Votes of

want of

confidence.

In 1769, Lord Chatham sought public support of the same kind, in his efforts to obtain a dissolution of Parliament. Lord Rockingham and some of the leading Whigs, who doubted at first, were convinced of the constitutional propriety of such a course; and Lord Camden expressed a decisive opinion, affirming the right of the subject.1 The people were justly dissatisfied with the recent proceedings of the House of Commons; and were encouraged by the opposition to lay their complaints at the foot of the throne, and to pray for a dissolution.

The contest between Mr. Pitt and the coalition was characterised by similar proceedings. While the Commons were protesting against a dissolution, the supporters of Mr. Pitt were actively engaged in obtaining addresses to his Majesty, to assure him of the support of the people, in the constitutional exercise of his prerogative.2

The House of Commons in the first instance,—and the people in the last resort,-have become arbiters of the fate of the ministers of the crown. Ministers may have the entire confidence of their sovereign, and be all-powerful in the House of Lords: but without a majority of the House of Commons, they are unable to administer the affairs of the country. The fall of ministries has more often been the result of their failure to carry measures which they have proposed, or of adverse votes on general questions of public policy: but frequently it has been due,particularly in modern times,-to express representations to the crown, that its ministers have not the Temple, Nov. 8th, 1769; Grenville Papers, iv. 479.

1 "His answer

was full and manly, that the right is absolute, and unquestionable for the exercise." Lord Chatham to Lord

See Address of the City, Ann. Reg., 1784, p. 4, &c.

confidence of the House of Commons. Where such votes have been agreed to by an old Parliament,— as in 1784,-ministers have still had before them the alternative of a dissolution: but when they have already appealed to the country for support,-as in 1841, and again in 1859,-a vote affirming that they have not the confidence of the House of Commons, has been conclusive.

confidence.

The disapprobation of ministers by the House of Votes of Commons being decisive, the expression of its confidence has, at other times, arrested their impending fall. Thus in 1831, Lord Grey's ministry, embarrassed by an adverse vote of the other House, on the second reform bill1, was supported by a declaration of the continued confidence of the House of Commons.

And at other times, the House has interposed its advice to the crown, on the formation of administrations, with a view to favour or obstruct political arrangements, then in progress. Thus, in 1784, when negotiations had been commenced for a fusion of parties, resolutions were laid before his Majesty expressing the opinion of the House of Commons, that the situation of public affairs required a “firm, efficient, extended, and united administration, entitled to the confidence of the people, and such as may have a tendency to put an end to the divisions and distractions of the country.' 2 Similar advice was tendered to the Prince Regent in 1812, after the death of Mr. Perceval; and to William IV., in 1832, on the resignation of Earl Grey.3

But this constant responsibility of ministers, while it Impeachhas made their position dependent upon the pleasure of

1 Supra, p. 120.

Supra, p. 106, 360; Hans. Deb.,

2 Parl. Hist., xxiv. 450; Ann. 1st Ser., xxiii. 249.

Reg., 1784, p. 265.

ments.

Impeachments not

abated by a

Parliament, has protected fallen ministers from its vengeance. When the acts and policy of statesmen had been dictated by their duty to the crown alone, without regard to the approval of Parliament, they were in danger of being crushed by vindictive impeachments, and attainders. Strafford had died on the scaffold: Clarendon had been driven into exile1: Danby had suffered a long imprisonment in the Tower2; Oxford, Bolingbroke, and Ormond had been disgraced and ruined3, at the suit of the Commons. But parliamentary responsibility has prevented the commission of those political crimes, which had provoked the indignation of the Commons; and when the conduct or policy of ministers has been condemned, loss of power has been their only punishment. Hence the rarity of impeachments in later times. The last hundred years present but two cases of impeachment,-the one against Mr. Warren Hastings, on charges of misgovernment in India, the other against Lord Melville, for alleged malversation in his office. The former was not a minister of the crown, and he was accused of offences committed beyond the reach of parliamentary control; and the offences charged against the latter, had no relation to his political duties as a responsible minister.

The case of Mr. Warren Hastings finally established the constitutional doctrine, that an impeachment by dissolution the Commons is not terminated by any prorogation or dissolution of Parliament. It had been affirmed by the Lords in 1678, after an examination of pre

1

Having gone abroad pending his impeachment, an Act of banishment and incapacity was passed by Parliament.

2 Not being brought to trial, he was admitted to bail by the Court

of King's Bench, after an imprisonment of five years. St. Tr., xi. 871.

3 Oxford was imprisoned for two years in the Tower. Bolingbroke and Ormond, having escaped, were attainted.

2

cedents1: when Lord Stafford fell a victim to its assertion; and six years afterwards, it had been denied, in order to secure the escape of the "popish lords," then under impeachment. Lord Danby's lingering impeachment had been continued by the first decision, and annulled by the last. The same question having arisen after the lapse of a century, Parliament was called upon to review the precedents of former impeachments, and to pass its judgment upon the contradictory decisions of the Lords. Many of the precedents were so obscure as to furnish arguments on both sides of the question: conflicting opinions were to be found amongst text-writers; and the most eminent lawyers of the day were not agreed.3 But the masterly and conclusive speech of Mr. Pitt was alone sufficient to settle the controversy, even on the grounds of law and precedent. On broad constitutional principles, the first statesmen of all parties concurred in upholding the inviolable right of the Commons to pursue an impeachment, without interruption from any act of the crown. It could not be suffered that offenders should be snatched from punishment, by ministers who might be themselves concerned in their guilt. Nor was it just to the accused, that one impeachment should be arrested before a judgment had been obtained; and another preferred,-on the same or different grounds,-perhaps after his defence had suggested new evidence to condemn him. Had not the law already provided for the continuance of im

1 March 18th, 19th, 1678. Lords' Journ., xiii. 464, 466.

2 May 22nd, 1685. Lords' Jour., xiv. 11.

3 Lord Thurlow, Lord Kenyon, Sir Richard Arden, Sir Archibald

Macdonald, Sir John Scott, Mr. Mitford, and Mr. Erskine contended for the abatement: Lord Mansfield, Lord Camden, Lord Loughborough, and Sir William Grant, maintained its continuance.

Improved

the crown

with the Commons.

peachments, it would have been necessary to declare it. But it was agreed in both Houses, by large majorities, that by the law and custom of Parliament, an impeachment pending in the House of Lords continued in statu quo, from one Session and from one Parliament to another, until a judgment had been given.1

As parliamentary responsibility has spared ministers relations of the extreme penalties of impeachments, so it has protected the crown from those dangerous and harassing contests with the Commons, with which the earlier history of this country abounds. What the crown has lost in power, it has gained in security and peace. Until the Commons had fully established their constitutional rights, they had been provoked to assert them with violence, and to press them to extreme conclusions but they have exercised them, when acknowledged, with moderation and forbearance.

Strong

and weak governments.

At the same time, ministers of the crown have encountered greater difficulties, from the increased power and independence of the Commons, and the more direct action of public opinion upon measures of legislation and policy. They are no longer able to fall back upon the crown for support: their patronage is reduced, and their influence diminished. They are left to secure a majority, not so much by party connexions, as by good measures and popular principles. Any error of judgment,—any failure in policy or administration, is liable to be visited with instant censure. Defeated in the Commons, they have no resource but an appeal to the country, unaided by those means of influence, upon which ministers formerly relied.

1 Com. Deb.; Parl. Hist., xxviii. 1018, et seq.; Lords' Deb.; Ibid., xxix. 514; Report of Precedents;

Lords' Journ., xxxix. 125; Tomline's Life of Pitt, iii. 161.