Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary ExplanationCooperation among humans is one of the keys to our great evolutionary success. Natalie and Joseph Henrich examine this phenomena with a unique fusion of theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation, ethnographic descriptions of social behavior, and a range of other experimental results. Their experimental and ethnographic data come from a small, insular group of middle-class Iraqi Christians called Chaldeans, living in metro Detroit, whom the Henrichs use as an example to show how kinship relations, ethnicity, and culturally transmitted traditions provide the key to explaining the evolution of cooperation over multiple generations. |
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Page 11
... success) can outcompete those who do not. A large amount of mathematical modeling eVort has been expended in ... success and prestige biases, and (2) conformity biases. Success and Prestige Biases Once an individual is learning from ...
... success) can outcompete those who do not. A large amount of mathematical modeling eVort has been expended in ... success and prestige biases, and (2) conformity biases. Success and Prestige Biases Once an individual is learning from ...
Page 12
... success.'' Following this logic, we argue in the next chapter that learners should preferentially learn social norms from individuals who share their ethnic markers (e.g., their dialect, language, or dress; see McElreath, Boyd, and ...
... success.'' Following this logic, we argue in the next chapter that learners should preferentially learn social norms from individuals who share their ethnic markers (e.g., their dialect, language, or dress; see McElreath, Boyd, and ...
Page 13
... success of potential cultural models, may take advantage of the existing pattern of deference by using the amounts and kinds of deference that diVerent models receive as cues of underlying skill. Assessing diVerences in deference ...
... success of potential cultural models, may take advantage of the existing pattern of deference by using the amounts and kinds of deference that diVerent models receive as cues of underlying skill. Assessing diVerences in deference ...
Page 14
... success or competence. For example, are people successful in farming because of what they plant, when they plant, how they plant, or how they make sacriWces to the spirits—or all four? Because of this ambiguity, humans may have evolved ...
... success or competence. For example, are people successful in farming because of what they plant, when they plant, how they plant, or how they make sacriWces to the spirits—or all four? Because of this ambiguity, humans may have evolved ...
Page 15
... Success and Prestige Biases in Nonsocial Situations Pingle (1995) conWrms that people (well, university students) will imitate the strategies of successful individuals in nonsocial circumstances, especially when payoVs are on the line ...
... Success and Prestige Biases in Nonsocial Situations Pingle (1995) conWrms that people (well, university students) will imitate the strategies of successful individuals in nonsocial circumstances, especially when payoVs are on the line ...
Contents
3 | |
7 | |
3 Evolutionary Theory and the Social Psychology of Human Cooperation | 35 |
History and the Community Today | 75 |
Kinship Explains Most Cooperative Behavior | 89 |
6 Cooperation through Reciprocity and Reputation | 109 |
7 Social Norms and Prosociality | 133 |
8 Culturally Evolved Social Norms Lead to ContextSpecific Cooperation | 157 |
10 Cooperative Dilemmas in the World Today | 205 |
The Underlying Structure of Cooperation | 215 |
Ethnographic Research Methods and Challenges | 219 |
Constructing the Ethnicity and Cooperation Indices | 225 |
Notes | 229 |
References | 241 |
Index | 255 |
InGroup Preferences and Cooperation | 175 |
Other editions - View all
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Why Humans Cooperate: A Cultural and Evolutionary Explanation Joseph Henrich,Natalie Henrich Limited preview - 2007 |
Common terms and phrases
altruistic Arabs aVect beliefs beneWts biases Chaldean community Chaldean language chapter coethnics conformist transmission context conWrm cooperative dilemma costly costs cues cultural evolution cultural group selection cultural learning culturally transmitted defect Detroit Dictator Game diVerent diYcult domains donations Dual Inheritance Theory economic environment ethnic group ethnic identity ethnic psychology ethnographic eVect evolved example experimental experiments explain favor genes give gossip grocers Henrich human identiWcation imitation immigrants indirect reciprocity individuals interaction interview involving inXuence Iraq kin psychology kinship Machiguenga markers metro Detroit models Natalie natural selection non-Chaldean one’s oVspring parents partners patterns payoVs person players population predictions preferences prosocial Public Goods Games punish norm violators reciprocity-based recycling rejected relatedness relationship relatives reputational information responder round share situations social groups social norms SouthWeld speciWc strategies success suYciently Telkaif theoretical tion Ultimatum Game vaccination variables Wgure Wnancial Wndings Wrst Wtness