Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
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Page 7
... imitate may come into direct conXict with the prudential teachings of pleasure and pain, and yet may be acted upon ... imitation, these families' human children have been observed 7 2. Dual Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of Cultural ...
... imitate may come into direct conXict with the prudential teachings of pleasure and pain, and yet may be acted upon ... imitation, these families' human children have been observed 7 2. Dual Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of Cultural ...
Page 8
... imitation, you would have to individually Wgure out a huge amount of information about animal behavior, tracking, hunting skills, and how to manufacture the necessary technology. Simply making a bow and arrow, which often requires a ...
... imitation, you would have to individually Wgure out a huge amount of information about animal behavior, tracking, hunting skills, and how to manufacture the necessary technology. Simply making a bow and arrow, which often requires a ...
Page 11
... ideas, beliefs, values, preferences, or strategies that might be gleaned, at least partially, through observation. For example, an aspiring farmer might imitate the strategies and practices of the most Dual Inheritance Theory 11.
... ideas, beliefs, values, preferences, or strategies that might be gleaned, at least partially, through observation. For example, an aspiring farmer might imitate the strategies and practices of the most Dual Inheritance Theory 11.
Page 12
A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich, Natalie Henrich. farmer might imitate the strategies and practices of the most skillful, successful, or prestigious farmers who live around him. Simply Wguring out who obtains the ...
A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich, Natalie Henrich. farmer might imitate the strategies and practices of the most skillful, successful, or prestigious farmers who live around him. Simply Wguring out who obtains the ...
Page 13
... imitate these individuals. These patterns relate to attention, eye gaze, verbal tones and rhythms, and behavioral postures ... imitation, as a means of assessing whom to pay attention to for cultural learning. As we will discuss below, a ...
... imitate these individuals. These patterns relate to attention, eye gaze, verbal tones and rhythms, and behavioral postures ... imitation, as a means of assessing whom to pay attention to for cultural learning. As we will discuss below, a ...
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
3 Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human Cooperation | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | 89 |
6 Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | 109 |
7 Social Norms and Prosociality | 133 |
8 Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific Cooperation | 157 |
10 Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | 205 |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | 215 |
Ethnographic Research Methods and Challenges | 219 |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | 225 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 241 |
Index | 255 |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
altruistic Arabs aVect beliefs beneWts biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter coethnics conformist transmission context conWrm cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Detroit Dictator Game diVerent diYcult domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic eVect evolved example experimental experiments explain favor genes give gossip grocers Henrich human identiWcation imitation immigrants indirect reciprocity individuals interaction interview involving inXuence Iraq kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean one’s oVspring parents partners patterns payoVs person players population predictions preferences prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling rejected relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms SouthWeld speciWc strategies success suYciently Telkaif theoretical tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables Wgure Wnancial Wndings Wrst Wtness