direction of Imperial economic unity that I venture to think our thoughts should turn.

But so as not to leave this great question altogether in the air, I would fain attempt, briefly and however imperfectly, to illustrate what it implies. The Empire's war debts were incurred for a common purpose, so that, not Britain only, but the whole Empire, might retain its freedom. They are, however, being carried separately. It is quite obvious that Britain is staggering under the load. The root cause is that under post-war conditions this little island is not large enough-is not economically large enough to support its population or to carry that load. The Empire, however, has potentialities which, if realized, would soon make the burden of its war debts, especially if equitably spread, feel light. Now, if the whole of the war debts of the Empire were placed on an Empire basis-that is, if they were unified and the net interest thereon and the sinking funds were met out of a pool to be formed, let us say, by a uniform tax on incomes and a duty on foreign imports; if there were Free Tradeor as near Free Trade as may be-between the countries of the Empire; if there were a uniform basis for the currencies of the Empire, which basis could be a given portion of the war debts in the form of bills backed by a percentage of gold, retaining for the present the embargo on its export; and if there were a system of central banking for the Empire combining transfers at par throughout-then the Empire would have gone a long way towards becoming an economic unit. The war debts would be borne equitably, each part contributing according as it increased in wealth, while the foreigner would also be brought under contribution. Capital, whether for long or short employment, would flow freely to where it was most wanted; Empire-produced goods would receive a preference all round, and could be exchanged without let or hindrance; and, not least important, the rate of interest, freed from outside dictation, could be regulated to suit the Empire's needs. Thus the way would be cleared for such a development of the limitless resources of the Empire as could keep us all busy for as long as any of us need look forward to.

J. F. DARLING

A FIRST-CLASS BLUNDER AND ITS

RESULTS

It will be a nice question for posterity to determine which of the three capital mistakes committed by the "first-class brains" of the Coalition after the Armistice was most disastrous in its results to the Empire. Those three mistakes were the peace which allowed Germany to escape serious reparation payments; the surrender to the "Murder Gang" in Southern Ireland, which destroyed the United Kingdom; and the tearing up of the British Alliance with Japan, to please the United States, and without any sort of equivalent. The first mistake is the chief cause of the present trade crisis in this country. The second has stirred up sedition wherever it was latent throughout the Empire and placed a hostile, anarchic republic on the British lines of communication. The third, following on the quarrel of our Governments with France, has left Great Britain isolated in the world, and opened the way to fresh combinations hostile to British interests which it may be out of our power to meet.

Why was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance destroyed? It was the instrument of peace. Its foundations were laid by the faithful efforts of the three greatest English newspapersThe Times, the Morning Post, and the Daily Mail. For its actual conclusion the British people has to thank the sagacity and courage of King Edward, a sovereign to whom full justice has not yet been done. Nor must we overlook the honourable rôle of Lord Lansdowne, British Foreign Minister at the time, who had considerable Cabinet opposition to overcome. Neither sovereign nor statesman had forgotten that in the days of the Jameson Raid and the early period of the Boer War attempts had been made to organize a great Continental Coalition against the British Empire. The Japanese Alliance was the first of the measures which the King took to meet such manoeuvres and adjust British foreign policy to the needs of the twentieth-century world, the conclusion of the Entente with France being the second.

It may, of course, be said by malicious critics that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance immediately preceded the war between Russia and Japan. The alliance was concluded in January 1902; the war came in February 1904. war was not the wish of England or of Japan. The stuff talked about Japanese "jingoism "is mainly of American

But

provenance. Japan in 1902 realized too clearly the terrible risks of a life-and-death struggle with such a gigantic Power, as Russia then seemed, to court a war, if it could be averted by any reasonable compromise. And the compromise which she offered was reasonable and fair. It was in effect that Russia should recognize Japan's privileged position in Korea, while Japan recognized Russia's privileged position in Manchuria. That compromise was urged upon Russia with the full strength of British and French diplomacy, but it was urged in vain. While Edward VII was exerting all his power to save the Tsar from a calamitous clash with Japan, and was warning him that the strength of Japan both by sea and land was far greater than was currently supposed, William II, that Imperial mischief-maker, was advising him, whatever happened, to secure Korea for Russia.*

The stupendous victories of Japan by land and sea made it seem as if the whole world had suddenly swung back on its orbit and the stars returned in their courses. These victories, moreover, were accomplished with a strict and scrupulous respect for the laws and customs of war; there was none of that brutal savagery which marked the Germans. Correspondents and foreign soldiers who accompanied the Japanese were loudest in praise of their chivalry. They were not, of course, a nation of saints. But there are few examples of great national conflicts carried through with such forbearance and self-restraint. Unfortunately, the very triumph of the Japanese aroused jealousy and suspicion among those who imagined that all the Asiatic races, with their long tradition of civilization and art, are coloured barbarians. Nowhere did it arouse more jealousy than on the Pacific coast of the United States, where Mr. Hearst's newspapers stirred up against the Japanese the latent hostility of a white population to immigrants who were not easily assimilated and were habituated to a lower standard of life. As all will remember, shortly before Japan's war with Russia the United States had conquered the Philippines from Spain and obtained a footing in the Far East. To some Americans it seemed as if this new victorious Asiatic Power was dangerously near the Philippines, and such people failed to realize that the distance of over one thousand miles which separates that group from the main islands of Japan is a pretty considerable obstacle. There arose chauvinists in America who preached incessantly that Japan was the certain future enemy of the United States, and who

* Grant, Kaiser's Letters to the Tsar, 105.

either really lived or professed to live in terror of her machinations and aggressiveness. This feeling was reflected, if to a less extent, in those British Dominions which were situated in the Pacific or had seaboards on that ocean.

The United States Government, at the date when the second British treaty of alliance with Japan was concluded, in 1905, was in the strong hands of Theodore Roosevelt. He was a believer in adequate armaments; he was not a believer in war with Japan or in Japan's supposed sinister purpose. It is certain that he approved of the AngloJapanese Treaty; he had no doubts of the friendliness of the British Empire, and he respected and understood the character of the Japanese. By the alliance terms of 1905 either Great Britain or Japan was bound to intervene if the other Power, when defending its special interests or territorial rights in Eastern Asia (including India), was attacked by any hostile Power. The earlier treaty of alliance had provided only for intervention by the other partner if one of the two contracting Powers was attacked by two or more enemies. The aim of the treaty was to secure peace in the Far East, and facilitate a reconciliation between Russia and Japan, which, as all know, was ultimately achieved. This treaty did not cover war in Europe or in any other part of the world than Asia and Asiatic waters.

As the years went on after the war with Russia and the second British treaty of alliance with Japan, the problem of Japanese immigration into the United States caused increasing difficulty and embarrassment. The fashion in which it was handled in American journals and in Congress did not render it easier of settlement. The right method of dealing with it was to avoid humiliating references to colour or race and to base American policy on the principle of "equality for equal standards of life." The real objection to Japanese immigration on any scale was that its standard of life was lower, and that, as Lafcadio Hearn pointed out more than a generation ago, "the Oriental can underlive the Occidental." As yet the Oriental has not been able to open up a new country for himself. Despite the many great qualities of the Japanese, they have not shown themselves pioneers in emigration, and they have preferred to settle, when they were allowed to do so, in communities with a higher standard of life than their own. They have at their doors the fertile island of Yezo, with a good climate and an area equal to that of Scotland, but to this day it has not 750,000 inhabitants.

Mr. Hearst conducted an incessant campaign of mischief

against Japan and against Great Britain on the pretext that they were associated in hostility to the United States. As that hostility was purely imaginary, the two countries threatened by this agitation modified the terms of the treaty of Alliance by introducing in 1911 a new clause providing that the alliance should not come into force in a war with any Power with which either England or Japan had a treaty of general arbitration. Such a treaty of general arbitration had just been negotiated between England and the United States, but it was fractiously rejected by the American Senate, and fell to the ground. Let it be observed that the nullification of the provision for British neutrality in a war between Japan and the United States was none of England's doing. It was an act of American unfriendliness due to Irish and German influence. Yet opinion in America was not satisfied. Both England and Japan then intimated that the treaty of alliance did not apply, and was not intended to apply, to a war in which the United States was engaged. Even this did not placate the implacable. Mr. Hearst and others like him continued their diatribes against England and Japan. They let it be known that they would be satisfied with nothing short of the complete destruction of the alliance, which by the terms of the treaty of 1911 was to run for ten years. Japan was further assailed for seeking markets and a sphere of influence in Northern China, which was a not unreasonable action on her part in view of the fact that the United States by the Monroe Doctrine had staked off the whole of America, and that, but for Japanese arms, Northern China would have been dominated by Russia. She was also bitterly attacked for asserting her control of Korea, and it was seemingly forgotten that the United States had made herself mistress of Cuba and Panama.

Such was the position when the Great War of 1914 came. Japan's attitude was such as to deserve our British gratitude. She stood not upon the terms of the treaty of alliance which would have entirely justified her in abstaining from operations against Germany. On August 15th she despatched an ultimatum to Berlin, and in the period of strained relations, before the ultimatum expired, she undertook to place her cruisers on the trade routes and protect British shipping as well as her own. She thus enabled the British Admiralty to concentrate upon convoying the Australian and New Zealand troops and conducting operations against Spee. The pressure of the powerful Japanese Navy further played a very great part in driving Spee east to South America, where he was finally destroyed. There