406; King v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 78; Rex v. Shaw, 6 Car. & P. 372. But premeditation will not be implied from the use of a deadly weapon. Clark v. State, 8 Humph. 671.

No appreciable time need intervene between the premeditated intent and the homicidal act. People v. Nichol, 34 Cal. 211; People v. Williams, 24 Cal. 31, 43 Cal. 344; Miller v. State, 54 Ala. 155; Jones v. Com. 75 Pa. 403, 1 Am. Crim. Rep. 262; People v. Cotta, 49 Cal. 169; Halbert v. State, 3 Tex. App. 656; State v. Dunn, 18 Mo. 419; Green v. State, 13 Mo. 382; State v. Hays, 23 Mo. 287; State v. Garrand, 5 Or. 216; State v. Holmes, 54 Mo. 153; People v. Bealoba, 17 Cal. 389; State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, overruling Fouts v. State, 4 G. Greene, 500. See Com. v. Green, 1 Ashm. 289; State v. Millain, 3 Nev. 409; Lewis v. State, 3 Head, 127; and see Binns v. State, 66 Ind. 433; Beauchamp v. State, 6 Blackf. 299; Fahnestock v. State, 23 Ind. 231; Keenan v. Com. 44 Pa. 55, 84 Am. Dec. 414; McKenzie v. State, 26 Ark. 334; State v. Jennings, 18 Mo. 435; Duebbe v. State, 1 Tex. App. 159; Wright v. Smith, 22 Gratt. 880. A momentary deliberation may suffice. Duebbe v. State, supra. The reflection and premeditation may take place even at the moment of committing the act, and, like any other fact, may be proved by circumstances which exclude every reasonable doubt. Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. (Va.) 722; Com. v. Jones, 1 Leigh, 611; People v. Clark, 7 N. Y. 385; Com. v. York, 9 Met. 93, 43 Am. Dec. 373; Shoemaker v. State, 12 Ohio, 43; People v. Freel, 48 Cal. 436; O'Brien v. People, 48 Barb. 274; State v. Dunn, 18 Mo. 419; State v. Holme, 54 Mo. 153; State v. Johnson, 8 Iowa, 525, 74 Am. Dec. 321; Lewis v. State, 3 Head, 127; Donnellan v. Com. 7 Bush, 676; State v. Ah Lee, 8 Or. 214; see Burgess v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 488; Desty, Am. Crim. L. § 129 note K.

$283. Wide Range of the Evidence as to Premeditation.-Premeditation of crime, or the means to do it with, may precede the bare act of it a long time. Hence, evidence of them may seem to take a wide range in both time and space. Buying poison may be shown, or stealing it, no doubt, with burglary and arson, perhaps; it may be a witness of a former crime, or a parti ceps criminis liable to turn state's evidence, who is put out of the way; prior like attempts on the same person or thing, or like crimes on other persons, but standing in similar relations and giving rise to the same motives; sexual crimes or acts indicating a

desire of change in marriage relations-in all these cases, and many more found in the books, a prior crime may be disclosed; but in all of them this disclosure is a mere incident, not an element or the burden of the evidence. And this we understand to be the true rule and spirit of all the authorities. State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 24 Am. Rep. 69.

§ 284. Statement of the Rule as to Criminal Intent.— It is a general proposition previously adverted to, that the rules of evidence in civil cases apply with equal force in the investigation of criminal offenses; but in such investigation many rules are in vogue which are not recognized in civil causes. For instance: "A cardinal doctrine of criminal law is, that it is the intention with which an act is done, that constitutes its criminality. The intent and the act must both concur, to constitute the crime; and, hence, the intent must be proved, like the other material facts in the case. This proof may be either by evidence, direct or indirect, tending to establish the fact, or by an inference of law, from other facts proved. Thus, where an act, in itself indifferent, becomes criminal, if done with a particular intent, there the intent must be proved and found, but, if the act is in itself unlawful, the law implies a criminal intent." Haines, Justices of Peace, 687, citing 3 Greenl. Ev. § 13.

Guilty knowledge, or guilty intent, is, in general, an essential element in crimes at common law; but, whether a criminal intent, or a guilty knowledge, is a necessary ingredient of a statutory offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute, in view of its manifest purpose and design. Com. v. Weiss, 11 L. R. A. 530, 139 Pa. 247.

§ 285. Intent, how Proved.-The state is not expected, and cannot be required, to make proof of felonious intent, as a fact, by direct and positive evidence; for, as a general rule, men who do or commit acts which the law denounces as public offenses do not proclaim in public places the intent with which such acts are done. If the state were required to make direct and positive proof of the felonious intent which characterizes the act done as a public offense, the result would be that many persons, charged and guilty of public crimes, would go acquitted, “unwhipt of justice." Therefore all that the state is required to do, in such cases, is to introduce such evidence on the trial of the cause as

will satisfy the triers of the facts, whether court or jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only that the act was done by the defendant, but that it was done with the felonious intent charged in the indictment. Padgett v. State, 103 Ind. 550.

When it is necessary, in the course of a cause, to inquire into the nature of a particular act, or the intention of the person who did the act, proof of what the person said at the time of doing it is admissible in evidence for the purpose of showing its true character. 1 Phil. Ev. (Gould's ed.) 231. But to render the declaration competent, the act with which it is connected should be pertinent to the issue; for where the act is in its own nature irrelevant, and when the declaration is per se incompetent, the union of the two will not render the declaration admissible. Wright v. Doe, 7 Ad. & El. 313.

A man's intention must be judged by his acts and expressions; and it is manifested by circumstances that vary with almost every case that is presented for consideration. The general rule to determine what he intends by his acts is, that a man intends that consequence which he contemplates, and which he expects to result from his acts, and he therefore must be taken to intend every consequence which is the natural and immediate result of any act which he voluntarily does. 2 Stark. Ev. 573; State v. Davis, 38 N. J. L. 176.

§ 286. Presumption as to.-A sane man must be presumed to contemplate and intend the necessary, natural and probable consequences of his own acts. 3 Greenl. Ev. §§ 13, 14; Rex v. Farrington, Russ. & R. 207; Com. v. Webster, 5 Cush. 305, 52 Am. Dec. 711. But when the intent is the gist of the crime, this presumption, though a very important circumstance in making the proof necessary upon this point to convict, is not conclusive nor alone sufficient, and should be supplemented by other testimony to avoid a reasonable doubt. People v. Sweeney, 55 Mich.

586.

"The law infers an intent to do what a party does do. If I come to one of you and draw a pistol and shoot you, it infers that I intended to kill you, if you die from the wounds." Westbrook, J., in People v. Batting, 49 How. Pr. 392.

Persons of sound mind and discretion must, in general, be understood to intend, in the ordinary transactions of life, that which is the necessary and unavoidable consequences of their acts,

as they are supposed to know what the consequences of their acts will be in such transactions. Experience has shown the rule to be a sound one and one safe to be applied in criminal as well as civil cases. Exceptions to it undoubtedly may arise, as where the consequences likely to flow from the act are not matters of common knowledge, or where the act or the consequence flowing from it is attended by circumstances tending to rebut the ordinary probative force of the act or to exculpate the intent of the agent. First Nat. Bank of Clarion v. Jones, 88 U. S. 21 Wall. 325, 22 L. ed. 542.

It often occurs in human experience that the mere fact that a particular act has been done affords the best evidence of the motive or intention with which it was done. State v. Teeter, 69 Iowa, 717.

This rule is always applied, unless from the circumstances of the case, it affirmatively appears that the will of the actor was subordinated to some controlling and irresistible cause precluding the existence of any voluntary mental action. In Starkie on Evidence it is said, "that a rational agent must be taken to contemplate and intend the natural and immediate consequences of his own act, is a presumption so cogent as to constitute rather a rule of law than of mere evidence." Vol. 2, p. 848. "There is a general presumption in criminal matters that a person intends whatever is the natural and probable consequences of his own action." 1 Phil. Ev. 632. It was said by Judge Andrews that "it is a fundamental rule of evidence of very general application, founded upon observation and experience, that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act." Foster v. People, 50 N. Y. 609.

§ 287. Prosecution may Show Evil Intent.-It is always competent for the government to introduce evidence of any facts tending directly to show an evil intent, or from which such evil intent may be justly and reasonably inferred; but all proof in relation to transactions not intimately and directly connected with the particular accusation against the defendant, or with the evidence, or in necessary explanation of the evidence introduced in support of the charge contained in the indictment, is irrelevant and inadmissible. Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 198. Evidence should have a peculiar and intimate, if not also an inseparable connection with, and tendency to explain and characterize, the act in issue charged against the prisoner.

So, in Com. v. Campbell, 7 Allen, 542, it was held that such evidence is inadmissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are distinct. State v. Lapage, 57 N. H. 245, 24 Am. Rep. 69.

No doubt, where guilty knowledge is an ingredient of the offense, the knowledge must be found; but actual positive knowledge is not usually required. In many cases, to require this would be to nullify the penal laws. The case of knowingly passing counterfeit money is an illustration; very often the guilty party has no actual knowledge of the spurious character of the paper, but he is put upon his guard by circumstances which, with felonious intent, he disregards. Another illustration is the case of receiving stolen goods, knowing them to be stolen; the guilt is made out by circumstances which fall short of bringing home to the defendant actual knowledge. He buys, perhaps, of a notorious thief, under circumstances of secrecy, and at a nominal price, and the jury rightfully hold that these circumstances apprise him that a felony must have been committed. Andrews v. People, 60 Ill. 354; Schriedley v. State, 23 Ohio St. 130; Bonker v. People, 37 Mich. 4.

288. Accused may Testify as to his Intent.-Much of the misconception of uncertainty that pervades the right of a party to testify as to his intent, has been dispelled by a late decision of the New York court of appeals. The question is far removed from any approach to certainty, and in the New York case, three of the judges are recorded as dissenting. Still, the majority opinion written by that eminent jurist who is now the chief judge of that celebrated court must be regarded as tending to settle a controversy that is always perplexing and quite apt to result in gross injustice. The case referred to is that of People v. Baker, 96 N. Y.340. The extract from the opinion will disclose the pertinency of the case to the subject we are endeavoring to illustrate.

"The defendant as a witness in his own behalf was permitted to testify that he did not, at the time he received the $575, intend to defraud Mecker. He was also asked this question, 'Was your intention when you received moneys from time to time from Meeker, to defraud him? That was objected to as incompetent and inadmissible, and the objection was sustained. As the intent with which those moneys were received was one of the material inquiries he should have been permitted to show that he did not