scope of interstate rendition on the one hand and international extradition on the other. The first is amenable to and circumscribed by the recitals of the Federal Constitution. The second is entirely dehors that instrument and is dependent for interpretation upon treaty obligations solely.

Interstate rendition will permit the accused to be tried, in the demanding state for any crime whatever against its laws irrespective of the offense alleged in the moving papers, on the contrary every principle of international law and comity demands in extradition proceedings that the trial shall be had only for the identical offense charged. This distinction is admirably stated by Mr. Justice Jackson in Lascelles v. Georgia (U. S. Sup. Ct.) April 3, 1893-a case that will effectively quell all future controversy on the subject. What follows under this subdivision is an extract from that able opinion:

"The proposition advanced on behalf of the plaintiff in error in support of the Federal right claimed to have been denied him is, that inasmuch as interstate rendition can only be affected when the person demanded as a fugitive from justice is duly charged with some particular offense, or offenses, his surrender upon such demand carries with it the implied condition that he is to be tried alone for the designated crime, and that in respect to all offenses other than those specified in the demand for his surrender, he has the same right of exemption as a fugitive from justice extradited from a foreign nation. This proposition assumes, as is broadly claimed, that the states of the Union are independent governments, having the full prerogatives and powers of nations, except what have been conferred upon the general government, and not only have the right to grant, but do, in fact, afford to all persons within their boundaries an asylum as broad and secure as that which independent nations extend over their citizens and inhabitants. Having reached, upon this assumption or by this process of reasoning, the conclusion that the same rule should be recognized and applied in interstate rendition as in foreign extradition of fugitives from justice, the decision of this court in United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 30 L. ed. 425 et seq., is invoked as a controlling authority on the question under consideration. If the premises on which this argument is based were sound, the conclusion might be correct. But the fallacy of the argument lies in the assumption that the states of the Union

occupy towards each other, in respect to fugitives from justice, the relation of foreign nations, in the same sense in which the general government stands towards independent sovereignties on that subject; and in the further assumption that a fugitive from justice acquires in the state to which he may flee some state or personal right of protection, improperly called a right of asylum, which secures to him exemption from trial and punishment for a crime committed in another state, unless such crime is made the special object or ground of his rendition. This latter position is only a restatement, in another form, of the question presented for our determination. The sole object of the provision of the Con stitution and the Act of Congress to carry it into effect is to secure the surrender of persons accused of crime, who have fled from the justice of a state, whose laws they are charged with violating. Neither the Constitution, nor the Act of Congress providing for the rendition of fugitives upon proper requisition being made, confers, either expressly or by implication, any right or privilege upon such fugitives under and by virtue of which they can assert, in the state to which they are returned, exemption from trial for any criminal act done therein. No purpose or intention is manifested to afford them any immunity or protection from trial and punishment for any offenses committed in the state from which they flee. On the contrary, the provision of both the Constitution and the statutes extends to all crimes and offenses punishable by the laws of the state where the act is done. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U. S. 24 How. 66, 101, 102, 16 L. ed. 717, 727; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250.

"The case of United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 30 L. ed. 425, has no application to the question under consideration, because it proceeds upon the ground of a right given impliedly by the terms of a treaty between the United States and Great Britain, as well as expressly by the acts of Congress in the case of a fugitive surrendered to the United States by a foreign nation."

A fugitive from justice surrendered by one state upon the demand of another, is not protected from prosecution for offenses other than that for which he was rendered up, but may, after being resorted to the demanding state, be lawfully tried and punished for any and all crimes committed within its territorial jurisdiction, either before or after extradiction. Re Noys, 17 Alb. L. J. 407; Ham v. State, 4 Tex. App. 645; State v. Stewart,

60 Wis. 587, 50 Am. Rep. 388; People v. Cross, 135 N. Y. 536; Re Miles, 52 Vt. 609.

It is settled that, except in the case of a fugitive surrendered by a foreign government, there is nothing in the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States which exempts an offender brought before the courts of a state for an offense against its laws, from trial and punishment, even though brought from another state by unlawful violence, or by abuse of legal process. Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 444, 30 L. ed. 421, 424; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 707, 708, 712, 32 L. ed. 283, 285-287; Cook v. Hart, 146 U. S. 183, 190, 192, 36 L. ed. 934, 938, 939.

§ 608. Fugitive may be Surrendered for any Offense.The statute requiring the surrender of a fugitive from justice found in one of the territories, to the state in which he stands charged with treason, felony, or other crime, embraces every offense known to the laws of the demanding state, including misdemeanors. Each state has the right to prescribe the forms of pleading and process to be observed in her courts, in both civil and criminal cases, subject only to those provisions of the national Constitution designed for the protection of life, liberty and property in all the states of the Union; consequently, in a case involving the surrender, under the Act of Congress, of a fugitive from justice; it may not be objected that the indictment is not framed according to the technical rules of criminal pleading, if it conforms substantially to the laws of the demanding state. Upon the executive of the state or territory in which the accused was found rests the responsibility of determining whether he is a fugitive from the justice of the demanding state. But the Act of Congress does not direct or authorize his surrender, unless it is made to appear that he is, in fact, a fugitive from justice. If the determining of that fact, upon proof before the executive of the state where the alleged fugitive is found, is subject to the judicial review upon habeas corpus, the accused, being in custody under his warrant which recites the requisition of the demanding state, accompanied by an authentic indictment, charging him substantially as required by her laws with a specific crime committed within her jurisdiction-should not be discharged because, in the judgment of the court, the proof showing that he was a fugitive from justice may not be as full as might properly have been required. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 29 L. ed. 250.

609. Evidence as Affected by Treaty Stipulations with Foreign States.-"Most of the treaties [with foreign states] prescribe the evidence required to authorize an order of extradition. All hearings under treaty stipulation or convention shall be held on land, publicly, and in a room or office easily accessible to the public. Act Aug. 3, 1882, § 1, 22 Stat. at L. 215. . On

the hearing of any case, upon affidavit being filed by the person charged, that he cannot safely go to trial without certain witnesses, what he expects to prove by each of them, that he is not possessed of sufficient means and is actually unable to pay the fees of such witnesses, the judge or commissioner before whom the hearing is had may order that they be subpoenaed; the costs to be paid as similar fees are paid in the case of witnesses subpoenaed in behalf of the United States. Act Aug. 3, 1882, § 3, 22 Stat. at L. 215. Fees and costs shall be certified to the Secretary of State of the United States, who shall authorize payment of the same out of the appropriation to defray the expenses of the judiciary, and shall cause the amount to be reimbursed by the foreign government by whom the proceeding may have been instituted. Act Aug. 3, 1882, § 4, 22 Stat. at L. 215. Where any

depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof shall be offered in evidence upon the hearing of any case, the same shall be received as evidence for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused shall have escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that any deposition, warrant or other paper or copies thereof, so offered, are authenticated in the manner required by this Act. Act Aug. 3, 1882, § 5, 22 Stat. at L. 215." Anderson, Law Dict. title Extradition, p. 439.

With reference to these extradition proceedings, the substance, and not the form, should be the main object of inquiry, and they should not be conducted in any technical spirit with a view to prevent extradition. Re Herres, 33 Fed. Rep. 165.

Some cases declare the familiar principle of international law, that the right of one government to. demand and receive from another the custody of an offender against its laws, and who has sought an asylum in such foreign country, depends upon treaty

stipulations between such governments. Where no treaty exists, no obligation that can be insisted upon exists to surrender criminals for trial to the government from which they have fled; but as a matter of comity between nations, great offenders are usually surrendered on request from the government claiming the right to try them. A principle running through this latter class of cases has much that commends itself to a sense of justice. It is, that where a person whose extradition has been granted for trial for a particular crime named in the extradition warrant, the demanding government obtains no lawful right to try him for any other offenses, without bad faith to the government that consented to his extradition, and for which it would have just grounds to demand reparation. Such an act would be in violation of both the letter and spirit of the treaty. Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627. In cases of extradition by a foreign government under a treaty, the Supreme Court of the United States holds that a person who has been brought within the jurisdiction of a court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty could only be tried for one of the offenses with which he is charged in the proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and opportunity has been given him, after his release or trial upon such charge, to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly taken under those proceedings. United States v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, 30 L. ed. 425.

A distinction is made in some of the authorities between civil and criminal cases. In criminal cases, some courts hold that even a forcible seizure in another country, and the transfer by violence or fraud to this country, is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when brought within the jurisdiction of a court which has the right to try him for such an offense. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U. S. 436, 30 L. ed. 421; Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 32 L. ed. 283.

In proceedings for the extradition of a fugitive, evidence to contradict all that of the prosecution is not admissible. The accused is only entitled to show that the offense charged is not a crime mentioned in the treaty. Re Debaun (Canada) 11 Crimn. L. Mag. 47.

§ 610. What Evidence will Authorize an Arrest.-The evidence to detain the accused, for the purpose of surrender, must be sufficient to commit the party for trial, if the offense was committed in this country.