by abstract metaphysics alone, we may yet, without much effort, perceive the weakness and inconclusiveness of those arguments, by which the doctrine of Necessity is attempted to be sup ported.

Mr. Cogan observes, in your first Number for the year, "The proposition of the Necessitarian is precisely this, that every volition or determination of the mind, is the necessary result of the state of the mind at the time when the determination is formed." This appears to me to be what is called an identical proposition, and as such, it asserts nothing. What can the state of the mind mean, if we abstract from it volitions and determinations? At all events, these are the principal ingredients in the state of every man's mind; and if so, the proposition amounts for the most part to this-that "the state of every man's mind results from the state of his mind." Until it can be shewn that the state of the mind, also, is the result of Necessity, the advocate for this doctrine gains not a single step by "the proposition."

Mr. C. says, "The advocate for Liberty maintains, that there is in the human mind a self-determining power, to which, as their proper cause, all the volitions or determinations of the mind must be referred." I doubt if it be judicious in the assertor of Liberty to contend for such a self-determining power, unless he can define it accurately; because what he may rationally contend for in one restricted sense, will be applied and shewn to be absurd in some other sense. Let the phrase be submitted to a number of learned persons, and it is probable they will all vary in their explanation of it. Mr. C. replies to two or three explanations of his own suggesting, which have given him an opportunity for an ingenious combat with shadows. In consequence of this uncertainty, five or six of the ensuing paragraphs are so obscure or unmeaning, that they baffle all at tempts at replying to them by concise and close reasoning. Metaphysical subtilties, when protracted in this manner, elude the force of the mind, and thus are calculated only to perplex,

and not to convince.

We come to something intelligible where he quotes Dr. Clarke. "The true, proper, immediate, physical, effi

cient cause of action is the power of self-motion in men, which exerts itself freely, in consequence of the last judgment of the understanding." Upon these words Mr. C. remarks:-" If this power always obeys the last judgment of the understanding, the Necessitarian will ask no more. Then he may be silent for ever; for unless he can shew that the last judgment of the understanding is the result of Necessity, the result from the power of self-motion is nothing to the purpose. The question to be decided is not whether the last judgment of the understanding will certainly produce correspondent actions, but whether the judgment itself has been the result of Necessity. A short case may give us some definite ideas upon this subject. A poor man finds a valuable purse, which he is strongly inclined and tempted to apply to his own use. He pictures to himself the comforts it may afford him; but again, the still small voice of conscience reminds him not to forfeit selfesteem and the favour of God. After wavering for some time between these conflicting motives, he at last decides according to the suggestions of his conscience; he inquires for the man who lost the purse, he finds him and restores it. Now, the last judgment of his understanding caused him to restore the purse; but what was it that caused this last judgment of the understanding? Was it philosophical Necessity, was it the definite state of his mind, or some specific volitions? Nonsense! In contempt of all metaphysical jargon I contend that this last judgment of his understanding was the result of free-will, and of a virtuous struggle in his mind.

In the remainder of the letter Mr. C. combats the self-determining power in a manner which might give rise to a volume of argument, and leave the question as much at issue at the end as at the beginning. But he draws an inference from it, which makes it probable that his idea of this expression differs widely from that entertained by the assertor of Liberty. "If a man," says he, "had within him such a capricious principle as a selfdetermining power, the application of punishment would be improper, because it would be useless." We may be certain that the doctrine of free-will cannot be fairly stated, where such an

inference may be drawn from it; but I do not see how the Necessitarian can repel this inference from his own premises. No argument can reconcile any rational man to the justice or propriety of punishing a person who had no choice between good and evil. But Mr. C. thinks it may be justified when it is considered, that punishment will be corrective and will operate for his good. Such a plea is inconsistent with the doctrine which first supposes in this world a fate or necessity uncontrollable by the will of man, and consequently an arbitrary supreme power. If such frightful powers existed at any time, they would exist for ever; and if they should pursue the unfortunate but blameless sinner, if the expression can be allowed, to the next state, and visit him with punishment, this punishment could never be corrective nor produce moral goodness. Unless he should be fated to believe a lie, how could it produce remorse and sorrow for sin, to which the victim had been impelled by necessity, and consequently of which he was innocent? Sorrow, indeed, it would cause for his hapless fate; but, except that it would be unmerited, it would be like that worthless sorrow described by Prior :

O Father, my sorrow will scarce save
my bacon,

For 'twas not that I murder'd, but that
I was taken.

No; future punishment cannot be corrective unless the will be free both here and hereafter.

In a note, Mr. C. says, "A simple question presents itself. Can the mind will this or that without a certain feeling or disposition that prompts the volition?" If the feeling and disposition can be supposed entirely distinct from the volition, which seems doubt ful, then the proper question should be "Is the feeling or disposition that prompts the volition, the result of Necessity?" If Necessity rules any one of these, it rules them all; and farther, if it rules the feelings, dispositions and wills of one man in his senses, it rules them in all men. I will add, if it thus rules all men, it has ruled him who was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin, and who prayed, Father, not my will but thine be done, We cannot stop here, but must extend the rule to all beings who think, but

who are fated to think falsely, that they have a knowledge of good and evil.

The next Number of your Repository contains a reply from Mr. C. to objections brought against the doctrine of Necessity. As first, "It annihilates the distinction between virtue and vice." His answer is, "The objection is not true; a benevolent deed will retain its character, though the doctrine of Necessity be admitted." On his principles, the advocate for Liberty denies that benevolence or vir. tue can exist; and Mr. C. replies by assuming benevolence, at all events, on his view of the question. He might with equal reason overturn the assertion, that brutes are not capable of morality, by saying, that a moral deed by a brute will retain its character, though it be admitted that the brute is not a moral being. We have another presumption in the next sentence, that Mr. C.'s notion of a self-determining power of the will must differ widely from that entertained by the advocate for Liberty. As actions, says he, proceed ing from such a power, "would indicate no disposition of the heart, they would have no moral quality." One would imagine that in this place he is replying to the Necessitarian. But I leave the expression of a self-deterwho introduced it. mining power to be justified by those

Second objection. "The doctrine of Necessity subverts the foundation of praise and blame." Answer. "Then praise and blame can have no foundation at all. The truth is, we view moral beauty with complacency, and moral deformity with disgust; and praise and blame are expressions of these sentiments." The objection implies the denial of moral beauty or deformity on the principles of the Necessitarian; and Mr. C. replies to the objection by assuming them both without proof.

Third objection. "The doctrine of Necessity, if true, renders man an unfit subject for reward and punishment." Answer. "The objection is false, unless it can be shewn, that upon Necessitarian principles, reward and punishment cannot operate to the forma tion of virtuous affections, which, were men really constituted upon the principles of Philosophical Liberty, they certainly could not." Though the ob

jection appears to contain a self-evident truth, still we have no reply to it but unfounded assertions, and we look in vain for any thing like an argument. He adds, "But as the objection chiefly respects future punishment, it may be observed, that if this punishment is considered as corrective, the difficulty vanishes." How can we suppose that future punishment can be corrective on his principles, when any punishment would be manifestly unjust and useless? Punishment would be corrective, or produce moral goodness, as soon in a fish as it would in him who had been governed, and continues to be governed, in all his wills and actions by Necessity, and it would be equally merited in both cases. None but moral beings, who have it in their power to avoid vice, can deserve punishment, and no other beings can be morally corrected and benefited by it.

Fourth objection. "The doctrine of Necessity makes God the author of sin." I apprehend the objection would be more accurately stated thus: "The doctrine, if true, makes God the author of what we erroneously conceive to be sin." Mr. C.'s answer is, "If the moral evil which exists in the creation is conducive to good, no difficulty arises from its introduction." This is indeed a most excellent observation, if viewed without a reference to the philosophy of the author; for on his system, no such thing as moral good or evil can exist.

The two remaining objections, with Mr. C.'s replies, and a farther defence of Necessity, in your next Number, are of less consequence. I fear, Mr. Editor, I have trespassed too much on your valuable space. With your correspondent Dr. Morell, whose letter, in your second Number, [XV. 86,) is able and eloquent, I am alike unfriendly to the discussion of abstruse metaphysical subjects, without novelty or interest, in a popular publication. I trust it will be conceded to me, that I have not overlooked this sentiment, while I have endeavoured to disengage the minds of your readers from a perplexing subject, by shewing, in plain lan guage, that the doctrine of Necessity, as far as it has been advocated by Mr. Cogan, is not founded in argument.

S.

SIR,

Hackney-Road, October 15, 1821. AVING lately visited the Pot

Hteries in Staffordshire, I beg leave, through the medium of the Repository, to state to the Unitarian public, the prospect of the success of the Unitarian cause in that populous and important district, if proper aid be given, and effective means used to promote it. At Newcastle-under-Line, a chapel is now open, and Unitarian worship regularly conducted in it, This chapel was for a number of years lost to us, and brought into a dilapi dated state; but it has been recovered and put in a proper state of repair, by the laudable exertions of a few zealous individuals. In this chapel publie worship has been conducted once on a Sunday, for about twelve months, by the assistance of Mr. Fillingham, the minister at Congleton; but the friends of the cause, judging that much more night be done if they had a minister residing among them, and that it was highly desirable to establish Unitarian worship at Hanley, the central and most populous part of the Potteries, have engaged Mr. Cooper (who was educated at the Academy at Durham House, Hackney-Road, and is lately returned from the West Indies, where he was engaged three years in an attempt to instruct the Negroes) to be their minister, and he is now entering on his office and work; the most important part of which will be to establish and carry on the Unitarian cause at Hanley, and in other places in the Potteries. At Hanley a room is engaged, and Unitarian worship is con ducted in it once on the Sunday. In this room I preached three times to most crowded audiences. It was estimated that, the last evening, three hundred people crowded into the room, and, I was told, several hundreds went away who could not gain admittance. The room, when so crowded, is extremely inconvenient, on account of the heat, and so large a part of the hearers being obliged to stand in the aisle and at the entrance. It is supposed I might have had double the number of hearers had there been a place convenient to receive them.

It is well known to many of the friends of the Unitarian cause, that it is my fixed plan to dissuade newly

raised congregations from building chapels, until they have continued to meet together for a considerable time, and well counted the cost; but, in the present case, it appears to me, that the friends at Hanley ought to be encouraged to build a plain chapel, on the most economical plan, without loss of time. I am of this opinion, for the following reasons:-1. Hanley being in a central situation in so populous a district, where many of the common people seem disposed to attend to the Unitarian doctrine, it is highly desirable a chapel should be erected there without delay, as there seems no reason to doubt of its being well attended. 2. It seems necessary, first, to erect the standard firmly in this central situation, and then to establish occasional

lectures in a number of other places, but this cannot so well be done as by the speedy erection of a chapel. 3. A tried friend of the cause, now advanIcing in years, who resides in Hanley, liberally offers to give an eligible piece of land for a chapel to be built on, which, I believe, will also leave room for ground to bury in. As life is uncertain, should this kind offer be neglected, it might, at a future time, be difficult to procure a spot of ground suitable for the erection of a chapel. 4. It appears to me, that it would be unwise not to avail ourselves, to the utmost, of the attention and disposition to hear, now excited in the town and its vicinity; but how are we fully to avail ourselves of this, unless a convenient place be erected where the people may attend? 5. Mr. Cooper seems to be a minister well adapted to the situation and work; for though not a man of splendid talents, he possesses solid and useful ones; and he will work in the cause, without shrinking from any exertion in his power, which may promote it. I speak with confidence of him, having known him long, and known him well, and being fully persuaded that his character, conduct and labours will do honour to the cause in which he is engaged: therefore, it is to be wished that he may have full opportunity of labouring to advantage. 6. I know of no new district where the erection of an Unitarian chapel, without delay, is more to be desired, or promises more success.

From all these considerations, I

hope the managers of the Fellowship Funds, and the friends of the Unitarian cause at large, will be prepared to give their patronage and liberal aid to the erection of a chapel at Hanley, so soon as the matter is determined on. I have no doubt, if the friends at Hanley proceed in this undertaking, they will do it in the most economical way.

At Lane-end, in another part of the Potteries, a society of Baptists, who meet in an upper room, fitted up as a small chapel, are become Unitarians, and hold occasional meetings in some other places.

R. WRIGHT.

Ultra-Trinitarianism in Gentleman's Magazine and Eclectic Review.

like the man of Uz, that their adHE Unitarians have only to wish, versaries may write books. While they wrap themselves up in mystery, they may rely upon the superstitious reverence of their partisans, knowing that argument is as impotent against them as artillery levelled at the clouds; but when they descend to explanations, they betray the miserable confusion of their system and its utter inconsistency both with reason and scripture. Let them go on to write, and the Unitarians may very contentedly stand by and watch the result.

We are led to these remarks by a late singular exhibition of Trinitarianism in two soi-disant " orthodox" Journals, the Gentleman's Magazine, which represents the High Church Arminian Trinitarians, and the Eclectic Review, which represents the Dissenting Calvinistic Trinitarians. Considering how little sympathy there is between these two parties, it is amusing to observe how closely they resemble each other in the odium theologicum towards Unitarians, and in the honest, extravagance of their doctrine with regard to the Trinity.

Sylvanus Urban, Gent.," is reviewing the Bishop of St. David's recent Vindication of the Three Witnesses' text, and he drops this precious morşel of criticism upon it:

"As to the work before us, we have only to say, that there has been for years, a knowledge that the verse in question has been suppressed in some copies of the New Testament; (for we do not admit it