revenues. Pensions on the civil list III. for any term, longer than the life of the reigning king.1 This Act, however, having been passed before the union with Scotland, did not extend to the hereditary revenues of the Scottish crown. Nor was any similar Act passed in the Parliament of Ireland, restraining grants from the hereditary revenues of Ireland: neither did the Act of Anne extend to the 4 per cent. duties. Subsequently to this Act, pensions on the hereditary revenues of the crown in England could only be granted during the life of the reigning sovereign: but were practically re-granted at the commencement of every reign. But pensions charged on the hereditary revenues of Scotland and Ireland, and on the 4 per cent. duties, continued to be granted for the lives of the grantees. On the accession of George III., the larger branches of the hereditary revenues of the crown of England being of George surrendered in exchange for a fixed civil list, the pensions which had previously been paid out of the hereditary revenues, were henceforth paid out of the civil list. There was no limit to the amount of the pensions so long as the civil list could meet the demand; and no principle by which the grant of them was regulated, but the discretion of the crown and its advisers. Jealousy of the pension list. No branch of the public expenditure was regarded with so much jealousy, as that arising out of the unrestricted power of granting pensions by the crown. Not only did it involve a serious public burthen,-being one of the principal causes of the civil list debts,-but it increased the influence of the crown, and impaired the independence of Parliament. Mr. Burke, in bringing forward his scheme of economical reform in 1780, dwelt much on the excessive amount of the pension 11 Anne, st. 1, c. 7. list, and the absence of proper regulations; and particularly adverted to a custom which then prevailed, of granting pensions on a private list, during pleasure, by which dangerous corruption might be practised. Mr. Burke proposed that the English pension list should be gradually reduced to 60,000/., and that pensions should be restricted to the reward of merit, and "real public charity; " extraordinary cases being in future provided for by an address of either house of Parliament.1 upon the grant of 1782. By the Civil List Act of the Rockingham adminis- Restriction tration in 1782, the power of granting pensions was considerably limited. It was provided that until the pensions in pension list should be reduced to 90,000l., no pension above 300l. a year should be granted: that the whole amount of pensions bestowed in any year should not exceed 600l., a list of which was directed to be laid before Parliament: that the entire pension list should afterwards be restricted to 95,000l.; and that no pension to any one person should exceed 1200l. This Act fully recognised the principles of Mr. Burke's plan : it affirmed almost in his very words, that by the usage of granting secret pensions during pleasure, "secret and dangerous corruption may hereafter be practised ;" and it directed that in future all pensions should be paid at the Exchequer. It further acknowledged the principle that pensions ought to be granted for two causes only; —viz. as a royal bounty for persons in distress, or as a reward for desert. sion list. So far, therefore, the English pension list was regulated, Irish penand made subject to parliamentary control. But the crown still retained ample means, from other sources, 1 22 Geo. III. c. 82. On the 21st February, 1780, Sir G. Savile's motion for a list of the pensions was lost by a majority of two only,— Parl. Hist., xxi. 104; Lord Stan- |