Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
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Results 1-5 of 71
Page 7
... patterns or social norms. Interestingly, although human-reared chimpanzees seem to acquire little from their human families via imitation, these families' human children have been observed 7 2. Dual Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of ...
... patterns or social norms. Interestingly, although human-reared chimpanzees seem to acquire little from their human families via imitation, these families' human children have been observed 7 2. Dual Inheritance Theory: The Evolution of ...
Page 8
... patterns to goals and aVective responses, in domains ranging from toolmaking and food preferences to altruism and spatial cognition. If other animals are ''cultural,'' then we are a hypercultural species (Henrich 2003). Capacities for ...
... patterns to goals and aVective responses, in domains ranging from toolmaking and food preferences to altruism and spatial cognition. If other animals are ''cultural,'' then we are a hypercultural species (Henrich 2003). Capacities for ...
Page 9
... patterns and conditions of maladaptation, and thus provide theories of adaptation, maladaptation, and the dynamic process of cultural change (Boyd and Richerson 1985: chap. 7; Henrich 2004b). This is an advantage over the models ...
... patterns and conditions of maladaptation, and thus provide theories of adaptation, maladaptation, and the dynamic process of cultural change (Boyd and Richerson 1985: chap. 7; Henrich 2004b). This is an advantage over the models ...
Page 11
... patterns will emerge from individuals using such learning mechanisms. Moreover, and perhaps more signiWcant, a vast amount of Weld and laboratory data conWrm that these learning biases are indeed an important part of our cognition (data ...
... patterns will emerge from individuals using such learning mechanisms. Moreover, and perhaps more signiWcant, a vast amount of Weld and laboratory data conWrm that these learning biases are indeed an important part of our cognition (data ...
Page 13
... patterns of deference, people unconsciously indicate who they think is a good model through a series of ethological and behavioral phenomena that arise directly from eVorts to imitate these individuals. These patterns relate to ...
... patterns of deference, people unconsciously indicate who they think is a good model through a series of ethological and behavioral phenomena that arise directly from eVorts to imitate these individuals. These patterns relate to ...
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
3 Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human Cooperation | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | 89 |
6 Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | 109 |
7 Social Norms and Prosociality | 133 |
8 Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific Cooperation | 157 |
10 Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | 205 |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | 215 |
Ethnographic Research Methods and Challenges | 219 |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | 225 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 241 |
Index | 255 |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
altruistic Arabs aVect beliefs beneWts biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter coethnics conformist transmission context conWrm cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Detroit Dictator Game diVerent diYcult domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic eVect evolved example experimental experiments explain favor genes give gossip grocers Henrich human identiWcation imitation immigrants indirect reciprocity individuals interaction interview involving inXuence Iraq kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean one’s oVspring parents partners patterns payoVs person players population predictions preferences prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling rejected relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms SouthWeld speciWc strategies success suYciently Telkaif theoretical tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables Wgure Wnancial Wndings Wrst Wtness