Their responsibility is great and perilous but it has at least protected them from other embarrassments, of nearly equal danger. When the crown was more powerful, what was the fate of ministries? The first ten years of the reign of George III. witnessed the fall of five feeble administrations; and their instability was mainly due to the restless energies of the king. Until Mr. Pitt came into power, there had not been one strong administration during this reign. It was the king himself who overthrew the coalition ministry, the absolute government of Mr. Pitt, and the administration of "All the Talents." For more than ten years after Mr. Pitt's fall, there was again a succession of weak administrations, of short duration. If the king could uphold a ministry,-he could also weaken or destroy it. From this danger, governments under the new parliamentary system, have been comparatively free. More responsible to Parliament, they have become less dependent upon the crown. The confidence of the one, has guarded them from the displeasure of the other. No cause of ministerial weakness has been more frequent than disunion. It is the common lot of men acting together; and is not peculiar to any time, or political conditions. Yet when ministers looked to the crown for support, and relied upon the great territorial lords for a parliamentary majority,--what causes were so fruitful of jealousies and dissensions, as the intrigues of the court, and the rivalries of the proprietors of boroughs? Here, again, governments deriving their strength and union from Parliament and the people, have been less exposed to danger in this form. Governments have, indeed, been weakened, as in former times, by divisions among their own party: but they have been, in some measure, protected from faction, by the greater responsibility of all parties to public opinion. This protection will be more assured, when the old system of government, by influence and patronage, shall have given place to the recognition of national interests, as the sole basis of party. The responsibility of ministers has been further simplified, by the dominant power of the Commons. The Lords may sometimes thwart a ministry, reject or mutilate its measures, and even condemn its policy: but they are powerless to overthrow a ministry supported by the Commons, or to uphold a ministry which the Commons have condemned. Instead of many masters, a government has only one. Nor can it be justly said, that this master has been severe, exacting, or capricious. It can neither be affirmed that strong governments were characteristic of the parliamentary system, subverted by the reform act; nor that weak governments have been characteristic of the new system, and the result of it. In both periods, the stability of administrations has been due to other causes. If in the latter period, ministers have been overthrown, who, at another time might have been upheld by the influence of the crown; there have yet been governments supported by a parliamentary majority and public approbation, stronger in moral force, and more capable of overpowering interests adverse to the national welfare, than any ministries deriving their power from less popular sources. After the reform act, Earl Grey's ministry was all-powerful, until it was dissolved by disunion in the cabinet. No government was ever stronger than that of Sir Robert Peel, until it was broken up by the repeal ; of AL! E EI T of the corn laws. Lord Aberdeen's cabinet was scarcely On the other hand, the ministry of Lord Melbourne From the One of the most ancient and valued rights of the Control of mons over and taxes. supplies the Com Their liberality to the crown, matter, the measure and the time" of every tax imposed upon the people. In the same reign, they began to scrutinise the public expenditure; and introduced the salutary practice of appropriating their grants to particular purposes. But they had not yet learned the value of a constant control over the revenue and expenditure of the crown; and their liberality to Charles, and afterwards to James II., enabled those monarchs to violate the public liberties. - The experience of these reigns, prevented a repetition of the error; and since the Revolution, the grants of the Commons have been founded on annual estimates, -laid before them on the responsibility of ministers of the crown, and strictly appropriated to the service of the year. This constant control over the public expenditure has, more than any other cause, vested in the Commons the supreme power of the state; yet the results have been favourable to the crown. When the Commons had neither information as to the necessities of the state, nor securities for the proper application of their grants, they had often failed to respond to the solicitation of the king for subsidies,-or their liberality had fallen short of his demands. But not once since the reign of William III. have the demands of the crown for the public service, been refused.2 1 In 1625, the Commons postponed the supplies demanded by Charles I. for carrying on the war with Spain. - Parl. Hist., ii. 35. In 1675, they refused a supply to Charles II., to take off the anticipations upon his revenue. Ibid., iv. 757. In 1677, they declined a further supply till his Majesty's alliances were made known.-Ibid., 879. And in the next year they refused him an additional revenue. Ibid., 1000. In 1685, James II. required 1,400,000.; the Commons granted one half only.—Ibid., 1379. 2 The reductions in the army insisted upon by the Commons, in 1697 and 1698, were due to their constitutional jealousy of a standing army, and their aversion to the Dutch Guards, rather than to a Whatever sums ministers have stated to be necessary, for all the essential services of the state, the Commons have freely granted. Not a soldier has been struck from the rank and file of the army; not a sailor or a ship from the fleet, by any vote of the Commons. So far from opposing the demands of the crown, they have rather laid themselves open to the charge of too facile an acquiescence in a constantly-increasing expenditure. Since they have assumed the control of the finances, the expenditure has increased about fifty-fold; and a stupendous national debt has been created. Doubtless their control has been a check upon ministers. The fear of their remonstrances, has restrained the prodigality of the executive: but parsimony cannot be justly laid to their charge. The people may have some grounds for complaining of their stewardship: but assuredly the crown and its ministers have none. defeated on measures. While voting the estimates, however, the Commons Ministers have sometimes dissented from the financial arrange- financial ments proposed by ministers. Responding to the pecuniary demands of the crown, they have disapproved the policy, by which it was sought to meet them. In 1767, Mr. Charles Townshend, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, proposed to continue for one year, the land tax of four shillings in the pound: but on the motion niggardly disposition towards the public service.-See Lord Macaulay's Hist., v. 18, 24, 151, 177. With a few exceptions, so trifling as sometimes to be almost ridiculous, it will be found that, of late years, the annual estimates have generally been voted without deduction. In 1857, the Committee of Supply refused a vote for the purchase of a British chapel in Paris: in 1858, the only result of the vigilance of Parliament was a disallow ance of 3001. as the salary of the 2 On the 27th Feb., 1786, Mr. |