Various rights of election. " 2 over such places as these was acknowledged, and exerted so far back as the fifteenth century.1 It was freely discussed, in the reign of Elizabeth; when the House of Commons was warned, with a wise foresight, lest "Lords' letters shall from henceforth bear all the sway. As the system of parliamentary government developed itself, such interest became more and more important to the nobles and great landowners, who accordingly spared no pains to extend it; and the insignificance of many of the boroughs, and a limited and capricious franchise, gave them too easy a conquest. Places like Old Sarum, with fewer inhabitants than an ordinary hamlet, avowedly returned the nominees of their proprietors.3 In other boroughs of more pretensions in respect of population and property, the number of inhabitants enjoying the franchise was so limited, as to bring the representation under the patronage of one or more persons of local or municipal influence. Not only were the electors few in number; but and limited partial and uncertain rights of election prevailed in different boroughs. The common law right of election was in the inhabitant householders resident within the borough: but, in a large proportion of the boroughs, peculiar customs prevailed, by which this liberal franchise was restrained. In some, indeed, popular rights were enjoyed by custom; and all inhabitants paying “scot and lot,”—or parish rates,—or all "potwallers,” -being persons furnishing their own diet, whether householders or lodgers,—were entitled to vote. In others, none but those holding lands by burgage-tenure had the right of voting: in several, none but those enjoying corporate rights by royal charter. In many, these different rights were combined, or qualified by exceptional conditions. election the House Rights of election, so uncertain and confused, were Rights of founded upon the last determinations of the House of deterCommons, which, however capricious, and devoid of mined by settled principles, had a general tendency to restrict of Comthe ancient franchise, and to vest it in a more limited number of persons.1 In some of the corporate towns the inhabitants paying scot and lot, and freemen, were admitted to vote: in some, the freemen only and in many, none but the governing body of the corporation. At Buckingham, and at Bewdley, the right of election was confined to the bailiff and twelve burgesses: at Bath, to the mayor, ten aldermen, and twenty-four common-councilmen : at Salisbury, to the mayor and corporation, consisting of fifty-six persons. And where more popular rights of election were acknowledged, there were often very few inhabitants to exercise them. Gatton enjoyed a liberal franchise. All freeholders and inhabitants paying scot and lot were entitled to vote, but they only amounted to seven. At Tavistock, all freeholders rejoiced in the franchise, but there were only ten. At St. Michael, all inhabitants paying scot and lot were electors, but there were only seven.2 In 1793, the Society of the Friends of the People were prepared to prove that in England and Wales seventy members were returned by thirty-five places, 1 Glanville's Reports; Determinations of the House of Commons concerning Elections, 8vo., 1780; Introduction to Merewether and Stephens, History of Boroughs; Male's Election Law, 289, 317; 2 Parl. Return, Sess. 1831-32, mons. Number of small boroughs. Bribery at elections. in which there were scarcely any electors at all; that ninety members were returned by forty-six places with less than fifty electors; and thirty-seven members by nineteen places, having not more than one hundred electors.1 Such places were returning members, while Leeds, Birmingham, and Manchester were unrepresented; and their pretended representatives were the nominees of peers and other wealthy patrons, and voted at their bidding.2 No abuse was more flagrant than the direct control of peers, over the constitution of the Lower House. The Duke of Norfolk was represented by eleven members; Lord Lonsdale by nine; Lord Darlington by seven; the Duke of Rutland, the Marquess of Buckingham, and Lord Carrington, each by six.3 Seats were held, in both Houses alike, by hereditary right. Where the number of electors in a borough was sufficient to ensure their independence, in the exercise of the franchise, they were soon taught that their votes would command a price; and thus, where nomination ceased, the influence of bribery commenced. Bribery at elections has long been acknowledged as one of the most shameful evils of our constitutional government. Though not wholly unknown in earlier times, it appears,-like too many other forms of corruption, to have first become a systematic abuse in the reign of Charles II. The Revolution, by increasing power of the House of Commons, served to enlarge the field of bribery at elections. As an example of the extent to which this practice prevailed, it was the 1 Parl. Hist., xxx. 789. 2 The relations of patrons and nominees were often creditable to both parties; but the right of the patron to direct the political conduct of his members was unquestioned. Lord Campbell's Lives, vi. 216. Lord Colchester's Diary, i. 13, 17, 124-131. Lord Stanhope's Life, i. 47. 3 Oldfield's Representative Hist., vi. 286. + Macaulay's Hist., i. 236. alleged that at the Westminster election, in 1695, Sir Walter Clarges, an unsuccessful candidate, expended 20007. in bribery in the course of a few hours.1 bery Act of III. These notorious scandals led to the passing of the The BriAct 7 William III. c. 4. Bribery had already been william recognised as an offence, by the common law2; and had been condemned by resolutions of the House of Commons; but this was the first statute to restrain and punish it. This necessary measure, however, was designed rather to discourage the intrusion of rich strangers into the political preserves of the landowners, than for the general repression of bribery. It seems to have had little effect; for Davenant, writing soon afterwards, spoke of "utter strangers making a progress through England, endeavouring by very large sums of money to get themselves elected. It is said there are known brokers who have tried to stock-job elections upon the Exchange; and that for many boroughs there was a stated price."4 An act of parliament was not likely to touch the causes of such corruption. The increasing commerce of the country had brought forward new classes of men, who supplied their want of local connections by the unscrupulous use of riches. Political morality may be elevated by extended liberties; but bribery has everywhere been the vice of growing wealth.5 1 Macaulay's Hist., iv. 615. 2 Burr., iii. 1235, 1388; Dougl., iv. 294; Male's Election Law, 339 -345. 3 Com. Journ., ix. 411, 517. 4 Essay on the Balance of Power; Davenant's Works, iii. 326, 328. See also Pamphlets, "Freeholder's Plea against Stock-jobbing Elections of Parliament Men;"" Considerations upon Corrupt Elections of Members to serve in Parliament," 1701. 5 "The effect produced by the rapid increase in wealth upon political morality [in Rome] is proved by the frequent laws against bribery at elections, which may be dated from the year 181 B. C. In that year it was enacted that any one found guilty of using bribery to gain votes should be declared incapable of becoming a candidate for the next ten years."-Dr. Liddell's Hist. of Rome. These laws are General election in 1761. bobs." The prizes to be secured through seats in Parliament during the corrupt administrations of Walpole and Pelham, further encouraged the system of bribery; and early in the reign of George III. its notoriety became a public scandal. The very first election of this reign, in 1761, was signalised by unusual excesses. Never perhaps had bribery been resorted to with so much profusion.1 One The "Na- class of candidates, now rapidly increasing, consisted of men who had amassed fortunes in the East and West Indies, and were commonly distinguished as "Nabobs." Their ambition led them to aspire to a place in the legislature their great wealth gave them the means of bribery; and the scenes in which they had studied. politics, made them unscrupulous in corruption. A seat in Parliament was for sale, like an estate; and they bought it, without hesitation or misgiving. Speaking of this class, Lord Chatham said: "without connections, without any natural interest in the soil, the importers of foreign gold have forced their way into Parliament, by such a torrent of corruption as no private hereditary fortune could resist."2 To the landed gentry they had long since been obnoxious. A country squire, whatever his local influence, was overborne by the profusion of wealthy strangers. Even a powerful noble was no match for men, who brought to the contest the "wealth of the Indies." Nor were they regarded with much favour by the leaders of parties: for men who had bought enumerated in Colquhoun's Roman 1 "Both the Court and particu lars went greater lengths than in any preceding times. In truth, the corruption of electors met, if not exceeded, that of candidates."Walp. Mem., i. 42. 2 Jan. 22nd, 1770. Parl. Hist., xvi. 752. |