The true test for ascertaining the liberality of any age or country is, to observe the degree of temper and moderation exhibited on those topics by which it is powerfully excited. I am afraid that if we are thus tried, it will be found that we have much to learn. I know that in considering political questions we must recollect that they are not merely speculative. If I believe that I am oppressed by my adversary, the anger which is raised in my mind results from my view of his actions. It is true, that we do not sufficiently analyse our feelings; we often carry the indignation which is justly felt towards one man whose actions are bad, to another, whose only fault is agreeing with the first in political opinions.

And this leads me to my last point. Assuming, as I have done throughout, that opinion ought to be fettered by no legislative enactments, it still remains a question, how far we may in private life discountenance doctrines which appear to us pregnant with mischief, by shunning those who profess them.

It must be admitted, that the rights of individuals and of society rest upon very different grounds. If I shun a man, he may find others to associate with him, whose tastes better agree with his, or who are less fastidious in the choice of their companions; but if society shun him by law, it must be either by banishing him, or by throwing him into prison.

The opinions which he holds are either beneficial to society or they are injurious, or they are neither the one nor the other. If they are neutral, we may put them out of the account. Whether they are beneficial or injurious must be matter of experiment, and the proof will be found in the actions which spring from them. Now society can afford to try the experiment. It can patiently watch their operation, and if they shall prove by their results to be injurious, it can punish the actions which arise from them, and guard against their spreading, by demonstrating the falsity of the

rectè judicandum: ut etiam obsit maximè; labefactat enim judicium caliginemque offundit omnis animi perturbatio.-Aconnus. Lib. iii.

principles on which they are founded. On the other hand, if they prove beneficial, society is rewarded for its forbearance by the fruit which they yield.

But an individual has not capital (so to speak) sufficient to enable him to act thus. If he imbibe false principles, and act upon them, he may be irretrievably ruined. If a man should be induced by a train of sophistry to entertain doctrines which should lead him to cheat his neighbour of a thousand pounds, the latter sustains a great injury, and the former is ruined. It is of little consequence to the present supposition, whether or not the delinquent escapes a legal punishment; he is lost to the enjoyment of real happiness he is reduced to a state, from the contemplation of which we shrink, and that is all which the argument requires.

Society, however, is comparatively little injured-perhaps benefited. The fate of the deluded wretch has, perhaps, operated as a warning to others. At any rate, it has furnished proof to those who opposed the false doctrine, by which they may the more powerfully resist it.

From these considerations I deduce, that when I find a man holding opinions which appear to me to have a direct tendency to bad actions, I have a right to shun him, both because I may be injured by his acts and seduced by his doctrines to injure others.

But this reasoning evidently applies only to such opinions as have a clear influence on actions, and in all cases it may be set aside by testimony of a safer kind. Thus if I find, after a complete inquiry, that a person professing doctrines which appear to me dangerous, has, nevertheless, passed a life of unimpeached virtue, I ought to conclude that my estimate of the tendency of his opinions is mistaken : or if I cannot trace any pretty close connexion between his theory and moral conduct, I ought not to suffer mere discrepancy of opinion to destroy my intercourse with a person whom I have no other reason for avoiding. It is hardly necessary to say, that no one who confines himself to the society of those whose thoughts are only a reflex of his own, can rationally hope for improvement: but it is worthy of remark, that as the opinions of the com

them.

SIR,

M. D. H.

S Christianity is a system of doc

attempt to explain their nature and enforce their credibility deserves to be treated with candour. Allow me, therefore, to offer few hints to the consideration of your numerous readers, which are a summary of those reflections which have produced in my mind a belief in the miracles on satisfactory evidence and rational conviction.

The Founder of Christianity said to the Jews, "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me.-If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not." John x. 25, 37.

It has, however, unfortunately happened, from the ideas entertained of the nature of miracles, that formidable objections have been made to the truth of the doctrines founded on them in ancient and modern times. The Jews, believing in magic and the interference of evil spirits, ascribed our Saviour's miracles to Beelzebub. But as the present improved state of knowledge has rooted from the minds of men the belief in magic, the Christian apologist has not now to combat with this childish superstition. Modern objections have taken a different turn, and been principally grounded on the idea that miracles are violations of the lars of nature. Thus Mr. Hume, in his Essays, says, "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and

unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined." Many of the friends of Christianity whose writings I have consulted, acknowledge that miracles are deviations or departures from general laws. Mr. Farmer, in his Dissertation on Miracles, observes, "Every sensible deviation from, or contradiction to, the known laws of nature, must be an evident and incontestable miracle."

Dr. Priestley, in his Evidences of Natural and Revealed Religion, has a short section on the Nature and Use of Miracles, in which he observes, that "though it be wise to establish general laws, yet occasional deviations from them may contribute more to promote the same end than a perfect uniformity." He then proceeds to point out the advantages of these deviations, and important remark:

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Strictly speaking, indeed, it is improper to say the laws of nature are violated in working of miracles, because they are no more than the effect of an adequate power in nature exerted. But this view of miracles by no means affords any objection to the use of them that is here contended for, since whatever demonstrates the interposition of a power superior to human, must be referred to the operation of God, mediately or immediately, nor is it possi ble that any religion should have a stronger sanction than such works as these."*

Supported by such authority, I beg leave to define a miracle to be a work superior to human power, which God enables a messenger whom he has sent to perform in attestation of his divine mission, by the immediate agency of physical or material causes. If it be supposed that no being besides God ever wrought a real miracle, which appears to me to be the truth, the definition which I have given will not be materially affected. It is acknowledged they were wrought mediately or immediately by the power of God. The question to be considered is simply this,-Was this power exerted in violation of the laws of nature?

* Institutes, I. 255.

I shall endeavour to shew that this view of miracles is not unphilosophical, unscriptural, nor dangerous in its consequences, but likely to prove advantageous to the Christian cause.

When Lazarus was raised from the dead, his resurrection, commonly, though not strictly and philosophically speaking, may be considered as a deviation from a general law for there exists not in nature a law more general than the law of fermentation or putrefaction. It takes place in animal, vegetable, and even mineral bodies. It is the great law by which nature continually destroys her own works, and thence proceeds to a new creation. Now this law was prevented from taking effect in the body of Lazarus by a miracle. But it is well known this process may be prevented, stopped or accelerated by the skill of man, at different times and with different views. When suspended animation is restored to persons apparently drowned or suffocated by some such means as are recommended by the Humane Society, this law is prevented from taking effect in their bodies; but the members of

this benevolent institution do not consider themselves as departing from any general law. The difference between the resurrection of Lazarus and the restoration of suspended animation, is only this—the former was the effect of a miracle, that is, a competent power in nature exerted by the will of God; the latter, the consequence of the same cause made active by a skilful and persevering use of means sanctioned by experience and recommended by suc

cess.

selves, that is, in their essences or properties." * But perhaps I may be referred to a passage in the Book of Joshua which appears, at first view, a violation of the laws of nature. It is recorded in Josh. x. 12, 13: " Then spake Joshua to the Lord in the day when the Lord delivered up the Amorites before the children of Israel; and he said in the sight of Israel, Sun! stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon; and the sun stood still, and the moon stayed until the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies."

It is well known that the diurnal motion of the sun and moon is not real, but apparent, arising from the revolution of the earth round its axis. The laws by which the solar system is governed are so well understood, that the eclipses of the sun and moon, and their duration, may be calculated for ages back and for ages to come. To produce the phenomenon of the sun's standing still, the diurnal rotation of the earth must have been stopped, which would have been followed with consequences as destructive as those of the general deluge. But Joshua was unacquainted with the principles of astronomy. He supposed the diurnal motion of the heavenly bodies to be real, and not merely apparent. On this supposition there is a peculiar energy and beauty in his speech:

Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon, and thou moon in the valley of Ajalon." This was the word of Joshua, and the signal of battle. The arinies engage, and confidence, courage and Providence on one side, with consternation and dismay on the other, procured for the Hebrew General a speedy and decisive victory. And when the people had avenged themselves upon their enemies, the sun appeared to be upon Gibeon, and the moon upon the valley of Ajalon. By the figurative expressions, " and hasted not to go down about a whole day, and there was no day like that, before or after it, that the Lord hearkened unto the voice of a man," the writer testifies his admiration of the splendid event which he relates. The victory was

complete before night separated the

Ben Mordecai's Letters, Lett. VII.

combatants. It was the most brilliant on record, and gained in the shortest time. The word which Joshua spake in the sight of Israel was accomplished. Viewing this passage as a sublime, poetical figure, it is one of the most striking in the Old Testament. To 2. those who consider this passage as the 2 relation of a real miracle, I have only to observe, that it was wrought in attestation of the divine mission of no prophet, in confirmation of the truth of no doctrine, and that the miracles of Moses, of Christ and his apostles, are not liable to the objections to which, when taken in a literal sense, it is justly exposed. Let us, for example, consider the miracle of calming the sea, recorded in Luke viii. To say that this was a violation of the laws of nature, would be a departure from the principles of true philosophy; for "there is no man so well skilled in the principles of meteorology as can certainly foretell the state of our atmosphere for the very next day, and yet it reaches but a few miles from us; we are unable to judge whether we shall have fair weather or foul, calm or stormy, or even from what point the wind will blow."* No man has been able to calculate the latitude and longitude of a storm, the minutes and seconds of the duration of a tempest, or to favour the world with a projection of the devastations of a future hurricane. The causes which produce these effects are unsearchable; but a "firm and unalterable experience" has proved that the effects themselves are partial. Thunder, lightning and earthquakes have been rationally accounted for on the principles of electricity; and winds have been considered as the effects of heat and cold, by which the air is rarified or condensed. Those who attend to these subjects will find no difficulty in conceiving that there is in nature an adequate power to produce the calm spoken of by Luke, though they must, at the same time, acknowledge, that to give it activity is beyond the skill of man.

When Jesus walked on the sea it is evident that his body must have been rendered lighter than the water on which he trod. If it be asked, by what means? I answer, without hesitation,

I cannot tell. But the means whereby air-balloons and many bodies have been rendered lighter than the lower regions of the atmosphere, which is of less weight than water, are well known.

The multiplication of the loaves and fishes cannot be satisfactorily accounted for, but by supposing a continued addition of an homogeneous substance, otherwise the one would not have been bread nor the other fish. Or, in other words, the loaves were multiplied by the same cause that produces farina in a grain of wheat; and the water made wine, by the cause which generates. juice in the grape; and that these causes are material none will deny. The nobleman's son was cured of a fever when Jesus was at a distance. (John iv. 46.) The cause of fever is as unknown as that of electricity. But be it what it may, it is a material one, as it affects a material body; and it is difficult to conceive how it can be instantaneously removed by any other means than by the counteraction of another material cause.

Mr. Hume's argument against the credibility of miracles may be stated as follows, without lessening its force: "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; a violation of the laws of nature is contrary to a firm, unalterable experience. Therefore the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

This sophism may be easily detected. The first or major proposition, which contains the conclusion, is false. "A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature." This Mr. Hume has not proved, and I believe no man will be able to prove it, to the end of time.

But I may be asked, of what use are these speculations? If not useful, they are at least harmless. They threaten to undermine no creed reverenced

among Christians, nor to overturn any system but the system of infidelity. The conclave at Rome may adopt them without endangering the Cardinal's hat or the Pope's mitre. Indeed, I know not but they may prove of some use. They may save the Christian apologist and the Christian divine the learned labour and the metaphysical ingenuity of accounting for variations that never happened, departures that never took place, and deviations that never existed. They may remove from the minds of