upon no slight investigation: if this, or any thing like this meaning, belongs to the word scepticism, we cannot hesitate to say, that those who object to the metaphysical studies on such grounds, pass upon them, in the form of a censure, a very high eulogium. There is hardly any habit more pernicious, not merely in scientific researches, but daily and hourly in every department of life, than that loose indolent way which men have of jumping upon their conclusions in all sorts of subjects, and accepting, almost without examination, sentiments and maxims of the most extensive practical import. If, on the other hand, by scepticism is intended a disposition of mind unfavourable to the cordial reception of the truths of religion, upon what evidence is it asserted, that metaphysical studies have the tendency imputed to them? Was Locke a sceptic? Was Clark a sceptic? Was Berkley a sceptic? All these great men not only openly professed their belief in Christianity, but thought they could not better employ their best years and maturest faculties than by consecrating them to the defence of those truths, which thoughtless, licentious men are apt to deride, but which it is the peculiar character of a truly elevated understanding to feel and venerate. Bishop Berkley, in particular, was led to the adoption of his peculiar theory in metaphysics, principally from an anxiety to refute the sceptics of his day, whose reasonings were all founded on the received opinions respecting a material world; and, in the work which he entitled "The Minute Philosopher," he has discussed at large all the prevailing objections to natural and revealed religion, and employed much of his metaphysical learning, particularly his important discoveries respecting vision, and his very fine and original speculations on the nature of

language, as materials for replying to those objections Mr. Hume, indeed, whom every body knows to have been sceptical enough, has applied that term to characterize the Berkleian theory. But let Berkley speak for himself; and in his own writings, not in the commentaries of his scholars; and it will be found that he dogmatized (we do not mean in the invidious, but in the proper sense of that word) as steadily as Zeno or Epicurus; though perfectly free from the austerity of the one, and the pride of the other. In later days, symptoms of an unfavourable dispo sition towards Christianity, have certainly been visible in the works of some of the most celebrated metaphysical writers in Scotland, and upon the continent; and this probably is the real explanation of the evil report which has gone forth against metaphysics. But we suspect that this is exactly one of those hasty conclusions from first appearances, which we have just condemned. Speculative men have for some time past turned their attention a good deal to the philosophy of mind, and it has happened (from causes which are perfectly explicable), that speculative men, during the same period, have had a sort of vanity in profess ing scepticism upon religious subjects; but it does not therefore follow that metaphysics and infidelity have any natural alliance. It was not always thus. In the ancient world, the infidels were found among the natural philosophers; in the schools of Epicurus, not in those of Plato and Aristotle. In the middle ages, metaphysics were assiduously cultivated by the stoutest doctors of the Church: Aquinas, and Abelard, and Ockham, and all the pillars of orthodoxy, were deep in the philosophy of Aristotle, and fought as fiercely about universals, as if the fate of religion had depended on the controversy; while those, who, neg

lecting such matters, quietly cultivated researches into physics, laboured under a pretty general suspicion of infidelity. Galileo was sent to a dungeon in his old age, not for any speculations upon mind, but for the discoveries he had made respecting the constitution of nature. So late as the days of Sir Thomas Brown, that learned and eloquent writer informs us that the physicians had long been generally supposed to entertain opinions unfavourable to the truth of Christianity; and he published his Religio Medici to rescue himself from the imputation which attached to his profession. And, in our own time, the greatest naturalist in Italy professed Atheism. It may therefore, perhaps, be fairly said, that, in respect of any supposed tendency to scepticism, the evidence of history is full as strong against natural philosophy as against metaphysics; yet who ever dreamed of proscribing the natural sciences? Let us at least be just, and either condemn the researches of Galileo and Newton, or acknowledge that neither the philosophy of mind nor the philosophy of nature have any natural alliance with scepticism, though sceptics may occasionally be found among the students of both.

The end of all knowledge is to enable us better to understand the will of God, and more perfectly to obey it. Unsanctified by these principles, neither wit nor learning can be of any lasting benefit to their possessors, and may but swell the sad account they must one day render. Let us not be misunderstood. If we recommend metaphysical studies, or any other studies not strictly religious, it is not for their own sake that we recommend them. Every thing is trifling which has not some respect to our everlasting destiny; and it matters really very little, if the amusement of the present time is our only object,

whether that is sought at a puppet-show, or in the schools of philosophy. Life resembles a well-constructed drama. There must be variety of incidents; and some little episodes may fairly be admitted. But unity of action is indispensable, and every lesser part must tend upon the whole to swell the interest of the great catastrophe. In the pursuits of learning, if we would be wise to any pur pose, the glory of God must be our great aim; the advancement of practical holiness in our own hearts, and in the world, an object continually present to our thoughts. Directed towards such ends, the value of learning is unquestionable, and is indeed now doubted only by weak and ignorant enthusiasts. Different pursuits may be suited to different understandings and conditions of life: some studies may be in their nature more practically profitable than others: but in the circle of useful sciences, we cannot hesitate to include the philosophy of the human mind: we see many reasons for expecting advan、 tages to result from its cultivation, and none of any real moment for proscribing it.

Mr. Stewart, after dismissing the topics discussed in his preliminary chapters, employs about an hundred and fifty pages in noticing different theories which have prevailed respecting the sources of human knowledge. It is certainly to be lamented that these inquiries should have engaged too exclusively the attention of metaphysical writers; so that, by many persons, the whole science of the philosophy of the mind is imagined to be confined to this, the least satisfactory and least useful part of it. Yet the subject is curious in itself, and is rendered still more so by the efforts which some very powerful and original thinkers have made to clear its obscurity. It would

be a very serious undertaking to follow Mr. Stewart systematically through this "dark, illimitable ocean;" but we may track his voyage, and admire the skill with which he keeps his reckoning, notwithstanding a cloudy sky, shifting winds, and cross currents.

The first Essay, which is divided into four chapters, treats principally of the account which Mr. Locke gave of the origin of human knowledge. This great man was the first who applied the canons of philosophy, which Bacon had recommended, to metaphysical researches; and though his conclusions were far from being always correct, his labours were so considerable as to have purchased for him, both in this country and upon the continent, the character of the father of the intellectual philosophy. The following are his leading opinions respecting the ori gin of our knowledge. He insists that the mind naturally is unfurnished with any of the materials of knowledge; in contradiction to the schoolmen, and to Des Cartes, who' held the doctrine of innate ideas. Through the medium of the senses, (he says,) we acquire all our ideas of external objects; and (agreeing with the schoolmen in their opinion that the external objects themselves are not united to the mind,) he describes the ideas thus received to be copies or images of the objects. The other class of our ideas he conceives to be derived from the "perception of the operations of our mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got." These ideas thus acquired, "the understanding has the power to repeat, compare, and unite; and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas; but it has not the power to invent or frame one new simple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways before mentioned *."

* Locke's Essay, Book ii. Chap. 1, 2.
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