Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 16
Page 10
... aVect cultural transmission will guarantee that sawdust will likely not be a popular popcorn additive in any human society (sawdust is not very tasty). Both salt and sugar have innate content biases for sensible evolutionary reasons ...
... aVect cultural transmission will guarantee that sawdust will likely not be a popular popcorn additive in any human society (sawdust is not very tasty). Both salt and sugar have innate content biases for sensible evolutionary reasons ...
Page 29
... aVect (''This is fun''). This preaching condition was paired with donating either (1) generously or (2) very little. The vertical axis gives the fraction of tokens the subjects donated to charity (to ''poor children''), with the ...
... aVect (''This is fun''). This preaching condition was paired with donating either (1) generously or (2) very little. The vertical axis gives the fraction of tokens the subjects donated to charity (to ''poor children''), with the ...
Page 30
... aVect or preaching generosity (compare the vertically striped bars for ''positive aVect'' and ''preaching generosity'' with ''preaching selWshness''); (3) this eVect endures on retests two month later; and (4) showing positive aVect ...
... aVect or preaching generosity (compare the vertically striped bars for ''positive aVect'' and ''preaching generosity'' with ''preaching selWshness''); (3) this eVect endures on retests two month later; and (4) showing positive aVect ...
Page 35
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Page 36
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
You have reached your viewing limit for this book.
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
3 Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human Cooperation | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | 89 |
6 Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | 109 |
7 Social Norms and Prosociality | 133 |
8 Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific Cooperation | 157 |
10 Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | 205 |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | 215 |
Ethnographic Research Methods and Challenges | 219 |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | 225 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 241 |
Index | 255 |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
altruistic Arabs aVect beliefs beneWts biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter coethnics conformist transmission context conWrm cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Detroit Dictator Game diVerent diYcult domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic eVect evolved example experimental experiments explain favor genes give gossip grocers Henrich human identiWcation imitation immigrants indirect reciprocity individuals interaction interview involving inXuence Iraq kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean one’s oVspring parents partners patterns payoVs person players population predictions preferences prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling rejected relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms SouthWeld speciWc strategies success suYciently Telkaif theoretical tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables Wgure Wnancial Wndings Wrst Wtness