Liberalism and the Limits of JusticeA liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. This new edition includes a new introduction and a new final chapter in which Professor Sandel responds to the later work of John Rawls. |
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Page 4
... empirical foundation , utilitarian or otherwise , can secure absolutely the primacy of justice and the sanctity of individual rights . A principle that must presuppose certain desires and inclinations can be no less conditional than the ...
... empirical foundation , utilitarian or otherwise , can secure absolutely the primacy of justice and the sanctity of individual rights . A principle that must presuppose certain desires and inclinations can be no less conditional than the ...
Page 5
... empirical ends . Even a union founded on some common end which all members share will not do . Only a union ' as an end in itself which they all ought to share and which is thus an absolute and primary duty in all external relationships ...
... empirical ends . Even a union founded on some common end which all members share will not do . Only a union ' as an end in itself which they all ought to share and which is thus an absolute and primary duty in all external relationships ...
Page 6
... empirical ends , justice stands privileged with respect to the good , and sets its bounds . But this raises the question what the basis of the right could possi- bly be . If it must be a basis prior to all purposes and ends , uncondi ...
... empirical ends , justice stands privileged with respect to the good , and sets its bounds . But this raises the question what the basis of the right could possi- bly be . If it must be a basis prior to all purposes and ends , uncondi ...
Page 7
... empirical foundations , awaits neither teleology nor psychology . In this way , it powerfully completes the deontological vision . As the right is prior to the good , so the subject is prior to its ends . For Kant , these parallel ...
... empirical foundations , awaits neither teleology nor psychology . In this way , it powerfully completes the deontological vision . As the right is prior to the good , so the subject is prior to its ends . For Kant , these parallel ...
Page 8
... empirically but must none the less presuppose as the condition of knowing anything at all , is the subject itself . The subject is the something ' back there ' , antecedent to any particular experience , that unifies our diverse per ...
... empirically but must none the less presuppose as the condition of knowing anything at all , is the subject itself . The subject is the something ' back there ' , antecedent to any particular experience , that unifies our diverse per ...
Contents
Justice and the Moral Subject | 15 |
THE ORIGINAL POSITION | 24 |
EMPIRICIST OBJECTIONS | 28 |
DEONTOLOGICAL REJOINDER | 40 |
IN SEARCH OF THE MORAL SUBJECT | 47 |
THE PRIORITY OF PLURALITY | 50 |
THE SUBJECT OF POSSESSION | 54 |
INDIVIDUALISM AND THE CLAIMS OF COMMUNITY | 60 |
Justice and the Good | 133 |
THE CASE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION | 135 |
THREE CONCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY | 147 |
AGENCY AND THE ROLE OF REFLECTION | 154 |
AGENCY AND THE ROLE OF CHOICE | 161 |
THE STATUS OF THE GOOD | 165 |
THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY OF JUSTICE | 168 |
JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY | 172 |
Possession Desert and Distributive Justice | 66 |
MERITOCRACY VERSUS THE DIFFERENCE PRINCIPLE | 72 |
DEFENDING COMMON ASSETS | 77 |
THE BASIS OF DESERT | 82 |
Who Owns What? | 95 |
Contract Theory and Justification | 104 |
THE MORALITY OF CONTRACT | 105 |
CONTRACTS VERSUS CONTRACTARIAN ARGUMENTS | 109 |
LIBERALISM AND THE PRIORITY OF PROCEDURE | 113 |
WHAT REALLY GOES ON BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE | 122 |
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice | 175 |
CHARACTER SELFKNOWLEDGE AND FRIENDSHIP | 178 |
A Response to Rawls Political Liberalism | 184 |
CONTESTING THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT OVER THE GOOD | 185 |
DEFENDING THE PRIORITY OF THE RIGHT OVER THE GOOD | 189 |
ASSESSING POLITICAL LIBERALISM | 195 |
| 219 | |
| 227 | |
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Common terms and phrases
affirm affirmative action agency agreement aims argue assess attributes basis benevolence bounds ception choice choose circumstances of justice claim common assets communitarian comprehensive moral conception of justice contingencies contract debate defined deontological ethic deontological liberalism depend desert difference principle distinction distributive justice doctrines Dworkin emphasis added empirical ends entitled epistemological equal essential fact of reasonable human Ibid ideal identity independent individualistic institutions interests justice as fairness Kant Kant's Kantian libertarian meritocracy moral and religious moral subject moral worth motivations mutual disinterest natural assets notion Nozick object original position particular parties person political conception political liberalism possible presuppose primacy of justice principles of justice procedural justice public reason question rational Rawls reasonable pluralism reflection reflective equilibrium relevant requires respect Ronald Dworkin seeks self-knowledge situation social subject of possession theory of justice tice tion unity utilitarian values veil of ignorance virtue voluntarist wants and desires