breathes through every page. To our shame be it spoken, that, although from the circumstances under which it

"You ask me first for Castalio's sentiments. If, as I conjecture, the work entituled De Hæreticis an sint persequendi, &c., which purports to be compiled by Martin Bellius, and to which Beza's celebrated treatise, De Hæreticis à Civili Magistratu puniendis, &c., was an answer, was drawn up by Castalio, it seems to have been his opinion that Turks and Unbelievers ought not to be molested by the civil magistrate on account of their principles, though he appears to think differently with respect to Atheists: 'Si quis (as he writes in the work referred to) Deum negat, is impius et atheus est et omnium judicio meritò abominandus.' Having noticed the agreement of the Turks and Christians in their belief of One God, and afterwards the diversity of their opinions respecting Christ, he proceeds, Quid igitur in tantis dissidiis superest? Ut fiat quod docet PaulusQUI NON COMEDIT, COMEDENT NE CONTEMNAT, NAM UTERQUE SUO DOMINO STAT AUT CADIT. Ne damnent Judæi aut Turca Christianos, rursumque ne contemnant Christiani et Turcas aut Judæossed potius doceant et pietate alliciant. Itemque inter Christianos ne damnemus alii alios, sed si doctiores sumus, simus etiam meliores et misericordiores.'

"There is some reason to suspect that the Unitarian writers of this period wished to evade the question respecting the toleration of Unbelievers, lest by opposing it they should weaken their defence of religious liberty, or by advocating it increase the odium which their religious tenets had drawn upon them. Lælius Socinus, if (as I suppose) he was the author of the work entitled Contra Libellum Calvini; in quo ostendere conatur Hæreticos jure gladii coercendos esse, 1554, seems liable to this suspicion. Thus in one place he writes, Si quis evangelium, quod ante professus fuisset, plane negaret, et de Christo aut de Deo malediceret, ac petulanter blasphemaret, pro eo loqui equidem minime vellem.' And again, Qui negant Sacras Literas, ii non hæretici, sed infideles et impii habendi sunt, de quibus nos hic non agimus. In another part of the work, however, where he professes to discuss the question, • Quid fit hæreticus et quonam modo tractandus,' he speaks out more explicitly: Quoniam Calvinus de hæreticis disputans omnia confundit et modo blasphemos, modo alienorum Deorum cultores, modo falsos prophetas insectando, Hæreticos horum nominum invidia gravarit. Ostendum eos

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was written, it is peculiarly connected with England, it has never been translated (at least in a complete state) into

qui hæretici habentur non esse tales. Impios illos et Sacrarum Literarum contemptores ac blasphemos Hæreticorum nomine non comprehendo. Sed ut impios tractandos judico. Si Deum negant, si blasphemant, si palam de sancta Christianorum doctrina maledicunt, sanctam piorum vitam detestantur, eos ego relinquo magistratibus puniendos, non propter religionem quam nullam habent, sed propter irreligionem. Quod si quis magistratus eos in vinculis teneret si forte se corrigerent (quoniam immensa est Dei misericordia) is mihi magistratus non alienus esse videtur à Christiana clementia. The object of Crellius's book, Vindicia pro Religionis Libertate, was to obtain for the Unitarians of Poland a toleration of the public profession of their religion. He argues principally on the ground that no injury could arise from their opinions to the civil interests of the community. He notices the Turks and Mahometans, but only to shew that, as the Catholic government tolerated both these bodies without suffering any civil injury, they might, with at least equal safety, tolerate Unitarians. He states, that in the case of neither would the government be charged with countenancing or approving their peculiar and distinguishing tenets.

"Schlichtingius, in his work, Apologia pro Veritate accusata, 1663, had nearly the same object as to the Unitarians of Holland, as Crellius had respecting those of Poland. He mentions Turks and Jews only for the purpose of refuting a charge which had been alleged against the system of the Unitarians, as resembling Judaism and Mahometanism. He seems to have entertained the most liberal views of religious liberty. Quid enim (he writes) aliud est conscientiæ uni vero Deo ad

stricto, libertas quam in religione sentire quæ velis, et qua sentias libere pronunciure.'

"The principle which you referred to, of distinguishing between the modest worship' of heretics, or the privately holding of heretical opinions, and the public profession and promulgation of their sentiments, is frequently noticed incidentally by the early Unitarian writers in their controversies with the orthodox of their day. But I am unable at this moment to give you any extracts from the writers you specify on the subject. It was acted upon by L. Socinus and Blandrata in the affair of Francis David, whom they would have allowed to remain unmolested if he had abstained from the

our own language. But it had the misfortune of too far anticipating the progress of civilization. Had it been less excellent, it would have been more prized. The highest eulogium will be pronounced upon it, if I say that some of the finest passages of Milton's Areopagitica, may be traced to Acontius. It is melancholy, however, to see how popular prejudices affect the greatest works, even when the author has freed his own opinions from their thraldom. There is a species of literary cowardice, under which the finest minds labour, which attempts to pare down the noblest principles, until they are minute enough to gain admittance into narrow intellects. This, perhaps, was the cause why Acontius lost the honour of first announcing to the world the great maxim, that the civil magistrate ought to claim no authority in matters of opinion.

The cause of those unfortunate men who, under the names of Apostates and Atheists, have endured so much persecution with so little sympathy, he does not venture to plead. He separates their case from that of heretics, and, allowing that they are still under the penalties of the Mosaic law against idolaters, leaves them to the mercy of the secular arm. The abstract right of the civil magistrate to punish heretics he does not deny; but he labours to shew, from the parable of the tares, that it is more in accordance with the precepts of the Christian religion, to leave them to a tribunal where there

public avowal and defence of his sentiments. And Faustus Socinus, in his celebrated letter to Vadovitz, (Toulmin's Life, p. 105,) maintains, that an Heresiarch who does not labour under a fault of the will, but of the understanding, should meet with pity;' but he adds, ' and the only thing to be regarded, is to hinder his endeavours to propagate his doctrines, and, if it cannot be otherwise done, by chains and a prison."

Multa sunt alia que facere et possit et debeat: ut punire irreverentes in Deum voces; animadvertere in eos qui deserere universam Christianam religionem, quique authores esse cuiquam, ut eam desereret, ausi fuerint. Si qui instituti fuerint externi cultus, aut erecta simulachra, ea tollere: avertere à piorum cervicibus impiorum vim atque injurias: publicam tueri tranquillitatem, et si quid aliud est ejusmodi.-Lib. iii.

can be no danger of false judgment. He then proceeds to shew, by many arguments, most of which those who have borrowed from him, have made familiar to us, the folly of expecting a sincere change of opinions from the dread of punishment. He even venures to hint at the use of error in stimulating the clergy to watchfulness, an idea which Milton has so beautifully amplified.

I will make one extract to shew his manner of reasoning; it is from the homely translation of John Goodwin:

"One thing there is which, verily, I could never understand but to be altogether void of reason. That he who is thought to have taught something false and impious should be forced to recant, which if he do, Ire shall not be punished. To what purpose, I pray you, serves this practice? What good is there gotten, if for the avoiding of punishment, against his conscience an heretic shall recant his opinion? There is only one thing that may be alleged for it; viz. that such as are possessed with the same error, and unknown perhaps, will do the like in their own hearts, yea will counsel others to do the same. That opinion must needs have a very light impression which can so easily be plucked out of men's mindes. Have we no reason to suspect that such a recantation is rather for fear of punishment than from the heart? Will there not rather much heart-burning by this means arise, if the magistrates shall seem not only to kill the body, but to plot the ruine of the soul? Are we, indeed, so ill furnished with weapons to vanquish error, as to be forced to defend ourselves with a lye, to put our trust in recantations made through fear? But some may say, this is not what we desire, to force men to any kind of recantation, but that an heretic may acknowledge his error not so much with his mouth as with his heart. This were excellent, indeed, if these could bring him to it. But what work is there for threats or blandishments in this case? These have some power, indeed, to prevail with the will, but thy business is with the understanding: it is changed neither by threats nor flatteries nor allurements. These cannot cause that what formerly seemed true should now seem false, though the party may very much desire to change his judgment, which

that have the truth, and those that would have the truth, be afraid of error? Seeing truth discovereth dark and dangerous wayes of error, though abroad, in open books, even as light discovereth dark and dangerous places, though abroad, in open high wayes, and as the more dark and dangerous the wayes be, the more necessary and needful will light be found of all that travel; so the more dark and dangerous errors be, the more needful and profitable will truth be found of all that would travel to heaven. But some may object and say, let all this be granted, yet it is no wisdom, we think, to bring dangerous errors into the light, that so many men may stumble at them, which not being brought to light would not so much as be known to

some.

"I answer, no more than a rock that lyeth hid under water, which (for want of bringing into light) many men may make shipwreck thereon, and so stumble and fall neverthelesse, though it be not so much as known to them before. Therefore, as a rock in the seas, (though not so much as known to some,) yet (for want of being known) many men do stumble and fall thereon, and so perish, both men and goods; so an error, though not so much as knowne to some, yet for want of being made known, many men stumble and fall thereon, and so perish bodies and souls, which is the more lamentable. And as rocks in the seas, the more they manifest themselves the more furtherance in the way of heaven. And you shall understand, that errors being brought to the light of the word of God, will vanish as darkness before the light of a torch; even as the chaffe before the winde cannot stand, so error before truth cannot abide: therefore it is no hindrance but a great furtherance to have all erroneous rocks in the haven to heaven made known and published."-Pp. 22, 23.

Busher has no hesitation in recommending that even the Mahommedans should be allowed the free exercise of their religion, and the right of defending it when attacked in controversy. The only prohibition he would make is against railing; but then he would punish the Christian railer against Infidels, as the Infidel railer against Christians.

Experience has proved that even this

restriction is better and more safely to the interests of society, enforced by public opinion, than by the civil magistrate. With this single exception no discovery in the great branch of political science under consideration has been made since his time. Busher's work fell into neglect, and though it was republished during the civil wars, yet its principles had made so little progress, that even Milton objects to the toleration of Catholics on the ground of their being idolaters! Locke, too, falls into an error as fatal, though not so absurd. He talks of the opinions held by Catholics being dangerous to the security of the State. It is painful to write the names of Milton and Locke for any purpose but to hold them up to admiration and reverence; if, however, it be true that some imperfections are necessary to that close alliance with humanity, which is requisite for strongly exciting the feelings of affection, we may not love the memory of these great men the less from knowing that they were not exempt from the frailties of their species. They lived in an age when the Church of Rome was a bitter and powerful enemy of liberty, and when Catholic ascendancy in this country would have been a severe evil, not only as regarded its immediate effect on our own interests, but as respected the ultimate interests of the whole world.

The light of freedom is now so widely spread, that no cloud, however broad and dense, can entirely shut it out; but in their time the existence of liberty depended on the fate of England. We may, therefore, explain, though we cannot justify the narrow limits of their views.

It is, I know, a favourite opinion even now with men whose general principles will deserve the praise of liberality, that although it may be safe in the present day to grant Catholic emancipation, there was a time when, for the reasons to which I have alluded, it was just and wise to withhold it.

If the doctrine that political exclusion ought to be attached to the profession of obnoxious or even dangerous opinions is ever true, it must be under the following circumstances: where the minority, having the most enlightened and benevolent views, exercise power more favourably for the cominunity than the majority would do if

the reins of government were entrusted into their hands. For if the enlightened party themselves form the majority, it is evident that, without fear of injury to the State, they may admit their opponents to seats in the Legislative bodies. But in the former case I allow, that self-defence being the first law of nature, no man or number of men ought to be expected to resign power into hands which will repay their liberality by oppression. The necessity, however, must be cogent, for the principle is most dangerous. The excluding party must act upon the most conclusive evidence, both of their enemies being too numerous for them to cope with, and too malicious or ignorant to be trusted.

But what proof have we that such a necessity ever existed in England? I can see none. Let us suppose for a moment the numerical forces of the Catholics and Protestants to be at all equal, and we must see that the oppressive laws under which they lived, inust have excited constant insurrections. The history of the two last centuries proves, beyond all doubt, that their strength has never been dangerous. If it had, we should have seen it displayed in the contest between Charles and his Parliament, when the Protestants being divided among themselves, the numbers of the Catholics would have been so effective. At the Revolution, even with the defection of the High Church party in their favour, they effected nothing, and as little was done in the two rebellions which arose after the accession of the House of Hanover.

their sending a poor shopkeeper to prison, and that whether they think so or not, the law having decided the question for them, they will violate their oaths if they find a verdict contrary to its decisions, they have not always sufficient knowledge and strength of mind to resist the appeal. But this weakness does not imply any love of persecution, nor do I impute any great anxiety on the score of religion to the prosecutors, as I see a cause in operation quite sufficient to account for all their ardour.

The truth is, that the public mind is much less engaged on polemical questions than formerly. Theological disquisition is not the fashionable mental employment. Politics furnish the great stimulus, and religious persecution is only practised as far as it may promote the ends of party.

As in the reign of Henry the VIII. an additional odium was cast on heresy, by making it treason against the civil magistrate; so in our times we have seen a ruling party attempt to punish attacks against themselves by the cry of blasphemy. These facts mark the different spirit of the two ages: in the former, the real motive was religious bigotry; in the latter, political hatred.

Such appears to me to be the present state of sentiment with respect to freedom of opinion. That we have made large advances during the two last centuries cannot be denied, yet I think we must attribute some share of the change to the declining importance attached to the speculative part of religion. It may be a fair matter of inquiry, how far the discovery of religious truth may be impeded or promoted by this disposition of the public mind. Perhaps it may be found, that when an inquirer believed his eternal happiness to depend on his success, the intensity of his interest would not be favourable to calm and impartial examination. It is, however, a question into which I shall not enter—Ï merely notice the

aut alteram in partem judicio inclinat Certè quidem quâque de re quisque aut ambigit. Qui ambigit autem si persuasus sit in errore certum salutis positum discrimen esse cum non sit, animo consternabitur. Quæ consternatio tantum abest ut judicio quicquam conferat ad