Web and Internet Economics: 10th International Conference, WINE 2014, Beijing, China, December 14-17, 2014, Proceedings

Front Cover
Tie-Yan Liu, Qi Qi, Yinyu Ye
Springer, Nov 25, 2014 - Computers - 500 pages
This book constitutes the thoroughly refereed conference proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Web and Internet Economics, WINE 2014, held in Beijing, China, in December 2014. The 32 regular and 13 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 107 submissions and cover results on incentives and computation in theoretical computer science, artificial intelligence, and microeconomics.
 

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Contents

Cake Cutting Algorithms for Piecewise Constant and Piecewise Uniform Valuations
1
Network Cournot Competition
15
Bounding the Potential Function in Congestion Games and Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria
30
Limiting Price Discrimination when Selling Products with Positive Network Externalities
44
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games
58
Optimal CostSharing in Weighted Congestion Games
72
Truthful Multiunit Procurements with Budgets
89
The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted Games
106
Coalitional Games on Sparse Social Networks
308
The Value of Temporally Richer Data for Learning of Influence Networks
322
Randomized Revenue Monotone Mechanisms for Online Advertising
324
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences
338
General Truthfulness Characterizations via Convex Analysis
354
Privacy Games
371
Simple and NearOptimal Mechanisms For Market Intermediation
386
GSP with General Independent ClickthroughRates
400

Fast Convex Decomposition for Truthful Social Welfare Approximation
120
A NearOptimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection
133
ValueBased Network Externalities and Optimal Auction Design
147
Matching Dynamics with Constraints
161
Truthful Approximations to Range Voting
175
Resource Competition on Integral Polymatroids
189
PTAS for Minimax Approval Voting
203
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching
218
Learning from Bids
232
Revenue Maximizing EnvyFree FixedPrice Auctions with Budgets
233
A TruthfulinExpectation Mechanism for the Generalized Assignment Problem
247
SubgamePerfect Equilibrium in Repeated Games Played by Computationally Bounded Players
249
Concise Bid Optimization Strategieswith Multiple Budget Constraints
263
Sampling and Representation Complexity of Revenue Maximization
277
Bounds on the Profitability of a Durable Good Monopolist
292
The Fisher Game
294
Position Auctions with Externalities
417
Quality of Service in Network Creation Games
423
The Sequential Price of Anarchy for Atomic Congestion Games
429
Multilevel Network Games
435
Coordination Games on Graphs Extended Abstract
441
On the Existence of LowRank Explanations for Mixed Strategy Behavior
447
Congestion Games with Higher Demand Dimensions
453
TimeDecaying Bandits for Nonstationary Systems
460
Market Equilibrium under Piecewise Leontief Concave Utilities
467
Computing the LeastCore and Nucleolus for Threshold Cardinality Matching Games
474
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria in Social Context Congestion Games
480
Nash Stability in Fractional Hedonic Games
486
The Role of Common and Private Signals in TwoSided Matching with Interviews
492
Author Index
498
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