Liberalism and the Limits of JusticeA liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. This new edition includes a new introduction and a new final chapter in which Professor Sandel responds to the later work of John Rawls. |
From inside the book
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Page 5
... affirm absolutely the primacy of justice leads to unfairness and coercion . Even if the desire for happiness were universally shared , it could not serve as basis for the moral law . Persons would still differ in their con- ceptions of ...
... affirm absolutely the primacy of justice leads to unfairness and coercion . Even if the desire for happiness were universally shared , it could not serve as basis for the moral law . Persons would still differ in their con- ceptions of ...
Page 7
... affirm , resides in the subject . ' It is nothing else than personality , i.e. , the freedom and independence from the mech- anism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws ( pure practical laws given ...
... affirm , resides in the subject . ' It is nothing else than personality , i.e. , the freedom and independence from the mech- anism of nature regarded as a capacity of a being which is subject to special laws ( pure practical laws given ...
Page 11
... short , the ideal of a soci- ety governed by neutral principles is liberalism's false promise . It affirms individualistic values while pretending to a neutrality which can 11 The Sociological Objection THE SOCIOLOGICAL OBJECTION.
... short , the ideal of a soci- ety governed by neutral principles is liberalism's false promise . It affirms individualistic values while pretending to a neutrality which can 11 The Sociological Objection THE SOCIOLOGICAL OBJECTION.
Page 12
Michael J. Sandel. affirms individualistic values while pretending to a neutrality which can never be achieved . But the sociological objection fails in various ways to appreciate the force of the deontological view . First , it ...
Michael J. Sandel. affirms individualistic values while pretending to a neutrality which can never be achieved . But the sociological objection fails in various ways to appreciate the force of the deontological view . First , it ...
Page 13
... affirms the priority of the self over its ends . Where this view departs from Kant is in denying that a prior and independent self can only be a transcendental , or noume- nal subject , lacking altogether an empirical foundation . This ...
... affirms the priority of the self over its ends . Where this view departs from Kant is in denying that a prior and independent self can only be a transcendental , or noume- nal subject , lacking altogether an empirical foundation . This ...
Contents
Justice and the Moral Subject | 15 |
THE ORIGINAL POSITION | 24 |
EMPIRICIST OBJECTIONS | 28 |
DEONTOLOGICAL REJOINDER | 40 |
IN SEARCH OF THE MORAL SUBJECT | 47 |
THE PRIORITY OF PLURALITY | 50 |
THE SUBJECT OF POSSESSION | 54 |
INDIVIDUALISM AND THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY | 60 |
Justice and the Good | 133 |
THE CASE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION | 135 |
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY | 147 |
AGENCY AND THE ROLE OF REFLECTION | 154 |
AGENCY AND THE ROLE OF CHOICE | 161 |
THE STATUS OF THE GOOD | 165 |
THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUSTICE | 168 |
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY | 172 |
Possession Desert and Distributive Justice | 66 |
MERITOCRACY VERSUS THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE | 72 |
DEFENDING COMMON ASSETS | 77 |
THE BASIS OF DESERT | 82 |
Who Owns What? | 95 |
Contract Theory and Justification | 104 |
THE MORALITY OF CONTRACT | 105 |
CONTRACTS VERSUS CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENTS | 109 |
LIBERALISM AND THE PRIORITY OF PROCEDURE | 113 |
WHAT REALLY GOES ON BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE | 122 |
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice | 175 |
CHARACTER SELFKNOWLEDGE AND FRIENDSHIP | 178 |
A Response to Rawls Political Liberalism | 184 |
CONTESTING THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT OVER THE GOOD | 185 |
DEFENDING THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT OVER THE GOOD | 189 |
ASSESSING POLITICAL LIBERALISM | 195 |
219 | |
227 | |
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Common terms and phrases
affirm affirmative action agency agreement aims argue assess attributes basis benevolence bounds ception choice choose circumstances of justice claim common assets communitarian comprehensive moral conception of justice contingencies contract debate defined deontological ethic deontological liberalism depend desert difference principle distinction distributive justice doctrines Dworkin emphasis added empirical ends entitled epistemological equal essential fact of reasonable human Ibid ideal identity independent individualistic institutions interests justice as fairness Kant Kant's Kantian libertarian meritocracy moral and religious moral subject moral worth motivations mutual disinterest natural assets notion Nozick object original position particular parties person political conception political liberalism possible presuppose primacy of justice principles of justice procedural justice public reason question rational Rawls reasonable pluralism reflection reflective equilibrium relevant requires respect Ronald Dworkin seeks self-knowledge situation social subject of possession theory of justice tice tion unity utilitarian values veil of ignorance virtue voluntarist wants and desires