Liberalism and the Limits of JusticeA liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. This new edition includes a new introduction and a new final chapter in which Professor Sandel responds to the later work of John Rawls. |
From inside the book
Results 1-5 of 45
Page x
... define what counts as just or unjust . On this view , the case for recognizing a right depends on showing that such a right is implicit in the shared understandings that inform the tradition or community in question . There can be dis ...
... define what counts as just or unjust . On this view , the case for recognizing a right depends on showing that such a right is implicit in the shared understandings that inform the tradition or community in question . There can be dis ...
Page xi
... define people's rights or investigate ' the nature of the ideal constitution ' , he writes , ' it is nec- essary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of life . As long as that remains obscure , the nature of ...
... define people's rights or investigate ' the nature of the ideal constitution ' , he writes , ' it is nec- essary for us first to determine the nature of the most desirable way of life . As long as that remains obscure , the nature of ...
Page xiii
... definition of its cit- izens is to frustrate them more profoundly than to deprive them of interests less central to the projects that give meaning to their lives . But encumbrance as such is not a sufficient basis for special respect ...
... definition of its cit- izens is to frustrate them more profoundly than to deprive them of interests less central to the projects that give meaning to their lives . But encumbrance as such is not a sufficient basis for special respect ...
Page xv
... defined by the ethnic or religious group to which they belong , an insult to the group can inflict a harm as real ... define rights according to the prevail- ing values of the communities in question , the answer must be no . The liberal ...
... defined by the ethnic or religious group to which they belong , an insult to the group can inflict a harm as real ... define rights according to the prevail- ing values of the communities in question , the answer must be no . The liberal ...
Page 1
... defined in opposition to utilitarian conceptions , the liberal- ism I have in mind might best be described as ' deontological liberalism ' , a formidable name for what I think will appear a familiar doctrine . ' Deontological liberalism ...
... defined in opposition to utilitarian conceptions , the liberal- ism I have in mind might best be described as ' deontological liberalism ' , a formidable name for what I think will appear a familiar doctrine . ' Deontological liberalism ...
Contents
Justice and the Moral Subject | 15 |
THE ORIGINAL POSITION | 24 |
EMPIRICIST OBJECTIONS | 28 |
DEONTOLOGICAL REJOINDER | 40 |
IN SEARCH OF THE MORAL SUBJECT | 47 |
THE PRIORITY OF PLURALITY | 50 |
THE SUBJECT OF POSSESSION | 54 |
INDIVIDUALISM AND THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY | 60 |
Justice and the Good | 133 |
THE CASE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION | 135 |
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY | 147 |
AGENCY AND THE ROLE OF REFLECTION | 154 |
AGENCY AND THE ROLE OF CHOICE | 161 |
THE STATUS OF THE GOOD | 165 |
THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUSTICE | 168 |
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY | 172 |
Possession Desert and Distributive Justice | 66 |
MERITOCRACY VERSUS THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE | 72 |
DEFENDING COMMON ASSETS | 77 |
THE BASIS OF DESERT | 82 |
Who Owns What? | 95 |
Contract Theory and Justification | 104 |
THE MORALITY OF CONTRACT | 105 |
CONTRACTS VERSUS CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENTS | 109 |
LIBERALISM AND THE PRIORITY OF PROCEDURE | 113 |
WHAT REALLY GOES ON BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE | 122 |
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice | 175 |
CHARACTER SELFKNOWLEDGE AND FRIENDSHIP | 178 |
A Response to Rawls Political Liberalism | 184 |
CONTESTING THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT OVER THE GOOD | 185 |
DEFENDING THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT OVER THE GOOD | 189 |
ASSESSING POLITICAL LIBERALISM | 195 |
219 | |
227 | |
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Common terms and phrases
affirm affirmative action agency agreement aims argue assess attributes basis benevolence bounds ception choice choose circumstances of justice claim common assets communitarian comprehensive moral conception of justice contingencies contract debate defined deontological ethic deontological liberalism depend desert difference principle distinction distributive justice doctrines Dworkin emphasis added empirical ends entitled epistemological equal essential fact of reasonable human Ibid ideal identity independent individualistic institutions interests justice as fairness Kant Kant's Kantian libertarian meritocracy moral and religious moral subject moral worth motivations mutual disinterest natural assets notion Nozick object original position particular parties person political conception political liberalism possible presuppose primacy of justice principles of justice procedural justice public reason question rational Rawls reasonable pluralism reflection reflective equilibrium relevant requires respect Ronald Dworkin seeks self-knowledge situation social subject of possession theory of justice tice tion unity utilitarian values veil of ignorance virtue voluntarist wants and desires