claimants of the goods to produce a certain invoice in court for the inspection of the government attorney, and to be offered in evidence by him, was an unconstitutional exercise of authority; and that the inspection of the invoice by the attorney, and its admission in evidence, were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings. It does not require actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. A compulsory production of a party's books and papers to be used against himself or his property in a criminal or penal proceeding, or for a forfeiture, is within the spirit and meaning of the Amendment. It is equivalent to a compulsory production of papers, to make the non-production of them a confession of the allegations which it is pretended they will prove. A proceeding to forfeit a person's goods for an offense against the laws, though civil in form, and whether in rem or in personam, is a criminal case within the meaning of that part of the 5th Amendment which declares that no person "shall be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. ed. 746. PART V. EVIDENCE IN ITS RELATIONS TO SPECIFIC OFFENSES. INTRODUCTION. In the concluding chapters the endeavor is to place before the practitioner such evidentiary rules as regulate the trial of specific offenses under a criminal indictment. All attempt is disclaimed to even tabulate the list of felonies and misdemeanors, but a studious effort is made to indicate the divergences in probative methods by which peculiar evidence may sustain an indictment for certain offenses or support a traverse of its recitals. The common incidents of "Police Court" evidence tending to sustain a charge of disorderly conduct, thieving, vagrancy, etc., are presumptively within the knowledge of the practitioner after a reading of the foregoing text. But in order to sustain a conviction for the more serious crimes the Penal Law requires a high degree of demonstration as to the guilt of the accused before it will venture to place upon him a stigma which must be borne for life and frequently transmitted to unoffending children. Here it is that technical rules engraft themselves upon the primary requirements of the law and impart an element of doubt and complexity to evidentiary procedure that it is the province of this subdivision to dispel. The attempt is to deal intelligently with such phases of the Law of Evidence as are generally regarded as exceptional-with rules of specialized and unusual application-that are far more perplexing to both bench and bar than any questions within the range of either pleading or practice. 697 CHAPTER LI. FALSE PRETENSES. 8434. The Offense Defined. 435. What must be Proved. 436. Must Relate to an Existing Fact. 438. Something of Value must be Obtained. 439. Similar Frauds may also be Shown. 440. Evidence of Ability to Repay the Amount Obtained Im material. 441. Pretense must be Such as to Mislead Men of Ordinary 442. Distinction between Larceny and False Pretenses. 444. Partial Review of the Authorities. 8 434. The Offense Defined.-False pretenses consist in persuading the owner to part with his property by the utterance of a conscious falsehood by the party making the false pretenses or by the offender's simulation of a character that does not belong to it or by representing himself to be in a condition he knows he does not really occupy. People v. Haynes, 14 Wend. 546, 28 Am. Dec. 530. A false pretense is a false statement about a past or present fact, and not a mere promise, opinion, or statement of something to take place. Opinion as to quantity, quality, value, amount, etc., do not constitute the crime. Browne, Crim. L. 50. § 435. What must be Proved. To constitute the offense charged, four things must concur, and four distinct averments must be shown by the evidence, viz: 1. An intent to defraud; 2. Actual fraud committed; 3. False pretenses for the purpose of perpetrating fraud; and it must further appear, 4. That the fraud was accomplished by means of the false pretenses made use of; and this must be the cause which induced the owner to part with his property. Com. v. Drew, 19 Pick. 184; People v. Wasservogle, 77 Cal. 173. State v. Matthews, 10 L. R. A. 308, 44 Kan. 596; People v. Jordan, 66 Cal. 10; People v. Wakely, 62 Mich. 297; 2 Bishop, Crim. Proc. § 163. Tested by the above rules, which seem to be supported by reason and authority, it must appear that some one has been defrauded to insure a conviction. State v. Clark, 46 Kan. 65. Under indictments for this offense it is competent for the commonwealth to introduce evidence of other false pretenses made at or about the same time with the one charged, as tending to establish the guilty intent-an ingredient in every crime that must always be proved. People v. Wakely, 62 Mich. 298; Strong v. State, 86 Ind. 208, 44 Am. Rep. 292; State v. Jamison, 74 Iowa, 613; Com. v. Stone, 4 Met. 43; People v. Henssler, 48 Mich. 49; Thompson v. Rose, 16 Conn. 71, 41 Am. Dec. 121; State v. Myers, 82 Mo. 558, 52 Am. Rep. 389; State v. Bayne, 88 Mo. 604; Com. v. Blood, 141 Mass. 571; Cowan v. State, 22 Neb. 520; State v. Sarony, 95 Mo. 349; State v. Long, 103 Ind. 481; Mayer v. People, 80 N. Y. 364; Trogdon v. Com. 31 Gratt. 862; Rex v. Roberts, 1 Campb. 399; Weyman v. People, 4 Hun, 511; Rex v. Ellis, 6 Barn. & C. 145; Bielschofsky v. People, 3 Hun, 40; Copperman v. People, 56 N. Y. 591; Rex v. Davis, 6 Car. & P. 177; Com. v. Tuckerman, 10 Gray, 179; Rex v. Wylie, 1 Bos. & P. 94; Hitchcock's Case, 6 City Hall Rec. 43; Reg. v. Dossett, 2 Car. & K. 306; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 189, 48 Am. Dec. 596; Com. v. Choate, 105 Mass. 459; Com. v. Coe, 115 Mass. 481; Rex v. Dunn, 1 Mood. C. C. 146; Com. v. Stone, 4 Met. 43; Rex v. Oddy, 2 Den C. C. 264; Com. v. Price, 10 Gray, 472, 71 Am. Dec. 668; Reg. v. Forster, 1 Dears. C. C. 456; Com. v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386; Bottomley v. United States, 1 Story, 135; People v. Wood, 3 Park. Crim. Rep. 681; State v. Williams, 2 Rich. L. 418; Stout v. People, 4 Park. Crim. Rep. 71; Wood v. United States, 41 U. S. 10 Pet. 360, 10 L. ed. 994; Reg. v. Geering, 18 L. J. M. C. 215; Reg. v. Richardson, 8 Cox, C. C. 448; Reg. v. Francis, 12 Cox, C. C. 612; Reg. v. Cooper, L. R. 1 Q. B. 19. In Com. v. Stone, supra, Shaw, Ch. J., speaking of this kind of evi |