Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
From inside the book
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Page 14
... eVect of prestige- and model-based cues (e.g., gender and ethnicity) on the imitation of suicide (which we'll ... eVects emerge broadly across contexts, including economic decisions, opinions, food preferences, beliefs, styles, dialects ...
... eVect of prestige- and model-based cues (e.g., gender and ethnicity) on the imitation of suicide (which we'll ... eVects emerge broadly across contexts, including economic decisions, opinions, food preferences, beliefs, styles, dialects ...
Page 16
... eVect: the group does better. Interestingly, these imitation mechanisms also can produce maladaptive behavior (i.e., bad decisions). Dual Inheritance Theory shows that cultural learning mechanisms exist because they did better on ...
... eVect: the group does better. Interestingly, these imitation mechanisms also can produce maladaptive behavior (i.e., bad decisions). Dual Inheritance Theory shows that cultural learning mechanisms exist because they did better on ...
Page 17
... eVects of social information. Interestingly, two diVerent learning biases emerged. First, of the three individuals, those with lower payoVs tended to move toward the beliefs of those with higher payoVs. However, Dual Inheritance Theory 17.
... eVects of social information. Interestingly, two diVerent learning biases emerged. First, of the three individuals, those with lower payoVs tended to move toward the beliefs of those with higher payoVs. However, Dual Inheritance Theory 17.
Page 19
... eVect of diVerent sources on opinion change and found evidence for prestige learning biases. The sources used were: (1) a prominent individual, (2) a prominent newspaper, and (3) a prominent social group. His 3x3 design tested for how ...
... eVect of diVerent sources on opinion change and found evidence for prestige learning biases. The sources used were: (1) a prominent individual, (2) a prominent newspaper, and (3) a prominent social group. His 3x3 design tested for how ...
Page 20
... eVects of the source's positive and negative attitudes and found that subjects' attitudes were pulled closer to the source's even when subjects' prior opinions were contrary.6 With similar Wndings, Haiman (1949) also showed that a ...
... eVects of the source's positive and negative attitudes and found that subjects' attitudes were pulled closer to the source's even when subjects' prior opinions were contrary.6 With similar Wndings, Haiman (1949) also showed that a ...
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
3 Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human Cooperation | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | 89 |
6 Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | 109 |
7 Social Norms and Prosociality | 133 |
8 Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific Cooperation | 157 |
10 Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | 205 |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | 215 |
Ethnographic Research Methods and Challenges | 219 |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | 225 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 241 |
Index | 255 |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
altruistic Arabs aVect beliefs beneWts biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter coethnics conformist transmission context conWrm cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Detroit Dictator Game diVerent diYcult domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic eVect evolved example experimental experiments explain favor genes give gossip grocers Henrich human identiWcation imitation immigrants indirect reciprocity individuals interaction interview involving inXuence Iraq kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean one’s oVspring parents partners patterns payoVs person players population predictions preferences prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling rejected relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms SouthWeld speciWc strategies success suYciently Telkaif theoretical tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables Wgure Wnancial Wndings Wrst Wtness