Made perpetual. Its imperfect success. who was honestly persuaded that the " The Grenville Act was continued from time to time; and in 1774, Sir Edwin Sandys brought in a bill to make it perpetual. It encountered a strong opposition, especially from Mr. Fox, who dreaded the surrender of the privileges of the House: but the successful operation of the Act, in the five cases which had already been tried under its provisions was so generally acknowledged, that the bill was passed by a large majority. "This happy event," wrote Lord Chatham, "is a dawn of better times; it is the last prop of Parliament should it be lost in its passage, the legislature will fall into incurable contempt, and detestation of the nation." "The Act does honour to the statute-book, and will endear for ever the memory of the framer.”3 This Act was passed on the eve of another general election, which does not appear so far as evidence is accessible to have been marked by so much corruption as that of 1768. But the value of boroughs had certainly not declined in the market, as Gatton was sold for 75,000%.4 For a time this measure undoubtedly introduced a marked improvement in the judicature of the House of Commons. The disruption of the usual party combinations, at that period, was favourable to its success; and the exposure of former abuses discouraged their immediate renewal, in another form. But too soon. it became evident, that corruption and party spirit had 1 Hatsell's Prec., ii. 21. 2 250 to 122; Parl. Hist., xvii. 1071; Fox Mem., i. 95, 133. 3 Letter to Lord Shelburne, March 6th, 1774; Corr., iv. 332. 4 Lord Mahon's Hist., vi. 27. not been overcome.1 Crowds now attended the ballot, as they had previously come to the vote, not to secure justice, but to aid their own political friends. The party which attended in the greatest force, was likely to have the numerical majority of names, drawn for the committee. From this list each side proceeded to strike thirteen of its political opponents; and the strongest thus secured a preponderance on the committee. Nor was this all. The ablest men, being most feared by their opponents, were almost invariably struck off, a process familiarly known as "knocking the brains out of the committee;" and thus the committee became at once partial and incompetent. The members of the committee were sworn to do justice between the rival candidates; yet the circumstances under which they were notoriously chosen, their own party bias, and a lax conventional morality,-favoured by the obscurity and inconsistencies of the election law, and by the conflicting decisions of incapable tribunals,-led to this equivocal result: :- that right was generally discovered to be on the side of that candidate, who professed the same political opinions as the majority of the committee.2 A Whig candidate had scant justice from a Tory committee: a Tory candidate pleaded in vain before a Whig committee. constitu tion of elec tion committees. By these means, the majority of the House continued, Improved -with less directness and certainty, and perhaps with less open scandal,-to nominate their own members, as they had done before the Grenville Act. And for half a century, this system, with slight variations of procedure, was suffered to prevail. In 1839, however, 1 Walpole's Mem., iv. 111 and n. 2 These evils were ably exposed in the Report of the Committee on Controverted Elections (Mr. C. Distribution of pensions. the ballot was at length superseded by Sir Robert Peel's Act1 committees were reduced to six members, and nominated by an impartial body, the general committee of elections. The same principle of selection has since been adhered to in later Acts, with additional securities for impartiality; and the committee has been finally reduced to five members.2 The evil was thus greatly diminished: but still the sinister influence of party was not wholly overcome. In the nomination of election committees, one party or the other has necessarily had a majority of one; and though these tribunals have since been more able and judicial, their constitution and proceedings have too often exposed them to imputations of political bias. Such being the vices and defects of the electoral places and system, what were their results upon the House of Commons? Representatives holding their seats by a general system of corruption, could scarcely fail to be themselves corrupt. What they had bought, they were but too ready to sell. And how glittering the prizes offered as the price of their services! Peerages, baronetcies, and other titles of honour,-patronage and court favour for the rich,-places, pensions, and bribes for the needy. All that the government had to bestow, they could command. The rapid increase of honours 3 attests the liberality with which political services were rewarded; while contemporary memoirs and correspondence disclose the arts, by which many a peerage has been won. Restrained From the period of the Revolution, places and by Parlia- pensions were regarded as the price of political de ment. 1 2 & 3 Vict. c. 38; Hans. Deb., 3rd Ser., xlv. 379; Ibid., xlvii. 576, &c. 2 4 & 5 Vict. c. 58, and 11 & 12 Vict. c. 98; Report on Contro- pendence; and it has since been the steady policy of Parliament to restrain the number of placemen, entitled to sit in the House of Commons. To William III. fell the task of first working out the difficult problem of a constitutional government; and among his expedients for controlling his Parliaments, was that of a multiplication of offices. The country party at once perceived the danger with which their newly-bought liberties were threatened from this cause, and endeavoured to avert it. In 1693, the Commons passed a bill to prohibit all members hereafter chosen from accepting any office under the crown: but the Lords rejected it. In the following year it was renewed, and agreed to by both Houses; when the king refused his assent to it. Later in his reign, however, this principle of disqualification was commenced, the Commissioners of Revenue Boards being the first to whom it was applied.1 And at last, in 1700, it was enacted that after the accession of the House of Hanover, " no person who has an office or place of profit under the king, or receives a pension from the crown, shall be capable of serving as a member of the House of Commons."2 This too stringent provision, however, was repealed,-before it came into operation, — early in the reign of Anne. It was, indeed, incompatible with the working of constitutional government; and if practically enforced, would have brought Parliament into hopeless conflict with the executive. 3 By the Act of Settlement of that reign, other restrictions were introduced, far better adapted to correct the evils of corrupt influence. The holder of every new 1 4 & 5 Will. & Mary, c. 21 (Stamps); 11 & 12 Will. III. c. 2 (Excise). 2 12 & 13 Will. III. c. 2, s. 3. Acts of George I., and ÏÏ. Secret Pensions. The Place Bill of 1742. office created after the 25th of October, 1705, and every one enjoying a pension from the crown, during pleasure, was incapacitated from sitting in Parliament; and members of the House of Commons accepting any old office from the crown, were obliged to vacate their seats, but were capable of re-election.1 It was the object of this latter provision to submit the acceptance of office by a representative, to the approval of his constituents a principle which, notwithstanding several attempts to modify it,-has since been resolutely maintained by the legislature. Restrictions were also imposed upon the multiplication of commissioners.2 At the commencement of the following reign, incapacity was extended to pensioners for terms of years3; but as many pensions were then secretly granted, the law could not be put in force. In the reign of George II. several attempts were made to enforce it: but they all miscarried. Lord Halifax, in debating one of these bills, said that secret pensions were the worst form of bribery: "A bribe is given for a particular job: a pension is a constant, continual bribe."5 Early in the reign of George III. Mr. Rose Fuller - - who had been a stanch Whig, was bought off by a secret pension of 500%, which he enjoyed for many years. The cause of his apostacy was not discovered until after his death." Still the policy of restricting the number of offices capable of being held by members of the House of Commons, was steadily pursued. In 1742, the Place Bill, which had been thrice rejected by the Commons, 1 4 Anne, c. 8. 4 No less than six bills were passed by the Commons, and rejected by the Lords; Parl. Hist., viii. 789; Ibid., ix. 369; Ibid., xi. 510; Ibid., xii. 591. 5 Parl. Hist., xi. 522. 6 Almon's Corr., ii. 8; Rockingham Mem., i. 79, n. |