Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
From inside the book
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Page 9
... situations. Emerging from this line of reasoning, Dual Inheritance Theory aims to take account of the evolution of our capacities for culture (sophisticated social learning), cultural evolution itself, and the interaction—or coevolution ...
... situations. Emerging from this line of reasoning, Dual Inheritance Theory aims to take account of the evolution of our capacities for culture (sophisticated social learning), cultural evolution itself, and the interaction—or coevolution ...
Page 14
... situations, including situations that involve direct competition among the learners.3 Second, the eVects emerge broadly across contexts, including economic decisions, opinions, food preferences, beliefs, styles, dialects, and strategies ...
... situations, including situations that involve direct competition among the learners.3 Second, the eVects emerge broadly across contexts, including economic decisions, opinions, food preferences, beliefs, styles, dialects, and strategies ...
Page 15
... Situations Pingle (1995) conWrms that people (well, university students) will imitate the strategies of successful individuals in nonsocial circumstances, especially when payoVs are on the line. Using a series of computerized decision ...
... Situations Pingle (1995) conWrms that people (well, university students) will imitate the strategies of successful individuals in nonsocial circumstances, especially when payoVs are on the line. Using a series of computerized decision ...
Page 18
... situations involving purely individual decisions, but do they really imitate others in situations in which the behavior of others also inXuences their own payoVs? Yes. Let's begin by reviewing some experiments that have explored ...
... situations involving purely individual decisions, but do they really imitate others in situations in which the behavior of others also inXuences their own payoVs? Yes. Let's begin by reviewing some experiments that have explored ...
Page 19
... situations in which behavior, opinions, and preferences shift both spontaneously and unconsciously. In testing the early observations of Miller and Dollard (1941) about prestige and social learning, psychologists Rosenbaum and Tucker ...
... situations in which behavior, opinions, and preferences shift both spontaneously and unconsciously. In testing the early observations of Miller and Dollard (1941) about prestige and social learning, psychologists Rosenbaum and Tucker ...
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
3 Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human Cooperation | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | 89 |
6 Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | 109 |
7 Social Norms and Prosociality | 133 |
8 Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific Cooperation | 157 |
10 Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | 205 |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | 215 |
Ethnographic Research Methods and Challenges | 219 |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | 225 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 241 |
Index | 255 |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
altruistic Arabs aVect beliefs beneWts biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter coethnics conformist transmission context conWrm cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Detroit Dictator Game diVerent diYcult domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic eVect evolved example experimental experiments explain favor genes give gossip grocers Henrich human identiWcation imitation immigrants indirect reciprocity individuals interaction interview involving inXuence Iraq kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean one’s oVspring parents partners patterns payoVs person players population predictions preferences prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling rejected relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms SouthWeld speciWc strategies success suYciently Telkaif theoretical tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables Wgure Wnancial Wndings Wrst Wtness